

# PP 290: Political Economy of Development

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## 1 Course Information

- **Location:** Public Affairs 4371
- **Schedule:** MW, 4-5:20p ( $\pm$  10 mins.)
- **Office Hours:** By appointment. Sign up at Public Affairs 6341.
- **Course Website:** <https://ccle.ucla.edu/course/view/16F-PUBPLC290-2>
- **Prerequisites:** Formally, none. The readings will challenge students who have not taken statistics through linear models.

## 2 Course Overview

Why are some countries poor and violent?<sup>2</sup> Recent work in economics and political science emphasizes the important (arguably, causal) role of political institutions in determining poverty or conflict. This course considers:

1. How do states and political institutions affect development?
2. What factors shape political institutions?; and
3. Whether interventions can correct or circumvent political impediments to economic growth and peace?

As an example, we'll consider whether and why corruption affects economic growth, what explains varying levels of corruption across countries, and what efforts to limit graft have been (in)effective.

<sup>2</sup> This course draws on studies from several continents. While the U.S. and other OECD countries will occasionally feature in our readings and discussion, they will not be the primary focus of this course.

## 3 Learning Goals

There are several goals for this course. By the end of the quarter, you should be able to:

1. Evaluate definitions of development and political institutions.
2. Explain why political institutions affect prosperity and peace.
3. Explain how factors, such as geography or colonialism, shape political institutions.
4. Assess the effectiveness of foreign aid and other selected interventions in overcoming political impediments to development.

## 4 Assignments

### 4.1 Participation (20%)

I expect that you'll attend every class (barring illness or another legitimate excuse), do the required readings in advance, and contribute to discussion. Posting links to relevant articles, posing questions, and commenting on the class website will also contribute to your participation grade.

**During the classes for which you've elected to write a blog post, I will expect you to help lead the discussion.** Count on being asked to reconstruct the logic and main findings of the papers for that week.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> If you'd like to prepare any slides or handouts for this purpose, please let me know in advance of the class session.

### 4.2 2 "Blog" Posts on Weekly Readings (15%)

[500-800 words each] During the second class session, you will choose two sub-sections from the course schedule (e.g., 2.2 *The Provision of Public Goods and Order*). Your blog post should discuss on one or (ideally) more readings from that sub-section. While it's important to demonstrate that you understand the readings and can convey their main points concisely, you can also elaborate on strengths, limitations, or contradictions in the papers.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> See Macartan Humphrey's reading "checklist" for guidance on how to critically read an academic paper: <http://www.macartan.nyc/teaching/discuss/>.

**Due Date:** Post to the class website by 11:59p the day *before* we meet to discuss those readings. These will be evaluated on a scale of {✓-, ✓, ✓+}.

### 4.3 Take-home Exam (25%)

You will have 2 hours to complete the exam. The exam will include 6 essay questions, but you will only be expected to answer 4. If you distribute your time uniformly, that gives you 30 minutes/question. By design, this is not enough time to (re)read articles, so you will need to review materials in advance.

The exam is intended to test your understanding of the core course material. A good answer will resemble a shorter and more hastily written blog post: you'll synthesize relevant articles and reflect critically on their contributions/shortcomings. You do not need to cite readings formally. You will, however, be expected to reference the readings by their author or (approximate) title.

**Due Date/Logistics:** The mid-term exam is scheduled for October 31. I will distribute the exam over email at 4p, and you must upload a PDF version of your exam to the course website by 6p.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Corrupted files do not constitute a valid submission.

#### 4.4 *Op-Ed (15%)*

[700-1000 words] While I expect your blog posts to be clearly written, this is an opportunity for you to practice writing a more polished piece that relates academic research to a contemporary policy issue of your choosing. For useful tips on how to write an op-ed, check out [The OpEd Project](#) (or just Google “how to write an oped” and refer to one of the many guides).

**Due Date:** Post to the class website by 11:59p on November 20. These will be evaluated on a scale of {✓-, ✓, ✓+}.

#### 4.5 *Grant Proposal (25%)*

[2000-2500 words] Students will work in groups of 3-5 to propose a specific development intervention. This can be an existing program or one of your design. Each group will complete a grant template for their proposed project (modeled on real templates from, for example, the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID)). This proposal will require the group to identify a specific social dilemma (see sub-section 2.1 of Course Schedule), explain how the intervention addresses this dilemma (citing relevant research), consider how the project will affect and be affected by local politics, and propose a strategy for evaluating its impacts.

Here’s a very condensed example: Migrants to Medellín, Colombia do not hold secure titles to their homes. Concerned that they may be evicted, these households under-invest in their property and cannot use their homes as collateral. You propose an intervention to help these households secure their property. You cite research on the importance of property rights and credit access. However, you recognize that local politicians and bureaucrats currently take advantage of migrants’ insecurity and “sell” them protection from eviction in return for electoral support or bribes. Thus, you are concerned that the project may upset powerful political incumbents. You propose a pilot study to monitor the program’s effects on households, as well as the response of these local officials.

**Final Due Date:** PDF uploaded to the course website by 11:59p on December 2.

#### **Checkpoints:**<sup>6</sup>

- Week 3: Formed Group;
- Week 6: Problem and Context;
- Week 8: Intervention and Theory of Change;
- Week 9: Political Risks and Measurement Strategy; and

<sup>6</sup> I respect your ability to manage your time and am not going to hold you accountable to these intermediate deadlines. These are simply suggestions to minimize end-of-quarter stress.

- Week 10: Final Proposal

## 5 Course Policies

### 5.1 Late Submissions

Late submissions of blog posts, the op-ed, or the group project will be penalized at a rate of one letter grade for every 24 hours. An exam that arrives 1-60 minutes late will be docked a letter grade; 61-120 minutes late, two letter grades; and so on.

### 5.2 Make-up Exams

If you have a medical excuse, we will arrange an alternative time for you to take the mid-term exam with no penalty. Otherwise, make-up exams will only be permitted on a case-by-case basis and docked a full letter grade.

### 5.3 Re-grades

You may submit for a re-grade on individual assignments (not the group project). I reserve the right to raise or lower your original score after reviewing the assignment.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> Chris Blattman offers a helpful perspective on grades for MPP students: “[U]nless you are applying for a PhD, no one will ever ask you about your grades again. Ever. This is all about how much you want to get out of the course and the material.”

### 5.4 Academic Integrity

Please review [UCLA’s rules related to academic integrity](#).<sup>8</sup> If you’re feeling overwhelmed or are unsure about the collaboration policy, please speak with me; don’t risk violating the honor code. Unfortunately, past MPP students have been investigated and punished by the Office of the Dean of Students.

<sup>8</sup> <http://goo.gl/DCIwSN>

Collaboration Policy: There is no collaboration on the blog posts, op-ed, or midterm exam. You are welcome to discuss ideas with classmates (and posting these conversations to the course website will help your grade), but originality will be rewarded; very similar answers, penalized.

## 6 Resources

The [New Students’ Orientation Handbook](#) lists a large number of resources for graduate students. I’ve listed a few resources below for quick reference.

### 6.1 *Mental Health*

UCLA Counseling and Psychological Services offers services and programs in a confidential environment to promote mental health and wellness.

### 6.2 *Writing*

The UCLA Graduate Writing Center offers **free** appointments with writing consultants. Feedback is essential to improving as a writer, and your friends will eventually tire of your proofreading requests.

### 6.3 *Academic Accommodation*

Students needing academic accommodations based on a disability should contact the Office for Students with Disabilities (OSD) at (310) 825-1501 or in person at Murphy Hall A255. When possible, students should contact the OSD within the first two weeks of the term as reasonable notice is needed to coordinate accommodations. For more information visit [www.osd.ucla.edu](http://www.osd.ucla.edu).

## 7 Course Schedule

**Legend:** ✱: Required; † Skim; ● Optional.

**Caveat:** This schedule is approximate, and we may drop or reorder sections as the quarter proceeds. I'd like the course to reflect your interests, so if you are looking forward to a particular topic, please email me.

### 1 How do we define development and political institutions? (2 Classes)

#### 1.1 Defining & Tracking Development (9/26)

- ✱ Amartya Sen. The Concept of Development. In H Cherney and T N Srinivasan, editors, *Handbook of Development Economics*, pages 9–26. ivut.iut.ac.ir, 1988 [[Link](#)]
- ✱ Daron Acemoglu. Economic Growth and Economic Development: The Questions. In Daron Acemoglu, editor, *Introduction to Modern Economic Growth*. press.princeton.edu, 2008 [[Link](#)]

† Abhijit V Banerjee and Esther Duflo. The Economic Lives of the Poor. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 21(1):141–168, March 2007 [[Link](#)]

- Lant Pritchett. Divergence, Big Time. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 11(3):3–17, August 1997 [[Link](#)]
- Morten Jerven. Poor numbers and what to do about them. *The Lancet*, 383(9917):594–595, February 2014 [[Link](#)]

#### 1.2 Defining & Tracking Institutions (9/28)

- Avner Greif and Christopher Kingston. Institutions: Rules or Equilibria? In N Schofield and G Caballero, editors, *Political Economy of Institutions*. Springer-Verlag, 2011 [[Link](#)]
- ✱ Robert Bates, I Sened, and Sebastian Galiani. The New Institutionalism. The Work of Douglas North. In *Institutions, Economic Growth, and Property Rights: The Legacy of Douglass North*. 2014 [[Link](#)]
- ✱ Henry Farrell. Why the hidden internet can't be a libertarian paradise. *Aeon*, February 2015 [[Link](#)]

- Douglass C North. Institutions. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 5(1):97–112, March 1991 [[Link](#)]
- David Skarbek. Governance and Prison Gangs. *American Political Science Review*, 105(04):702–716, October 2011 [[Link](#)]
- Theda Skocpol. Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research. In *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge University Press, 1985 [[Link](#)]

Choose sub-sections for blog posts.

### 1.3 *Optional Methods Review (9/28)*

Note: This optional ~45-minute session will occur after our second class section from ~6-6:45p.

- Macartan Humphreys. 10 Strategies for Figuring out if X Caused Y. URL <http://egap.org/methods-guides/10-strategies-figuring-out-if-x-caused-y>
- Abby Long. 10 Things to Know About Reading a Regression Table. URL <http://egap.org/methods-guides/10-things-know-about-reading-regression-table>
- A thorough outline for reading papers from Humphreys: <http://www.macartan.nyc/teaching/discuss/>. (Scroll down to “The Checklist”.)

## 2 *How do states foster order and development? (2 Classes)*

### 2.1 *Common Social Dilemmas (10/3)*

- ★ Ethan Bueno de Mesquita. *Political Economy for Public Policy*. Princeton University Press, 2016 [Link]
  - Collective Action: Sections 4-4.1 (pp. 104-110)
  - Coordination Problems: Sections 5-5.2.1 (pp. 159-72)
  - Commitment Problems: 6-6.2.1 (pp. 185-196)

Note: While we’ll only use short snippets of this book for this class, I highly recommend this text for those interested in a careful treatment of political economy topics tailored to MPP students.

### 2.2 *The Provision of Public Goods and Order (10/5)*

- ★ M. Olson. Dictatorship, democracy, and development. *American Political Science Review*, pages 567–576, 1993 [Link]
- ★ Chapters 1-2. Robert H Bates. *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. Cambridge University Press, 2008 [Link]

- Paul Seabright. The Birth of Hierarchy. In Kim Sterelny, editor, *Cooperation and Its Evolution*, pages 1–8. August 2012 [Link]
- Raul Sanchez de la Sierra. On the Origin of States: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo. *Working Paper*, pages 1–79, March 2014. URL <https://raulsanchezdelasierra.files.wordpress.com/2013/09/0-paper-1.pdf> [Link]

### 3 *How do capacity and political institutions vary across states? (1 Class)*

#### 3.1 *Capacity (10/10)*

★ Chapter 1. Timothy Besley and Torsten Persson. *Pillars of Prosperity*. Princeton University Press, August 2011 [Link]

- Cullen S Hendrix. Measuring state capacity: Theoretical and empirical implications for the study of civil conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 47(3):273–285, May 2010 [Link]

#### 3.2 *Accountability (10/10)*

★ Larry Diamond. Is the Third Wave of Democratization Over? an Empirical Assessment. *Working Paper*, February 1997. URL <https://www3.nd.edu/~kellogg/publications/workingpapers/WPS/236.pdf>

★ J Gandhi and A Przeworski. Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40(11):1279–1301, September 2007 [Link]

- Chapter 1. Adam Przeworski, Michael E Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge University Press, 2000 [Link]

### 4 *How does this variation affect order and development? (5 Classes)*

#### 4.1 *Insecure Property Rights (10/12)*

★ Sections 1-8. Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A Robinson. Institutions as a fundamental cause of long-run growth. In Philippe Aghion and Steven N Durlauf, editors, *Handbook of Economic Growth*. Handbook of economic growth, 2005 [Link]

★ Erica Field. Property Rights and Investment in Urban Slums. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, pages 279–290, May 2005 [Link]

- (Famous Paper) Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A Robinson. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *The American Economic Review*, 91(5):1369–1401, December 2001 [Link]
- (Critique of Data Used in Famous Paper) David Y Albouy. The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment. *American Economic Review*, 102(6):3059–3076, October 2012 [Link]
- (Rebuttal to Famous Paper) Edward L Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. Do institutions cause growth? *NBER Working Paper*, page 31, June 2004. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10568>



- Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson. Unbundling Institutions. *Journal of Political Economy*, 113(5): 949–995, October 2005 [[Link](#)]

#### 4.2 Poor Leadership (10/17)

- ★ Section 1.6 (“Incentives and Selection in Politics”) Timothy Besley. *Principled Agents?* Oxford University Press, USA, October 2007 [[Link](#)]
- ★ Timothy Besley. Political Selection. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3):43–60, 2005 [[Link](#)]
- ★ B.F. Jones and B.A. Olken. Do leaders matter? National leadership and growth since World War II. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3):835, 2005 [[Link](#)]

- William Easterly. Benevolent Autocrats. *Working Paper*, May 2011. URL <https://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2011/05/benevolent-autocrats-easterly-2nd-draft.pdf>
- Daron Acemoglu, James A Robinson, and Tristan Reed. Chiefs: Economic Development and Elite Control of Civil Society in Sierra Leone. *Journal of Political Economy*, 122(2), April 2014 [[Link to Article](#)] [[Link to Short Blog Post](#)]

#### 4.3 Corruption (10/19)

- ★ (Blog Post) Christopher Blattman. Corruption and Development: Not what you think?, November 2012. URL <http://chrisblattman.com/2012/11/05/corruption-and-development-not-what-you-think/>
- ★ (Blog Post) Matthew Stephenson. Yes, Corruption Is Bad for Development. No, Corruption Is Not a Western Obsession., April 2014. URL <https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/04/29/yes-corruption-is-bad-for-development-no-corruption-is-not-a-western-obsession-2/>
- ★ Jakob Svensson. Eight Questions about Corruption. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3):19–42, September 2005 [[Link](#)]
- ★ Vito Tanzi. Corruption: Arm’s-Length Relationships and Markets. In Gianluca Fiorentini and Sam Peltzman, editors, *The economics of organised crime*, pages 161–180. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 1996 [[Link](#)]

- Benjamin A Olken and Rohini Pande. Corruption in Developing Countries. *Annual Review of Economics*, 4:479–509, September 2012 [[Link](#)]
- Andrei Shleifer and Robert W Vishny. Corruption. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pages 599–617, August 1993 [[Link](#)]
- Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson. A Couple of Economists?, November 2012. URL <http://whynationsfail.com/blog/2012/11/13/a-couple-of-economists.html>

#### 4.4 *Clientalism & Distributive Politics (10/24)*

- ★ Allen Hicken. Clientalism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 14(1):289–310, June 2011 [[Link](#)]
- ★ Leonard Wantchekon. Clientalism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World Politics*, 55(3):399–422, 2003 [[Link](#)]

- Chapter 1. Sue C Stokes, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientalism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press, 2013 [[Link](#)]
- Randall Akee, Miriam Jorgensen, and Uwe Sunde. Critical junctures and economic development - Evidence from the adoption of constitutions among American Indian Nations. *Journal of comparative economics*, 43(4):844–861, November 2015 [[Link](#)]

#### 4.5 *Poor Service Delivery (10/26)*

- ★ Chapters 2-3. The World Bank. *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*. World Bank, 2003 [[Link](#)]
- ★ Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. Addressing Absence. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20(1):117–132, March 2006 [[Link](#)]

- † Masayuki Kudamatsu. Has Democratization Reduced Infant Mortality In Sub-Saharan Africa? Evidence From Micro Data. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 10(6):1294–1317, August 2012 [[Link](#)]
- † Nazmul Chaudhury, Jeffrey Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, and F Halsey Rogers. Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 20(1):91–116, March 2006 [[Link](#)]
- Robin Harding and David Stasavage. What Democracy Does (and Doesn't Do) for Basic Services: School Fees, School Inputs, and African Elections. *The Journal of Politics*, 76(01):229–245, 2014 [[Link](#)]
- Saad Gulzar and Benjamin Pasquale. Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Development: Evidence from India. *American Political Science Review* [[Link](#)]

### 5 *Mid-Term Exam (10/31)*

#### 6 *What explains variation in capacity and political institutions? (5 Classes)*

##### 6.1 *Conflict (11/2)*

- ★ Charles Tilly. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In Peter B Evans, D Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, editors, *Bringing the State Back In*. 1985 [[Link](#)]
- ★ Miguel Angel Centeno. Blood and Debt: War and Taxation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America. *American journal of Sociology*, 102(6):1565–1605, 1997 [[Link](#)]

- † Scott F Abramson. The Economic Origins of the Territorial State. *International Organization* [Link]
- Kenneth Scheve and David Stasavage. The Constriction of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation. *International Organization*, 64(04):529–561, October 2010 [Link]
- James D Fearon and David D Laitin. Does Contemporary Armed Conflict have "Deep Historical Roots"? *Working Paper*, 2014. URL <http://leitner.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/persistenceofarmedconflict3.pdf> [Link]

## 6.2 Geography (11/7)

- ★ Stanley L Engerman and Kenneth L Sokoloff. Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development Among New World Economics. *NBER Working Paper*, pages 1–55, October 2002. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9259>
- ★ Chapters 1-2. Jeffrey Herbst. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2000 [Link]

- † Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi. Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic Development. *NBER Working Paper*, October 2002. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w9305.pdf>

## 6.3 Natural Resources (11/9)

- ★ Michael L Ross. What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 18(1):239–259, May 2015 [Link]
- ★ Laura Paler. Keeping the Public Purse: An Experiment in Windfalls, Taxes, and the Incentives to Restrain Government. *Working Paper*, pages 1–50, March 2012 [Link]

- S. Haber and V. Menaldo. Do natural resources fuel authoritarianism? A reappraisal of the resource curse. *American Political Science Review*, 105(1), February 2011 [Link]
- Jorgen J Andersen and Michael L Ross. The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber-Menaldo Analysis. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(7):993–1021, May 2014 [Link]

## 6.4 Colonialism (11/14)

- ★ Nathan Nunn. The Importance of History for Economic Development. *Annual Review of Economics*, 1(1):65–92, September 2009 [Link]
- ★ Melissa Dell. The Persistent Effects of Peru's Mining Mita. *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, 78(6):1863–1903, 2010 [Link]

- † Leander Heldring and James A Robinson. Colonialism and Economic Development in Africa. *NBER Working Paper*, November 2012. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w18566.pdf>

- Stelios Michalopoulos and Elias Papaioannou. Divide and Rule or the Rule of the Divided? Evidence from Africa. *NBER Working Paper*, 2011. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w17184>
- Nathan Nunn. The Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trades. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(1): 139–176, February 2008 [Link]

### 6.5 Ethnic & Class Divisions (11/16)

- \* William Easterly and Ross Levine. Africa's Growth Tragedy: Policies and Ethnic Divisions. 1997 [Link]
- † James Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N Posner, and Jeremy M Weinstein. Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? *American Political Science Review*, 101(04):709–725, November 2007 [Link]

- \* Chapters 1-2. Daron Acemoglu and James A Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 2006 [Link]
- Alexander Bolton, James R Hollyer, and Leonard Wantchekon. Machines, Migration and Reform. *Working Paper*, June 2016. URL <http://0001c70.wcomhost.com/JRHPersonal/BHWMigrationReformEPSA2016Draft.pdf>
- Alberto Alesina and Eliana La Ferrara. Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 43(3):762–800, September 2005 [Link]
- Imran Rasul and Daniel Rogger. The Impact of Ethnic Diversity in Bureaucracies: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service. *American Economic Review*, 105(5):457–461, May 2015a [Link]

## 7 Can/should political institutions be (externally) reformed? (5 Classes)

### 7.1 The Dangers of Social Engineering (11/21)

- \* Introduction, Chapter 3, Conclusion. James C Scott. *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. Yale University Press, February 1999 [Link]
- \* (Online Article) Courtney Martin. The Reductive Seduction of Other People's Problems, January 2016. URL [goo.gl/CuKhBh](http://goo.gl/CuKhBh)

### 7.2 Democratization (11/21)

- \* David Samuels. Regime Change. In *Comparative Politics*. 2012 [Link]
- \* William Roberts Clark, Matt Golder, and Sona N Golder. Power and Politics: Insights from an Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Game. *Working Paper*, 2013. URL [http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/files/clark\\_golder.pdf](http://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/files/clark_golder.pdf)

- † Thomas Carothers. The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion. *Foreign Affairs*, 85(2):55–68, 2006 [Link]

- † Katherine Casey, Rachel Glennerster, and Edward Miguel. Reshaping Institutions: Evidence on Aid Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, pages 1755–1812, 2012 [Link]
- (Blog Post) Markus Goldstein. Power to the people? Taking a look at community driven reconstruction in the DRC, December 2012. URL <http://blogs.worldbank.org/impactevaluations/power-to-the-people-taking-a>

### 7.3 Information & Transparency (11/23)

- ★ Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The effects of Brazil’s publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2):703, 2008 [Link]
- ★ Katherine E Casey, Kelly Bidwell, and Rachel Glennerster. Debates: Voting and Expenditure Responses to Political Communication. *Working Paper*, pages 1–43, February 2016. URL <https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/gsb-cmis/gsb-cmis-download-auth/362906>
- ★ Evan Lieberman, Daniel N Posner, and Lily Tsai. Does Information Lead to More Active Citizenship? Evidence from an Education Intervention in Rural Kenya. *Working Paper*, pages 1–61, March 2013. URL [http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2228900](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2228900)

- Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M Weinstein. Policing Politicians: Citizen Empowerment and Political Accountability in Uganda - Preliminary Analysis. *IGC Working Paper*, March 2012. URL <http://www.theigc.org/sites/default/files/Humphreys%20and%20Weinstein%20March%202013.pdf>

### 7.4 Foreign Aid (11/28)

- ★ Nancy Qian. Making Progress on Foreign Aid. *Annual Review of Economics*, 3, 2014 [Link]
- ★ William Easterly. Can the West Save Africa? *NBER Working Paper*, September 2008. URL <http://www.nber.org/papers/w14363.pdf>
- ★ Gunilla Pettersson Todd Moss and Nicolas van de Walle. An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa. *CGD Working Paper*, pages 1–28, January 2006 [Link]

- † Charles Kenny. A Lot of Aid Doesn’t Work. That’s a Reason for Reform, Not Retrenchment. *cgdev.org*, October 2013. ISSN 1813-9450 [Link]
- Lant Pritchett, Michael Woolcock, and Matt Andrews. Looking Like a State: Techniques of Persistent Failure in State Capability for Implementation. *Journal of Development Studies*, 49(1), 2013 [Link]
- Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian. Aiding Conflict: The Impact of US Food Aid on Civil War. *American Economic Review*, 104(6):1630–1666, 2014 [Link]

7.5 *Civil Service Reform (11/30)*

- \* Martina Bjorkman and Jakob Svensson. Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(2): 735–769, May 2009 [[Link](#)]
- \* Imran Rasul and Daniel Rogger. Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service. *Working Paper*, June 2015b. URL <http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpimr/research/CSS.pdf>
- \* James Ferguson and Larr Lohman. The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development" and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. *The Ecologist*, 24(5), September 1994 [[Link](#)]

7.6 *Peacekeeping (Time permitting)*

- \* James D Fearon and David D Laitin. Civil War Termination. *Working Paper*, 2007 [[Link](#)]
- \* Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morje Howard. Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 11:283–301, 2008 [[Link](#)]
- \* Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M Weinstein. Demobilization and Reintegration. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(4):531–567, August 2007 [[Link](#)]