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The Long Walk from Freedom

AFRICAN STATES SINCE INDEPENDENCE

Preface

Africans have taken a long and troubled march from their exuberant moment of freedom in the early 1960s. But now is a moment for renewed optimism. Today, many countries are now providing growth, political voice, and security to their citizens.

Still dark clouds remain on the horizon. Throughout much of Africa, countries harbor terrorists in ungoverned spaces; struggle to control diseases that cross borders; and expel refugees fleeing civil war and abject poverty. Nonetheless, this is a moment of great possibility for African states to overcome the barriers — to economic development, to democracy, and to order — that have stifled them for a generation.

Their success is consequential for all of us, whether in Africa or abroad. Despite its importance, ignorance about Africa abounds. The US President had trouble pronouncing "Namibia" in a speech to African leaders. But this ignorance is not only among foreigners. Lecturing to a large audience of college-educated Nigerians at Stanford, one of the authors (David Laitin) found that none of them could recall the details of a civil war that had killed a million of their fellow citizens just a generation ago.

This limited awareness of African affairs persists despite an outpouring of academic research in and about Africa in the past quarter century. Unfortunately, this research — our own included — is written in technical language and

buried in specialized journals. In this book, we endeavor to make the findings from these works available to a wider audience. We also develop a framework for integrating decades of research across multiple disciplines, providing an explanation for why Africa's leaders, despite charisma and high hopes, struggled to escape their countries' geographic and historical constraints and implement effective policies. We hope the synthesis offered here will be of use to activists in NGOs, civil servants, entrepreneurs, university students, and the general public.

This book was motivated by an invitation to David Laitin to deliver the Castle Lectures in Ethics, Politics and Economics at Yale University. He was invited by Nicolas Sambanis and Ian Shapiro and acknowledges the honor bestowed upon him to deliver these prestigious lectures. Darin Christensen helped to craft those lectures and agreed to dramatically expand the three presentations into a broad-based book as an equal co-author.

At Yale, comments by Kate Baldwin were inspiring. Melina Platas Izama pointed us to omissions and carefully reviewed Part I. In early draft stage, members of the Working Group in African Political Economy (WGAPE) read and commented on the manuscript. Comments at that WGAPE meeting by Daniel Posner, Karen Ferree, James Fearon, and Jeremy Weinstein were especially useful in reorganizing the material. We then presented a revised version to the Center for African Studies at Stanford University, where comments by James Ferguson, Richard Roberts, Marcel Fafchamps, and David Abernethy compelled us to make further revisions. We are especially indebted to Nelson Kasfir who read the manuscript twice, each time correcting errors while offering continued encouragement. We also received penetrating comments on our economic policy chapters from Thomas Callaghy and Nicolas van de Walle. Kennedy Opalo provided final feedback with his exceptional knowledge of the literature on African politics.

We are grateful to all these exceptional scholars for their critical comments and suggestions.

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Region & Country Codes

World Bank Regions

EAP	East Asia & Pacific	ECA	Europe & Central Asia
LAC	Latin America & Caribbean	MENA	Middle East & North Africa
NA	North America	SA	South Asia
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa		

Country Codes

AGO	Angola	MOZ	Mozambique
BDI	Burundi	MRT	Mauritania
BEN	Benin	MUS	Mauritius
BFA	Burkina Faso	MWI	Malawi
BWA	Botswana	NAM	Namibia
CAF	Central African Republic	NER	Niger
CIV	Côte d'Ivoire	NGA	Nigeria
CMR	Cameroon	RWA	Rwanda
COG	Congo	SDN	Sudan
COM	Comoros	SEN	Senegal
CPV	Cabo Verde	SLE	Sierra Leone
ERI	Eritrea	SOM	Somalia
ETH	Ethiopia	SSD	South Sudan
GAB	Gabon	STP	Sao Tome and Principe
GHA	Ghana	SWZ	Swaziland
GIN	Guinea	SYC	Seychelles
GMB	Gambia	TCD	Chad
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	TGO	Togo
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	TZA	United Republic of Tanzania
KEN	Kenya	UGA	Uganda
LBR	Liberia	ZAF	South Africa
LSO	Lesotho	ZAR	Democratic Republic of the Congo
MDG	Madagascar	ZMB	Zambia
MLI	Mali	ZWE	Zimbabwe

Introduction

This book addresses a fundamental question for those interested in sub-Saharan Africa. Why have its post-colonial states not fulfilled their promise to deliver prosperity, good governance and security? On these three goals, at least through a generation of independent rule, most sub-Saharan states did not keep pace with other world regions that were also considered "underdeveloped" in the early 1960s, the decade of independence for most African states. Nor had many of them fulfilled the promises of their independence movements and the charismatic leaders who heralded a promising future.

Freed from the colonial yoke, many expected sub-Saharan countries to flourish. The soaring rhetoric of Africa's founding fathers, the assessments of international officials, and the more staid analysis of academics all predicted rapid economic and political development. The UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, after an extended early-1960 tour of Africa, wrote that he had just visited "a continent launched on the road to cooperative success by new and able young leaders…" (Young, 2012, 12). Economic forecasts from a World Bank report confirmed this travelogue, claiming that Africa's growth potential surpassed East Asia's prospects with at least seven newly independent countries "'clearly [having] the potential to reach or surpass' a 7 percent growth rate" (Easterly, 2002). Political scientists documented a sense of optimism

among Africans: Crawford Young, one of the eminent scholars conducting field work during the early independence years recalled, "The dawn of independence seemed full of promise…euphoria was widely shared across the continent" (Young, 2012, 10). They were also energized by the opportunities for crafting new political cultures and institutions. Even one of the more hard-nosed early analysts of African independence, Aristide Zolberg, seemed awed by Africa's bright prospects:

> "Most political scientists who were in the field [of African politics] sufficiently early to share in the enthusiasm of the new men at the helm of the liberating movement were caught up in the drama of man's search for polity which was being re-enacted in a new and strange environment. The study of African politics provided a great and exciting intellectual adventure comparable to the quests which earlier had driven explorers to overcome apparently insurmountable obstacles on the same continent. These intrepid men no longer sought to trace the sources of the Nile or the course of the Niger. The new challenge was to discover, with the help of imaginative theories of society, a system of rivulets which might merge into a new stream of democracy" (Zolberg, 1966, 1).

But the optimism was short-lived. In Part I, we illustrate the failures to meet these high expectations. In the first three decades after independence, sub-Saharan African countries fell behind other regions on standard indicators of development, democracy, and order. In terms of the distribution of power and resources, economic resources failed to grow and political power quickly became concentrated in the hands of (semi-)authoritarian rulers, who struggled to maintain order.

Part II offers a more sober look at the conditions facing the founding fathers of Africa's new states. The sharp divergence between expectations and performance becomes easier to explain after reviewing the constraints under which Africa's post-independence leaders worked. We consider,

for example, how geography and demography — expansive, sparsely populated, and ethnically diverse states — affected leaders' calculations regarding whether to expand the administrative reach of the state to peripheral regions. We also discuss those constraints imposed by the slave trade and other extractive institutions, the presence of missionaries, the partition of the continent by poorly informed European diplomats, and the strategies of rule employed by colonial states. No matter how inventive or ambitious the new African leaders were, these inheritances restricted the scope of feasible reform.

In part III, we discuss the policy choices in the post-independence period that contributed to economic stagnation, weak but repressive states, and internal conflict. Due to historical constraints and unrealistic ideological commitments, new leaders and their successors failed to provide growth and security. Africa stagnated for a generation. While our review is not exhaustive, we cover several important policy areas, including language choices, foreign policy, and the economic doctrines that guided government spending and monetary policy.

Lest one lose faith in the ability of governments to surmount constraints and promote economic and political development, in Part IV we discuss several recent successes. Beginning in the early 1990s, despite a few notable setbacks, movements to replace military rule and one-party states with democracy made meaningful progress. Aided by a boom in mineral prices, economic growth during the first decade of this century has been impressive in many African countries. And new solidarity pacts exemplified in the African Union have helped cauterize civil conflict and restrain dictatorial tendencies among fellow presidents. The negative framing of African affairs through the 1980s and 1990s is therefore being challenged, a cautiously hopeful sign for the future.

The Logic of Political Rule in Africa

After establishing in Part I the dimensions of Africa's post-independence lag, Parts II-IV proceed (for the most part) chronologically: we begin with geographic or historical constraints, discuss post-independence policy choices, and then end with a discussion of more promising recent trends. Yet, we also see these sections as illuminating different aspects of a more general political problem: working within the constraints imposed by history or geography, how do leaders survive in office and realize their policy (or personal) goals? The policy failures of the post-independence period were not simply due to bad ideas (though there were certainly some of those). A political logic guided African leaders' decisions to champion or shelve certain policies. Where reform threatened an incumbent's political base or outstripped the weak bureaucracy they had inherited from the colonial state, we should not be surprised that a leader opted for the status quo or muddled through with a sub-optimal alternative.

By describing the constraints facing leaders and their political objectives, we can make sense of policies that, ultimately, contributed to three decades of dismal economic growth and political instability for too many of Africa's newly independent states. To be sure, there were stunning economic successes, as in Botswana and Lesotho. And countries such as Tanzania avoided violent breakdowns. But on average, compared to other post-colonial regions, African states faced policy failure. To account for this failure, we develop a simple analytical framework here that we return to throughout the book to help explain the early policy failures, as well as the possibilities for a more successful future. When discussing leaders' choices, we consider both sides of the political ledger — the benefits (e.g., status, economic growth) and costs (e.g., fomenting opposition, running budget deficits) that inform leaders' decisions. We expect that leaders choose policies that maximize the ex-

pected value of office, adopting initiatives that they expect will deliver benefits without dramatically decreasing their odds of retaining power or imposing prohibitive costs.[1]

The diagram below (adapted from Acemoglu et al. (2005)), illustrates our framework. Starting on the left of figure 1, geography and history — both distant and more recent — shape the distribution of power and resources that leaders inherit. Some leaders inherit a country that is ethnically homogeneous; others, an ethnically diverse population. Some an incompetent bureaucracy; others, a meritocratic civil service. Some enjoy oil reserves; others rely heavily on cash crops for foreign exchange. Some oversee a population that (unevenly) benefitted from missionaries' educational efforts; others, a citizenry displaced and distrustful after centuries of slave trading. Some enjoy widespread support; others can count few supporters outside of their own region or ethnic group. This inheritance weighs heavily on the leader, constraining what is feasible. In Part II, we examine how history and geography limit leaders' choices.

[1] For those comfortable with symbolic representation, we can express the leader's problem as $max_{p \in P}\{S(p)[B(p) - C_S(p)] - [1 - S(p)]C_{NS}(p)\}$ where $S(p)$ is the probability of survival given policy choice p in the set of feasible policies P, and $B(p)$ is the benefit the leader receives from policy p. $C_S(p)$ is costs paid if leader survives, while $C_{NS}(p)$ is costs paid if leader does not survive. We set (or normalize) the benefits to be zero if leader doesn't survive.



Figure 1
Conceptual Framework

Moving to the right on our diagram, leaders make policy choices. Upon coming to power, they have their own objectives: industrializing, fostering equality, and promoting new national or trans-national identities. Guided by

these objectives and given their historical and contemporary constraints, these leaders pursue reforms that deliver policy or personal benefits without jeopardizing their political survival.[2] In Part III we unpack the ideological baggage that leaders brought to office, which provided the material for their cultural and economic policies.

[2] We interchange the words policy and reform. However, we recognize that the leader might opt for the status quo — a clear policy choice, but not one that entails reform.

But leaders do not always choose the optimal policy from the perspective of overall welfare. Constrained or not, leaders want to retain control and are unlikely to implement reforms that imperil their status, wealth, and continued rule. A potentially more beneficial policy for growth, for security, or for democracy may simply be ignored if that policy also compromises the leader's incumbency. Rooting out corruption, for example, could improve public service delivery, but also anger elites that depend on rents and extortion under the corrupt system. If the leader depends on the support (or acquiescence) of those same corrupt elites, reform is unlikely. Or a floating exchange rate. While this monetary policy could boost exports, leaders might dismiss the prospect out of hand, fearing the riots that would erupt from price hikes on the imported goods that urban constituents demand.

At the far right of our diagram, we see that policy choices shape the future distribution of power and resources. Winners win; losers lose. In redistributing economic and political power, policies also change the constraints facing the leader in the future — thus, the feedback loop connecting "future" to "historic" resources and power (one government's "future" is their successor's "history"). However, policy rarely reconfigures the social order, especially in weak states and where the social order reflects powerful historical and geographical forces. For example, a landlocked country faces constraints to international trade, whether under colonial rule or after independence. Hence, we allow for persistence in the distribution of economic and political power over time (i.e., a direct effect).

As we go through the historical and geographic constraints (in Part II) and early policies instituted by postcolonial leaders (in Part III), we use each chapter's conclusion to refer back to this framework, filling in the boxes with specific constraints and policies.

Distinguishing Our Approach

Our analytical framework might appear subject to Thandika Mkandawire's (2001) powerful, oft-cited critique of African development studies. Mkandawire highlights two contradictory sentiments in the writing of Western commentators: "the pessimism of the diagnosis and the optimism of the prescription" (289). These analysts can in the same breath — or, at least, a single work — lament the "impossibility of developmental states in Africa" and offer confident prescriptions for reforms that will ensure success.

We cannot deny that our review of the first thirty years of independence may feel bleak. However, we wish to highlight that Africa's geography and history, rather than serving as inescapable and enduring shackles, represent real but surmountable constraints. Moreover, we make no prescriptions for reform and remain cautiously hopeful about more recent improvements in economic development and political liberalization.

Similarly, we avoid simple dichotomies posing, for example "policy" vs. "destiny" as competing explanations for African countries slow growth (Collier and Gunning, 1999). As is hopefully already becoming apparent, we see these as *complementary* explanations. Without denying that history and geography can have direct effects on contemporary outcomes, they also constrain policy decisions.

Another fault line in the study of African politics divides "joiners" and "splitters." Splitters through their teaching and research have sought to undermine popular views of a culturally and political homogeneous continent. Some

societies, they note, are matrilineal; others patrilineal. Some societies are pastoral; others agricultural, and still others highly dependent upon mining. Some tribes are hierarchical; others acephalous (i.e., leader-less). Some countries faced indirect rule; others direct rule. Joiners have, on the other hand, searched for commonalities. Until relatively recently, they wrote about Africa's growth tragedy (Easterly and Levine, 1997). As economic prospects have improved, they've started to ask "Is this Africa's time?" (Robertson, 2012). Here African countries are seen as facing common constraints and opportunities.

Our innovation — and it may not totally satisfy either camp — is to draw upon both bodies of scholarship to help explain cross-national differences in human welfare. We're interested in why Kenya has grown faster than Somalia, but failed to keep pace with Thailand (which had nearly the same per capita GDP in 1965). The splitters help us to answer the first part of this question, recounting Kenya's relatively peaceful post-independence history, which contrasts sharply with Somalia's persistent struggle to maintain peace. The joiners take a broader perspective, explaining why East Asia and East Africa followed different policy and economic trajectories.[3]

It becomes imprudent to remain as joiners in addressing policy choices and outcomes post-1990. At this point variation across African states becomes more prominent in our analysis. Indeed, in this period, a divide has opened between states that are advancing economically and instituting political reforms and those that are mired in slow growth, personalist rule, and peripheral rebellion. In the African Economic Research Consortium's (AERC) review of African growth from 1960-2000, Ndulu and O'Connell (2008, 26) point out that the "variation in long-run growth within SSA [sub-Saharan Africa] dwarfs the difference between average growth in SSA and average growth in any other region." Therefore, in Part IV, we narrow our focus

[3] What readers, especially the splitters among them, may find missing in this manuscript is much discussion of differences within individual African countries and how these contribute to inequalities across towns or provinces (e.g., between Western and Central Kenya).

in an effort to chart divergent outcomes — stories of tentative successes and ongoing stagnation — among African states.

Whether splitters or joiners, scholars have recently made progress in getting to the roots of Africa's lag by engaging in careful empirical research that, while keenly aware of the difficulties, tries to identify variables that have a causal effect on democracy, on economic growth, and on security. An important goal of this volume is to synthesize those contributions along each dimension. Empirical research on the question of African states' unfulfilled promise has been impressively robust in the past several years, but it exists mostly in highly technical journals. Here, we accept the challenge of making these studies available to the general reader in a way that is both accessible and compelling. In this endeavor, we seek, through compelling graphical presentations and case studies, to convey and animate core findings.

However, we must warn readers that we cannot offer definitive answers on the causes of democratic failure, economic stagnation and conflict. The causal pathways from, for example, colonial rule to contemporary economic, political and social outcomes are numerous, intersecting, and perhaps beyond the tools of social science to fully map. Moreover, failure on one outcome can impede progress on another, and vice versa: the failure to educate children, for example, leads to poorly informed voters, who struggle to punish officials that fail to deliver increased spending on teachers or schools. These feedback loops (in this instance, poor education $\rightsquigarrow$ low accountability $\rightsquigarrow$ poor education…) trap countries in a ruinous autocratic and low growth equilibrium. This makes it all the more difficult to isolate cause and effect.

We hope that as the book progresses, each chapter will elaborate on our novel conceptual scheme of heroic goals confronting daunting constraints, and the policy compro-

mises and outcomes that result from this collision. Both the reasons for Africa's lag and the tentative steps that are being taken to correct it should become clearer as the book progresses. We see in this framework a realistic foundation for imagining a more democratic, a more secure, and a more prosperous continent.

Part I. From Great Expectations to Unfulfilled Dreams

In its first half-century of self-rule, newly independent African states have lagged behind the rest of the world in terms of economic development, the establishment of effective governance capable of securing social order, and the consolidation of democracy. Here in Part I, we first seek to capture a moment in the late 1950s: a new generation of Africans were on the threshold of becoming the founding fathers of states escaping colonialism. Although they acknowledged the challenges that independence would bring, their optimism and goals to restore the greatness of Africa, as we document in chapter 1, were exhilarating. Yet, as chapters 2-4 recount, the displacement of elected leaders with military dictators, the disease of corruption, and the specter of violence and civil war cumulatively undermined early optimism. African states' progress was far less impressive than in other world regions on most indicators of human development and security. The symptoms of this failure plagued African polities at least through the early 1990s. In chapter 2, we focus on the lag in human development, examining indicators of income, health and education. In chapter 3, we consider democracy and the rule of law, cataloging the undermining of democracy (with one-party states) and the cascade of coups that brought military dictatorships to many African countries. In addition, we highlight the corruption in both civilian

and military regimes that undermined the rule of law. In chapter 4, our focus turns to the breakdown of social order through communal conflict and civil war. In these three chapters, relying on statistical evidence and accompanying case studies, we compare African states with other regions to reckon the magnitude of Africa's lag and convey its human costs. These chapters raise the fundamental question of this book — what explains African states' struggles in the first half-century of independence?

1. *The Charismatic Founders and their Dreams*

We begin this book at a moment of great promise. A decade into the post-World War II peace, complementary geo-political and ideological changes enabled aspiring elites in the colonial world not only to articulate, but also to fulfill a vision of dividing empires into nations. A new generation of Africans, imbued with ideals of nationalism, pan-Africanism, and independence, articulated the aspirations of their colonized brethren.

Their idea that African states would escape the colonial yoke became an achievable goal as the dust settled from World War II. The war had incapacitated former empires. France had been occupied, and General Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the anti-Nazi French resistance, ruled in exile until 1944. Brazzaville in the Congo, not Paris, became the symbolic capital of *La France libre* (Free France). Meanwhile, Britain had made vast concessions to the Congress Party in India about a future independence in return for its support during the war. All the European metropoles had expanded their armed forces by recruiting and training soldiers from their colonies, and European warfare gave African soldiers an experience of the wider world and a confidence that they could succeed with self-rule.

Independence movements in sub-Saharan Africa came on the heels of successful struggles elsewhere (see fig-

ure 1.1). Nationalist uprisings against colonial rule in Vietnam (French retreat after defeat in Dien Bien Phu in 1954) and Algeria (the National Liberation Front was the *béte noire* of the French 4th Republic, helping its demise in 1958) were the major world conflicts during the post-war peace. In 1955 Sukarno, the nationalist leader of Indonesia, invited compatriots from other nationalist movements throughout Asia and Africa to Bandung. This was the origin of a "non-aligned" movement that foreshadowed a new era of independent states. In 1956, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who had overthrown a traditionalist monarchy in Egypt, burnished his nationalist credentials through the nationalizing of the Suez Canal, successfully defying the British and the French, who could no longer maintain their imperial control over this crucial chokepoint of international shipping.

Figure 1.1
Number of Independent States, 1940-2010



The US, the dominant state post-WWII, played a passive but important role in advancing the nationalist agenda. President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to support the French in their attempt to retain Vietnam as a colony and seethed with anger over France and Britain's military campaign to reestablish control over the Suez Canal. Through diplomatic channels, Eisenhower made clear that he would not wage war to sustain European empires. More publicly, the newly elected Senator from Massachusetts, John Fitzgerald Kennedy gave a visionary speech in the Senate in support of Algeria's National Liberation Front on July 2, 1957, only a few months after taking his seat:

> "The most powerful single force in the world today is neither communism nor capitalism, neither the H-bomb nor the guided missile; it is man's eternal desire to be free and independent…If we are to secure the friendship of the Arab, the African, and the Asian — and we must, despite what Mr. Dulles [the Secretary of State] says about our not being in a popularity contest — we cannot hope to accomplish it solely by means of billion-dollar foreign aid programs. We cannot win their hearts by making them

> dependent upon our handouts. Nor can we keep them free by selling them free enterprise, by describing the perils of communism or the prosperity of the United States, or limiting our dealings to military pacts. No, the strength of our appeal to these key populations — and it is rightfully our appeal, and not that of the Communists — lies in our traditional and deeply felt philosophy of freedom and independence for all peoples everywhere" (Kennedy, 1957).

This message was not ignored in imperial headquarters. Recognizing a new era, Tory Prime Minister Harold McMillan traveled to South Africa with a speech (on February 3, 1960) before the apartheid-supporting South African Parliament. "The wind of change," he declared, "is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it."

The inevitability of independence for Indonesia, for India, for Vietnam and for Algeria after World War II brought a new perspective on nationalism. Liberals and democrats had long seen "nationalism" as antithetical to a liberal state and associated it with doctrines such as Fascism and Nazism. But the anti-colonial moment provided a new positive valence to "nationalism" — it came to represent liberation of all third world peoples (Emerson, 1960).

Aspiring African leaders would take full advantage of this moment to press for liberation. In this chapter we seek to reconstruct this optimistic and forward-looking moment in Africa's political history.

1 *History Moved through "Charismatic Leadership"*

Third-world nationalism required a dynamic leader, who could both constitute a nation from the diverse populations contained within colonial boundaries, and also negotiate with the metropole over the transition to native rule. These leaders had to not only connect with and unite their populations, but also convince colonial administrators that they were ready to rule. They succeeded in the former by presenting themselves as icons of the nation rather than their tribe. Indeed nearly half of the initial heads of government were not from the dominant ethnic group of their newly independent state and could only gain wide support by associating themselves with the nation.[1] Many of them also earned legitimacy after being incarcerated by colonial authorities. They succeeded in the latter, in part, due to their Western educations — childhoods in missionary schools and university degrees from Europe and the US — which assuaged the racist concerns of colonial authorities.

[1] Of the 40 states that became independent in this moment, only 23 out of 40 inaugural heads of state came from the dominant ethnic groups in their countries (Mitchell et al., 1989).

New leaders inspired their fellow nationals with an almost magical quality, a phenomenon that the German sociologist Max Weber called "charisma" (from the Greek, literally "gift of grace"). Weber argued that it takes such leadership to overcome the routinized politics of everyday life; in this case, the narrow scope of political activity permitted by the colonial bureaucracy. These charismatic leaders had to convince their fellow nationals that independence was inevitable and on the path to a surmountable mountaintop, rather than an impossible uphill battle against a still dominant empire. The biographies of prominent founding fathers provide a compelling view into this pivotal moment in African history and convey their optimism regarding their countries' and the region's future

[2] Readers might wonder why Nelson Mandela is absent from these vignettes. His charismatic moment was in the 1990s. See Mandela (1990) for a collection of his speeches and writings from 1944 through to his release from prison in 1990.

Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana

Figure 1.2
Kwame Nkrumah

Kwame Nkrumah, the charismatic founder of Ghana (from the British Gold Coast Colony), was a prominent guest of Sukarno in Bandung and one of the visionaries of the non-aligned movement. He was born in 1909 to an Nzima speaking family, a language group representing less than 3 percent of Gold Coast's population. In Gold Coast, Nkrumah was educated by Catholic missionaries and won a scholarship to Achimoto, the prestigious colonial college. He did not qualify for a university scholarship in London, but through the intervention of an uncle, got accepted to Lincoln University in Pennsylvania (one of America's Historic Black Colleges and Universities); after that, he enrolled in the London School of Economics.

Still abroad in 1947, Nkrumah was induced to return home by J.B. Danquah, the founder of the earliest nationalist organization in the Gold Coast, the United Gold Coast Convention. Danquah offered the young Nkrumah the position of party secretary. Shortly after assuming this position, veterans of WWII rallied in Accra demanding their rightful benefits. A riot ensued which led to two deaths. Colonial authorities implicated Nkrumah, and he was detained in a remote village in the colony's north. Upon release, he challenged Danquah's conservatism, and he created the Convention People's Party (the CPP). Civil disobedience campaigns organized by the CPP led to his arrest and a prison sentence of fourteen months. Upon his release, 100,000 people were waiting for him on the streets. He had now established his street credibility. An enlightened colonial governor, Charles Noble Arden-Clarke, understood the threat and opportunity that Nkrumah represented and brilliantly appointed him as the colony's Prime Minister.

The sources of Nkrumah's charismatic appeal were manifold. He articulated a theory of "consciencism" (Nkrumah,

1970) that skillfully combined the Euro-Christian, the Islamic, and the African traditions into a compelling ideology for modern Africa. He could earn the trust (wearing western suits) of the British Governor as a serious and responsible future leader; yet he could also earn the trust of country villagers (wearing kente cloth robes) as a simple man who could sit on the ground and share a meal with peasants. In the Gold Coast, he stood for youth against age; for peasants against chiefs; and for "Ghanaians" against the British. Nkrumah was savvy enough to be on the right side of history on all three of these dimensions. This revealed impressive vision and earned him admiration to match the charismatic aura that he exuded.

His vision was clear, powerful, and yet initially deemed implausible. He envisioned self-government for a renamed country "Ghana" (after a defunct but once powerful West African kingdom) as a first step to liberating and uniting all of Africa. He presented this vision in his protest speeches, in Parliament in his role of Prime Minister, and in speeches through the countryside, which he traversed in his Cadillac. Speaking to Nkrumah's charisma, journalistic reports claimed that touching that car yielded ecstasy and a sense of connection to the future among his rural audiences.

Thanks to the presence of the American journalist John Gunther (1953, chapter 41, pp. 809-812) we have a record of Nkrumah's "independence" resolution in the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly in July 1953. He stood before the Legislative Assembly where "he wore a cotton smock, white with vertical black stripes [that] symbolizes simplicity in contrast to the ornate regalia of the chiefs." He began with a quotation from Edmund Burke emphasizing the need for political maturity and then Aristotle, emphasizing the need for political virtue. He moved from Biblical imagery ("The heroes of our future will be those who can lead our people out of…serfdom, into the valley of light…") to

practical wisdom ("As long as somebody else has charge of us, we can lay our mistakes at their door"). Yet his purpose was unmistakable: "We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquility." To be sure, Nkrumah faced opposition in the Assembly, especially from the cocoa regions that were to be heavily taxed to support his grand schemes. But on that day, the cheers at virtually every line were dutifully recorded by the Hansard stenographers.

Upon leaving his private anteroom after this speech, Gunther reports that Nkrumah was "lifted off his feet. Deputies, party friends, colleagues, seized him and, while he was laughing and struggling, carried him on their hands around and around the open square. There was a mad clatter of excitement and the parliamentarism we had just seen exploded into a wild, cheerful frenzy, and people began to sing and dance. Breathless, Nkrumah got off the shoulders of his partisans. If Sir Winston Churchill were ever to be captured outside Downing Street and hoisted into the air by Yeomen of the Guard dancing a jig," Gunther imagines, "the scene would be equivalent." Gunther then overhears an African onlooker, nearly weeping, who cried out, "The Prime Minister's speech is the turning point of my life. All my life I have thought that the white man was my enemy. Now I know that he is my friend!" This was the quintessential charismatic moment.

Figure 1.3
Julius Nyerere



Julius Nyerere of Tanzania

Julius Nyerere, the future leader of Tanzania, offered a somewhat more sedate appeal. He conceived of himself, and was regarded by the multitudes in Tanganyika (the name of the colony before the accession of Zanzibar), as *mwalimu*, or the teacher and *baba wa taifa*, or father of his nation. He constantly admonished his people as if he were their primary school teacher. *Mwalimu* scolded his countrymen for failing to match the world's great powers: "Our friends are using their brains while our [people] sleep

and grow fungus; they are sending rockets into outer space while we are eating wild roots!"

Nyerere vigorously promoted Swahili as a common language: he only spoke Swahili in country, and even translated Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* to demonstrate the language's adaptability. Despite his commitment to Swahili, Nyerere was brilliantly articulate in English and was the first Tanganyikan to get a university degree overseas (in Scotland). He was also baptized Catholic at age 20. Coming from a small tribe, he was not associated with any significant sub-group of Tanganyikans and faced almost no opposition in his election as president of the first nationalist party, the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU). As President of independent Tanganyika, he refused to live in State House and reported that he is far more comfortable joking with peasants on the road than speaking with diplomats. Typical of the first generation of leaders, he was also trusted by the British (who administered Tanganyika as a trust territory after German defeat in World War I). As independence was foreseen by the trust arrangement, Nyerere never engaged in the kind of agitation that would get him arrested.

It was several years later, after articulating a visionary statement for his country, that his fame reached charismatic proportions. He released his Arusha Declaration in 1967 (supplemented by his essay "Education for Self-Reliance") in which he articulated an ideology of *Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Freedom and Socialism). This was followed by the nationalization of banks, insurance companies, sisal estates, and other large establishments; and a code of conduct (moving them toward monastery rules) for all party officials. This announcement set off a spontaneous set of celebrations and marches across the country, with reports from the local press that an "entire village was seething with revolutionary enthusiasm emitted by the Spirit of Arusha."

Later on during a long march led by Nyerere, *The Standard* reported that "Mwalimu's brisk march into the town [of Mwanza] stunned the masses who on seeing him in sound health were driven wild with admiration and excitement to borders of near frenzy. The entire town was gripped with the revolutionary fervor of the Spirit of Arusha." Nyerere's vision for Tanzania — and indeed for Africa — was one that would build on native socialism and hard work to catch up with the great powers. That vision captured the imagination of his countrymen, many of whom believed his capabilities for transforming their society were extraordinary.

Figure 1.4
Jomo Kenyatta



Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya

Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first independence leader, may not have been credited with magical powers or adulation. Yet, during his long rule, few questioned that the presidency was his entitlement. He was not seen as a transitory political leader, but rather as an embodiment of his country.

An orphan, he was enrolled in a Scottish mission school near Nairobi. As a Kikuyu, he was a member of the plurality linguistic group in Kenya (representing about 21 percent of the population). The Kikuyu are not only Kenya's largest group, but also centrally located and, thus, were the primary victims of land seizures by the colonists establishing plantations in Kenya's central highlands. The group's numbers and grievances facilitated their political mobilization. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Kenyatta (then still "Johnstone") became active in Kikuyu organizations and by 1928 was publishing a Kikuyu language newspaper in Nairobi.

A year later he emigrated to the UK and, while there, married an English woman. He studied anthropology at the London School of Economics (and later in Moscow) and worked under Bronislaw Malinowski, considered one

of the most important anthropologists of the 20th Century. While physically removed, Kenyatta remained focused on Kenya and, specifically, Kikuyu history and culture, entitling his thesis *Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu* (1938) — a collection of essays that described the social ruin brought on by colonial policy. Seeking to enhance his credibility among Kenyans, he dropped the surname "Johnstone," given to him by missionaries, and became "Kenyatta." Kenyatta returned to his homeland in 1946 and joined the Kikuyu Central Association to help recover the "White Highlands," the area in central Kenya heavily settled by European farmers. Shortly, he became its Secretary General. It was dissolved by the British government for its radicalism, but it reemerged as the Kenya African Union (KAU), seeking to expand beyond Kikuyu membership. Kenyatta became the KAU's president. As he traveled through the country, his speeches attracted tens of thousands of people and gave subtle signals of his support for the Mau Mau, the insurgency seeking to retake the highlands. With the outbreak of violence between the Mau Mau and white settlers, Kenyatta was arrested. He refused to denounce the insurgency and, after a five month trial, was convicted in 1953 and sentenced to seven years. In that same year, the KAU was banned.

Kenyatta's persecution as a spokesman for independence gave him a unifying appeal. His charisma now combined with widespread support. When Kenyatta was freed in 1961 he assumed control of the dominant independence movement (now called the Kenyan African National Union or KANU). And with KANU's victory in the independence election, uncontested claim on the country's presidency — a post he held until his death in office in 1978.

Léopold Senghor of Senegal

Figure 1.5
Léopold Senghor

With some 95 percent of Senegalese professing the Muslim faith, and with Wolof-speakers constituting a majority of Senegalese, Léopold Senghor was a double minority: his father was a Serer Catholic, and his mother a Muslim from the Peul-speaking community. As a child, he was sent to a Catholic boarding school. Later, he transferred to a secular French school. He excelled in French literature and won a scholarship to study in France. He studied there through university and was honored with an appointment as a literature professor in Tours and in Paris. He took on French citizenship in 1932 and became the first African to be an elected member of the Académie Française.

Senghor served in the French army in WWII. He was captured and interned in a German prison camp, released, and then joined the French resistance. After the war, he won a seat in the French National Assembly as a member of the French Socialist Party. Senghor served as a state secretary and then an advisory minister in the Fourth Republic's socialist governments. He was on the drafting committee for the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. Up until independence, he favored Senegal being an equal region within France, but retained strong socialist ideals.

Part of Senghor's international prestige was built on his poetry (written in French) that gave beauty and substance to the concept of "négritude." Here he connected his personality and his future to African culture and sensibility. Upon his return to Senegal, he lent his support for African workers when conductors (bringing groundnuts to Dakar) struck against the French national railways. His combination of international prestige and a message combining culture and socialism gave him great honor. He became the first president of independent Senegal as a revered figure throughout the country.

Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea

Figure 1.6
Ahmed Sékou Touré

Sékou Touré earned his charismatic status quite differently from Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Senghor, all of whom combined overseas European education with an ability to connect with villagers. To be sure, he studied at a French technical school in Conakry, Guinea's capital, but he was more a rebel than a prized student in the colonial system. He was expelled from school for leading a food riot. He then landed a job in the postal service, but quickly became a labor organizer there and led the first successful labor union strike in French West Africa.

Unlike Senghor and Nkrumah, Touré was not from a marginalized ethnic group. He was a Mandé, representing some 48 percent of Guinea's population. But he identified himself even more broadly. He portrayed himself as a descendant of Samory, one of the great anti-colonial rebel fighters in the 19th century who had an appeal beyond today's Guinea, including today's Burkina Faso and Mali. He legitimated himself not by tribe, but by a broader category of nation.

Like Senghor, he got elected to the French National Assembly in 1951. But unlike Senghor, he was not permitted to take his seat. Twice rebuffed by colonial authorities to legislate in Paris, he got elected Mayor of Conakry, after which he was granted permission to sit in 1956.

His great fame and heroic status came two years later, when President de Gaulle offered French colonial territories the right to either demand immediate independence or recognize their long-term interests as fellow members of a newly created French Community. Touré was the only leader who lobbied for the former, making Guinea the first independent French-speaking state in sub-Saharan Africa, with Touré as its elected President. This turned him into a national hero, the only client of the French who would stand for true independence. His revolutionary

and anti-colonial ardor continued throughout his presidency (Touré, 1973). His nationalist prestige allowed him to retain presidential power for twenty-six years until 1984, when he died in office.

After the "no" vote of 1958, the French tore out every phone hook-up, all their office equipment, and left the country with no infrastructure. Unfazed, Touré turned to the Soviet Union for support, a bold move during the height of the Cold War. Later, after Nkrumah was ousted from power by a coup d'état, he became an honored guest in Guinea. Touré continued to have an uncanny ability to marginalize competing elites (surviving numerous coup attempts and assassination plots) while basking in the adulation of the masses.

Figure 1.7
Patrice Lumumba

Patrice Lumumba of Congo (Kinshasa)

Patrice Lumumba's charisma was amplified by his martyrdom. Unlike British and French colonies, the Belgians did not educate or train a professional class of Africans. In the late 1950s, there were almost no Congolese with European university experience. This was true for Lumumba. He was educated by both Protestant and then Catholic missionaries, which qualified him for a job as a postal clerk. He became active in the Belgian Liberal party, bringing him into some Pan-African circles, and in 1958 he created a nationalist party, the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC).

History suddenly moved all too quickly. In October 1959, while leading a rally in Stanleyville (today's Kisangani), he was arrested for fomenting a riot in which 30 people were killed. He was saddled with a 69 month prison sentence for his instigating role. But when his party won a decisive victory in the first local elections to be held in the Congo in January 1960, he was released to participate in a round-table conference in Brussels to discuss Congo's future. Belgium agreed to liberate Congo in six months'

time, with national elections to be held in May.

Lumumba's youth (he was then 34 years old) and radical vision made him wildly popular in electoral rallies. After the vote, he became the first Prime Minister of independent Congo. He differentiated himself from the President, Joseph Kasavubu, by his populist and ardent rhetoric on the day power was transferred, June 30, 1960. Lumumba railed against the atrocities unleashed on the population of the Congo Free State under Belgium's King Leopold II:

> "[N]o Congolese will ever forget that independence was won in struggle, a persevering and inspired struggle carried on from day to day, a struggle, in which we were undaunted by privation or suffering and stinted neither strength nor blood.
>
> [. . .]
>
> The Republic of the Congo has been proclaimed and our beloved country's future is now in the hands of its own people.
>
> Brothers, let us commence together a new struggle, a sublime struggle that will lead our country to peace, prosperity and greatness.
>
> [. . .]
>
> We shall show the world what the black man can do when working in liberty, and we shall make the Congo the pride of Africa."

With the (Belgium-supported) secession of the Katanga province months later, the west did nothing to support the central government in Kinshasa. Lumumba went to the USSR for support. Although the Soviets had limited resources to influence events in Congo, the resulting foreign accord led to a break with President Kasavubu, who arrested his own Prime Minister. Lumumba was brought to Katanga, where he was tortured and killed by a firing squad. Lumumba became a martyr, representing socialism, nationalism, and an African future freed from the colonial yoke and continued interference.

Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria

Awolowo (Awo) and Azikiwe (Zik) were Nigeria's preeminent "southern" nationalist leaders, creating all-Nigerian movements for independence. Awolowo was a Yoruba from the southwest, a language group representing about 20 percent of Nigerians. Azikiwe was an Igbo from the southeast, a language group representing some 17 percent of Nigerians. While both Yoruba and Igbo were plurality groups in two of Nigeria's three regions, they were minorities compared to the Hausas (representing about 29 percent of the population), who constituted a plurality in the Northern Region.

In the late 1950s, as Awolowo and Azikiwe traveled through their respective regions, the massive crowds chanted "Awo" and "Zik", the titles of their visionary treatises (Awolowo, 1960; Azikiwe, 1961). They fostered an enormous optimism and hope for what the inevitable independence of Nigeria would yield.

Awo got a law degree in London and came back to Nigeria as a journalist. In 1947, he founded the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* (the Society for the Sons of Oduduwa, Oduduwa being the traditional Yoruba deity) and then the "Action Group", the political party that in 1951 was demanding independence in a federal republic. Awo became western premier, and with great funding from cocoa marketing boards, he was the first to bring universal primary education and free health care for all to a region anywhere in Africa. He was lionized for this progressive agenda.

Figure 1.8
Nnamdi Azikiwe



Zik was trained by Methodists in Lagos, and then attended Howard University and finally Lincoln University in the United States, where he received a university degree. He returned to Nigeria and founded the *West African Pilot*, the most influential nationalist newspaper on the continent. He was based then in Lagos, the country's capital in the Yoruba-dominated southwest. This gave him a na-

tional vision, well beyond his home region. He founded his own political party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC), with a goal for a unified (i.e. non-federal) Nigeria. He became Chief Minister of the Eastern Region in the late colonial period and then Governor-General (formal head of state) at independence. With the proclamation of Nigeria as a republic (1963), in an electoral alliance with the northern party, he became Nigeria's first independent president. Zik was celebrated in the east, but through his editorship of the *Pilot* and his vision for a free and independent Africa, was endowed with charisma throughout Nigeria.

2 Conclusion

The late 1950s and early independence years were a sort of Jeffersonian moment. A generation of largely western educated nationalists took the helm of newly independent African states to overcome the oppressive, racist, and anti-developmental colonial states, envisioning independent Africa freed from the colonial yoke. In their constitutions, they fashioned new goals of educational and economic advancement as obligations of their states to their citizens (Spiro, 1960, 76). For example the Somali constitution, written for one of the poorest countries of the world, promised all citizens free primary education and social security (Articles 35 and 37). Freed from colonial dictates, African states would serve the real needs of their citizens.

Fast forwarding, Nkrumah declared himself a demi-god, and was ignominiously overthrown by his own army. Lumumba was killed by regional warlords. Nyerere survived, but watched his country stagnate economically for a generation. Senghor left office with honor, but with his country in similar economic straights. Touré's experiment in radical independence provided Guineans with little but poverty and stagnation. Awo and Zik survived, not without controversy, but both gave way to a succession of mili-

tary rulers, who were impervious to the more progressive visions of Nigeria's charismatic founders.

Clearly charisma did not lead African states to a promised land. In chapters 2-4, we catalogue the economic, security and democratic deficits that turned untamed hope into a gallows humor of disappointment, as many of the promises of the founding fathers went unfulfilled.

2. Lag in Human Development

The dreams of independence were scintillating. The young and ambitious generation of founding fathers articulated visions of négritude, African socialism, and pan-Africanism, all of which pointed from an oppressed past to a glorious future. Alas, on dimensions of human development, security, and democracy, the post-independence era was fraught. In this chapter, focusing on income, education, and health — all components of human development — we chronicle African states' struggles to fulfill expectations.

1 Income

Since 1960, Africa has lagged other regions of the world in per capita income.[1] As we see in figure 2.1, average per capita income in sub-Saharan states stagnates from 1960 (the year of independence for most sub-Saharan states) to 1990 — three decades that saw economic growth in most other regions. While growth has been more robust since 2000 (our subject in chapter 14), recent growth spurts have not dramatically narrowed the gap between African countries and other parts of the world.[2]

Some might argue that this is an unfair race, and that we should be comparing African states to other countries that were similarly impoverished in 1960. Yet, sub-Saharan states don't fare better in this comparison. First, we identify a group of 36 countries with an average per capita income

[1] The three-letter abbreviations used for regions and countries can be found on page x.

[2] As we discuss in chapter 14, Botswana is an outlier within sub-Saharan Africa, experiencing relatively consistent growth since the 1960s.

similar to sub-Saharan states: in 1960, this comparison group had an average GDP per capita of 1,182 USD, 65 USD more than the SSA sample. By 1990, average GDP per capita in this comparison group had increased over 125 percent (i.e., more than doubled); in our SSA sample, the increase over that same period was only 34 percent.



Figure 2.1
GDP Per Capita by Region, 1960-1990

Second, we look at specific examples of countries within and beyond sub-Saharan Africa that began the 1960s at similar levels of economic underdevelopment. The poor performance of resource-rich countries like Angola, Kenya, and Nigeria is especially striking when compared to the development trajectories of an Asian "tiger," South Korea and the new colossus, China. As figure 2.2 illustrates, all five states languished in deep collective poverty in 1960. Books and articles on Korea and China pointed to the barriers preventing economic growth, and these expositions were not much different from what was written about Africa's poverty.[3] But in the mid-1970s Korea broke from the pack

[3] In her lead article for a symposium on "International Cooperation for Social Welfare," Henderson (1960, 3) argues: "one half of the world's population lives in monsoon Asia [including Korea]. Within this region, the concentration of population in countries already facing tremendous problems of poverty, illiteracy, and ill health, presents the most serious challenge to national and international economic and social policies and programs."

with rapid growth. By 1990, the average income in South Korea reached nearly $9,000 per year, roughly ten times the levels achieved by Nigeria, Kenya, and Angola. China broke from the pack a decade after Korea and by 1990 had a per capita income roughly two times larger than these African states — a divergence that continued to grow after 1990.

This dismal economic performance among African states forced many economists to question earlier Nobel Prize-winning models of economic growth, which predicted that poorer countries would grow at a faster rate and, thus, uniformly converge to the higher income levels of more developed states (Sachs and Warner, 1995).



Figure 2.2
GDP Per Capita in Selected Cases, 1960-1990

These per capita figures are averages. Perhaps sub-Saharan countries are succeeding in raising the floor, but simply aren't producing exorbitantly wealthy citizens, who occupy the long right tail of the income distribution in more developed states. In figure 2.3, we focus instead on

whether those at the bottom are escaping dire poverty, and the numbers tell the same story. Using the available data from 2000-2010, we calculate the percentage of the population living on less than roughly 3 dollars per day (3.20 in 2011 dollars to use the World Bank's precise cut-off). In 35 (or 81 percent of) African countries, more than half of the population falls below this level of subsistence; only 10 other countries in the world reach such alarming levels. Note that this figure looks more bleak if we exclude the small island countries of Mauritius (MUS), Seychelles (SYC), and Comoros (COM). While these less-impoverished islands constitute half of the countries with poverty rates below forty percent, their combined population (2.9 million in 2010) is miniscule.



Figure 2.3
Share of Population in Poverty

2 *Education*

Income is not the only way to measure development. Nobel Prize winner, Amartya Sen, has forcefully argued that development involves enhancing individuals' "capabilities" to lead lives that they value (Sen, 2001). From

the individual perspective, education is a central capability that increases one's ability to experience and produce "works and events of one's own choice, religious, literary, musical, and so forth" (Nussbaum, 2011). From the societal perspective, education creates "human capital," which economists see as an essential driver of economic growth.

A great deal of development aid to Africa has gone into the educational sector, but with only limited success. While citizens in other regions can expect to receive nine or more years of education by their mid-twenties, the average African student will not receive more than an elementary school education (see figure 2.4). As one might expect, this affects student achievement; children in many African countries are deprived a basic education and, thus, score below their peers on international exams.



Figure 2.4
Years of Schooling by Region, 1960-1990

More fine grained evidence comes from the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ), a consortium of education

ministries, policymakers and researchers that in conjunction with UNESCO's International Institute for Educational Planning, collects primary school data from eleven African countries.[4] From their surveys, we have standardized student achievement tests in reading and mathematics for students who were then in the 6th form. The data show that about 60 percent of the students do not reach what SACMEQ considers the *minimum* acceptable reading level, and 86 percent fail to reach what is classified as a desirable reading level.

[4] SACMEQ's Round II survey includes information on around 40,000 students, 5,300 teachers and 2,000 headmasters from 2,000 primary schools.

UWEZO, a non-governmental organization operating in East Africa, reports similar findings from their household surveys in Kenya, (mainland) Tanzania, and Uganda (UWEZO, 2014). Between 2009 and 2012, the NGO collected data on 823,074 school-aged children from age 6 (7 in Tanzania) to 16 and (in the final round) on 10,422 schools. Their results reveal that "less than a third of children enrolled in grade 3 have basic grade 2 level literacy and numeracy [and] a significant number…do not possess foundational grade 2 level skills even as they approach the end of the primary school cycle" (4). Moreover, and despite considerable efforts at reform, there were no positive trends over the three rounds of surveys. One plausible answer to the disappointing results comes from the school inspections, which found that at least 10 percent of the teachers were absent from school on any given day.

Analysts have pointed to problems beyond the failure to monitor teacher absenteeism: leakage from education budgets (usually supplemented with generous foreign aid, both public and private), high levels of pupil absenteeism (with 34 percent of the students marked as "often absent"), and high drop-out rates (24 percent of the schools report drop-outs occur often) (Devarajan and Fengler, 2013). The culprits are manifold — and we'll discuss one candidate cause, the language of instruction, in greater detail in chapter 10— but here we report the outcome: a failure in independent

Africa states to match other regions in the production of human capital.

3 Health

Health has been a bright spot in recent African development. Data from the World Health Organization indicate that germ-based diseases account for a declining share of deaths in sub-Saharan Africa, due in large part to mass vaccination campaigns. Measles has been effectively eliminated, the percentage of deaths from malaria has been reduced by about 25 percent and substantial progress has been made on HIV/AIDS and diarrheal diseases. Recognizing these trends, *The Economist* editorialized in 2012 that the decline in African child mortality is "the best story in development."

Yet, despite these recent improvements, mortality rates in Africa remain relatively high. Consider infant mortality, the indicator most often used to judge the quality of a nation's health sector.[5] As can be seen from figure 2.5, sub-Saharan African countries made progress in the thirty years after independence: from well over 100 deaths per 10,000 births, the mortality rate in Africa fell by thirty percent in a generation. But, that was the slowest improvement of all regions, and the rate in 1990 remained the worst in the world. Returning to our earlier cases, China and South Korea saw rates converging to European standards, while infant mortality rates remained stubbornly high in Angola and Nigeria.

[5] Infant mortality is measured by the World Development Indicators (WDI) as the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age per 1,000 births.

Africa has an even greater gap looking at maternal mortality.[6] This indicator is more indicative of government failures than infant mortality, as mothers' deaths are typically due to poorly organized clinics and limited availability of urgent care (rather than the local disease burden). While data on maternal mortality does not extend as far back in time, even in 1990 the lag remained pronounced. By 1990, the rate in Africa was above 900 (per 100,000 live

[6] According to the World Health Organization, maternal mortality is the number of women per 100,000 live births that die within 42 days of the termination of pregnancy from any cause related to pregnancy or its management.



Figure 2.5
Infant Mortality by Country, 1960-1990

births); compare this to about 200 for other less developed countries and virtually zero for Europe. In the subsequent decade, African states made considerable progress. Yet, they continued to underperform all other regions. While maternal mortality in China declined to 58 by 2000, rates in Angola, Kenya, and Nigeria remained between 13 and 20 times higher.

Poverty, minimal education, and poor health are not independent outcomes: it is difficult for unhealthy children to keep up in school and, thus, obtain the education that wins them a good job. To be more concrete, consider the effects of intestinal worms (e.g., hookworm, roundworm, whipworm, and schistosomiasis), parasites that infect about 1.3 billion people worldwide. A study in southern Busia, a farming region in Kenya close to Lake Victoria, found that 92 percent of students surveyed had at least one infection related to these diseases (Miguel and Kremer, 2004). (This could be an underestimate, as stu-

Table 2.1
Average Maternal Mortality

Region	1990	2000	%Δ
SSA	900	767	-15%
SA	687	421	-39%
EAP	259	166	-36%
LAC	136	113	-17%
MENA	129	91	-29%
ECA	32	24	-26%
NA	9.5	10.5	11%

dents absent on the day of the survey may have had even higher rates of infection.) The economists who conducted this study found that treating the intestinal worms reduced student absenteeism.[7] Disease then, can not only directly affect quality of life, but also have an indirect effect on educational outcomes.

[7] The magnitude of both the direct effects and existence of any positive spillovers have been the subject of a very heated debate (see Humphreys (2015) for a "nonpartisan's" summary of the "worm wars").

Non-communicable Health Threats

If progress has been impressive in dealing with germ-based diseases, a growing concern for African health comes from non-communicable factors, such as nutrition, alcoholism, obesity, and road accidents. A tragic accident occurred in Cameroon in April 2016, where a lead car in a convoy transporting the US Ambassador to the UN — driving at breakneck speed — ran over and killed a young boy celebrating the Ambassador's arrival (Hume et al., 2016). This unsettling incident brought attention to a larger problem: road travel in much of sub-Saharan Africa entails considerable risk. In 2013, *The Economist* reported 26.9 fatalities for every 100,000 people (The Economist Data Team, 2015).[8] Compare that to just 9.3 fatalities in Europe, despite per capita car ownership that is ten times higher than in Africa. Or compare this instead to countries that were similarly underdeveloped in the early 1960s: India has 16.6; Korea, 12.0 deaths by road accident per 100,000 people (World Health Organization, 2014). Moreover, eight of the ten worst countries in the world in terms of automobile death rates are in Africa. And pedestrians bear a good deal of the burden, accounting for 40 percent of Africa's road deaths compared to a world average of 22 percent.

[8] See also Mathers and Loncar (2006), who estimate that road accidents will be the fourth largest cause of death in low income countries in the coming years. Habyarimana and Jack (2009) suggest why African roads are dangerous and how this public health problem can be (partially) remediated.

The AIDS Pandemic

Africa's AIDS epidemic is by far the worst in the world. To be sure, there has been notable progress in stemming its tide in sub-Saharan Africa. There were, according to UN data, 2.3 million new HIV infections detected in 2000; in 2014, that number was down to 1.4 million, a drop of

41 percent (UNAIDS, 2015). Still in 2013, according to AVERT, 24.7 million people were HIV positive in Africa, which amounted to 71 percent of the global total, with 1.1 million HIV-related deaths in that year (AVERT, 2015).

A South Africa Case Study

Given the scale of the epidemic, we dive deeper into the South African case, drawing on excellent qualitative work by Lieberman (2009). As it is challenging to summarize Lieberman's statement of the problem without also previewing his explanation, this section briefly touches on some proposed causes of South Africa's HIV/AIDS epidemic — a discussion we otherwise largely defer to Parts II and III.

Health data from South Africa again reveals that poverty can not fully explain mortality. After all, South Africa ranks among the top five richest countries in Africa. Yet, it is also the country that has had the largest HIV/AIDS epidemic, with an estimated 6.3 million people (19.1 percent of the general population) living HIV positive.[9] In KwaZulu-Natal, a province east of Lesotho, for women between the ages of 30 and 34, the infection rate exceeds 35 percent.

At the beginning of the crisis in the early 1980s, nearly 90 percent of the diagnosed AIDS cases were among males, both homosexual and bisexual. But by 1989, heterosexual transmission became the principal means of transmission, and the epidemic grew extraordinarily fast. By 2005, an estimated 320,000 South Africans had died of AIDS-related causes. Average life expectancy in South Africa was 64 in 1992; ten years later it fell to 46, a shocking decline due almost entirely to HIV/AIDS.

Although South Africa has a democratically elected government, its response to the crisis was halting and slow; it was not until 2000 that AIDS appeared as a line item in the national budget. The health ministry, wracked with resig-

[9] This comes from the CIA Factbook. In percentage terms, as of 2011, southern Africa is the region most affected by the virus. In Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa, the percentage of the population living HIV-positive ranges from 19.9 (South Africa) to 26.5 (Swaziland). Nearby Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, and Namibia have somewhat lower percentages, but all over ten percent. No other country in the world breaks ten percent.

nations by senior officials assigned to the AIDS program, was not only slow to respond but antagonistic to potential partners. The ministry was unwilling to support non-governmental efforts to provide medical aid, leading civil society organizations to protest against and, ultimately, sue the government for non-fulfillment of the National AIDS Plan. The government also alienated the international medical community by promoting its own AIDS drug without any evidence of its effectiveness. The government seemed uninterested in solving the public health crisis as it failed to target information to the gay community, the early victims of the epidemic, and even cut its AIDS-education budget in the mid-1990s, just as the percentage of cases was rising. It was not until 2007 that South Africa belatedly agreed to address this health catastrophe with reporting that met international standards.

What distinguishes South Africa's delayed response to this health crisis from similarly situated countries elsewhere in the world? In an ingenious comparison with Brazil's more comprehensive and rapid response to AIDS, Lieberman is able to rule out standard explanations such as regime type (both South Africa and Brazil are third wave democracies), bureaucratic competence (both had moderately effective government services), and civil society (both had well positioned activists demanding government action). Instead, Lieberman focuses attention on these countries' different levels of electoral competition. He shows that opposition parties in South Africa, namely the Democratic Alliance and Inkatha Freedom Party, were unable to challenge the African National Congress's (ANC's) dominance in 2004. Facing little competition, the ANC could remain silent on the epidemic, despite the government's glaring failure to address the public health crisis.[10]

Yet, the ANC's unassailable electoral control cannot be the entire explanation. Autocrats, such as Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Rwanda's Paul Kagame, also faced little

[10] Unlike Brazil or even other African countries, the ANC's leadership in ending apartheid earned them loyalty among a great majority and insulated them from cries for action in response to HIV/AIDS. Nelson Mandela, whose charismatic authority was unquestioned, did not use his bully pulpit to speak out on AIDS, as he feared it would hurt his electoral standing (Lieberman, 2009, 140). His successor Thabo Mbeki, despite his technocratic background, followed suit and had his health minister promote a healthy diet as the proper antidote. Jacob Zuma, Mbeki's successor, continued this despicable political tradition of denial, recommending a shower after sex with an HIV-victim to reduce the risk of infection.

political competition. However, they responded much more aggressively to HIV/AIDS.

Sharp and reified racial boundaries provide another plausible explanation for South Africa's delayed response to the epidemic (Lieberman, 2009, 143). The rigid categories of "black/African", "Coloured", "Indian", and "white/European" date back to the apartheid era and remain highly relevant. For example, surveys from the 1990s suggest that nearly 25 percent of South Africans do not want a neighbor of a different race, and inter-racial marriage is almost non-existent. Indeed, race almost perfectly predicts the language spoken in the home and the household's media diet. Perhaps unsurprisingly, discussions about AIDS in South Africa have also been racialized, with blacks (blaming white gays) and whites (blaming black sex workers) each seeing the other as responsible. Conspiracy theories abound in the popular press about how the disease is being used by one group to decimate the other. This racialism reached embarrassing levels when the head of the South African National Blood Services proposed disposing of blood from black donors in fear of infecting the wider society.

In the face of this racialization, a technical and unbiased approach to treating the epidemic was politically challenging. In office, Mandela was silent on the issue. Thabo Mbeki, his successor, argued publicly in 2001 that civil society groups had a hidden agenda; their demands for action were, in fact, proclamations that "our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust" (qtd. in Lieberman, 2009, 158).[11] Racial boundaries, a clear fact of life in many sub-Saharan states, but especially in South Africa, have reinforced a culture of blame and denial of responsibility that has not served citizens well in the face of a health catastrophe.

One might ask, if Lieberman is correct, how do we ex-

[11] Once out of office, Mandela changed course. At an international conference in Durban in 2001, he gave implicit support to the international response to AIDS. In January 2005, the cause became personal with his last surviving son, Makgatho, dying of AIDS-related complications. Politically, however, he walked a fine line, never criticizing Mbeki's reluctance to endorse the international campaign to fight AIDS.

plain the vigilant government response to the pandemic in Rwanda, a country in which ethnic boundaries dividing Tutsis and Hutus (reified under the Belgians) have been portrayed as racial? Indeed, since the 1994 genocide, there has been a "dramatic increase in [international] resources to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic…and a corresponding increase in the availability of services…With these resources, the Government of Rwanda has rapidly launched and brought to scale national HIV/AIDS services" (Kayirangwa et al., 2006, i27). One explanation is that post-genocide, many Tutsi women were infected with AIDS due to the gender-based violence perpetrated during the genocide. Kagame's Tutsi-led government was, even in the absence of political competition, especially concerned with addressing the needs of this constituency and invited international organizations to help.

But this cannot be the full answer. Well before Kagame's administration, "in 1986, Rwanda was the first country in the world to conduct and report on a nationally representative HIV seroprevalence survey. Also, in 1986, the Ministry of Health, the Red Cross, and the Norwegian Red Cross initiated an extensive AIDS education program using radio and public health educators. In 1987, the National AIDS Program was established in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO)" (Kayirangwa et al., 2006, p. i27). Consistent with Lieberman's argument, it could be that HIV/AIDS was never racialized in Rwanda, with one group blaming the other for the disease and using their alleged culpability as an excuse to deny public services. We do not have the data to support or refute that story. Whether sharp racial boundaries impede public health campaigns outside of South Africa, thus, remains an open question. In either case, South Africa's failure to stem the AIDS pandemic certainly weakens *The Economist's* sanguine evaluation of Africa's health programs.

The influence of PEPFAR on African Public Health

Foreign assistance has been a popular approach for addressing Africa's underdevelopment (see chapter 12 for our discussion of foreign aid's effectiveness). The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was US President George W. Bush's singular effort to address the international AIDS pandemic. From 2003-13, $42 billion was allocated for prevention, treatment and palliative care. There were 15 focus countries in this program, 12 of them in Africa. PEPFAR is an exceptionally resourced example of aid targeted at a specific problem. Indeed, PEPFAR constituted an infusion of funds larger in many cases than the entire health budget of the recipient countries. At one point, PEPFAR equaled 118 percent of the government's health budget in Ethiopia, 128 percent in Rwanda, 155 percent in Kenya, 234 percent in Mozambique, and 249 percent in Uganda.

There is little question that PEPFAR has been consequential in reducing adult deaths from HIV/AIDS. One study estimates that the program averted 2.9 million HIV infections from 2004-13 and, by increasing life span of those infected, reduced the number of orphans on the continent by 9 million (Heaton et al., 2015).

But the scope of the intervention's effects has been limited. For example, there is no evidence that the heavy emphasis on abstinence as a preventative measure had any effect on sex behavior (Lo et al., 2016). Similarly, PEPFAR has not helped to reduce neo-natal mortality rates, and if anything evidence suggests a slight increase in such deaths after the PEPFAR intervention. Lee and Izama (2015) suggest this is due to low quality primary health systems, which did not benefit from the infusion of PEPFAR funds. These authors argue PEPFAR not only failed to improve local health services, but that it actually crowded out more effective domestic programs; the increased funding

and salaries for those treating HIV/AIDS diverted qualified staff from other health care services.

Ebola 2014

The Ebola outbreak in 2014 provides additional perspective on the health lag in sub-Saharan Africa. As of early 2016, there were 11,315 deaths in Africa caused by Ebola since the most recent outbreak. In Liberia, the figure is 4,809; in Sierra Leone, 3,955; in Guinea, 2,536, and in Nigeria, 8 (BBC News, 2016).

Fighting Ebola demands state capacity, tracking individuals that have come in contact with infected individuals requires extensive government surveillance and record keeping. A professionalized medical establishment with clear rules of engagement, thus, appears essential for containing and preventing Ebola. We see some indication of this among the affected West African countries. Nigeria quickly contained confirmed cases and stemmed the spread of the disease — a feat that Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone struggled with. Nigeria has about 4 physicians and 18 trained nurses and midwives per 10,000 people, about four times that of the countries least successful in containing the outbreak.

But trust in government also played a role. In dealing with this epidemic, public health officials in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea called upon communities to change deep-rooted behaviors, such as burial customs. These dramatic behavioral changes would be a tall order in any setting; following years of poor service provision and corruption scandals, many distrusting citizens defied such demands, with some health workers in Guinea being killed by a skeptical and fearful mob. Based on a unique survey in Monrovia, Liberia, Tsai et al. (2015) suggest that distrust in government contributed to the spread of the disease: dubious households were less likely to use preventative measures and exhibited lower support for containment

policies. (In section 2, we discuss the slave trade as one historical explanation for this high level of distrust.)

It is informative to compare crisis response to Ebola in West Africa with the SARS epidemic in East Asia, affecting China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia, with further isolated cases around the world. Its sudden outbreak in October 2002 at first was kept under cloak and veil by the Chinese government. But within months the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) were in full investigative mode, Hong Kong and Singapore established quarantines, and the Chinese Premier shortly thereafter issued quarantine orders and threatened to punish local officials who did not report SARS cases in a timely and accurate manner. Within five months of the outbreak, the affected countries set up a joint ministerial task force to address the health pandemic, and in July 2003, nine months after outbreak, the WHO was able to announce that the disease had been contained (Wikipedia, 2016). While there are of course many differences between SARS and Ebola — including the threat to African cultural practices from isolating victims from their kin — the ability of East Asian states (a region with average incomes just slightly above sub-Saharan African countries in 1960) to resolve their health problem without facing massive distrust from their own citizens reveals the special problem many African states face in addressing crises that challenge the health and safety of their own populations.

Health and Human Development in Africa

Health is a crucial component of human development. There is much to applaud about recent improvements in post-independence Africa. But on several dimensions we see a persistent lag compared to the rest of the world. First, although communicable diseases now account for fewer deaths, the gap with the rest of the world remains. Sec-

ond, there is a disturbing rise in Africa of deaths due to non-communicable conditions, whether from obesity, alcoholism, or road safety. And, as shown with road safety, these death rates are greater than in other post-colonial countries that were underdeveloped a half-century ago. Third, in areas where government intervention is key to success, such as in AIDS treatment or responding to unanticipated public health epidemics (Ebola), many African governments lack the professionalism and trust to mount an effective response.

4 Conclusion

Human development is a multifaceted concept, including income, education, and health. In this chapter we reviewed the record of African governments in advancing the human development of its citizens. On all three dimensions, we report progress since independence but not enough to close the gap with most other countries of the world. This is but one part of Africa's lag that this book seeks to explain.

16. Conclusion

For most African countries, independence was a peaceful process and a moment of great promise. Freed from three quarters of a century of colonial subjugation, led (in some cases) by charismatic leaders who asserted control and articulated visions of equality and growth, Africans and international observers exuded optimism. This was not just political rhetoric; the UN Secretary-General, World Bank economists and other social scientists predicted political and economic development. In this "moment of madness" when everything seemed possible, these sympathetic observers overlooked the grim realities facing the new generation of African leaders.[1]

Independence did not wipe the slate clean, and charisma alone could not change what post-independence leaders inherited. *Geographically*, straddling the equator, many African states faced high disease burdens; poor soils limited agricultural productivity; and mineral wealth empowered autocrats and tempted insurgents. *Demographically*, sparsely populated expanses made it costly to project and consolidate power in peripheral regions. Seeing little evidence of the state's presence, individuals' loyalties remained to their ethnic group and not the national government, making it difficult to forge policy consensus. *Institutionally*, extractive institutions that enslaved and expropriated individuals sowed distrust and uncertainty. Growing up in systems that frequently disrespected their rights,

[1] Zolberg (1972) refers ironically to the belief that all was possible with the fall of Portugal's dictator in 1968; by this time, however, he was wizened by his own excitement of the possibilities for Africa when he was conducting research there in the 1960s.

individuals were reticent to make forward-looking investments in themselves or in their land. With the exception of missionaries who promoted health and literacy, European involvement undermined state development. Diplomats partitioned the continent with no clear knowledge of the ethnic communities or the boundaries of emerging military and political forces. Colonial powers constructed states that ruled by empowering local despots, rather than providing states services or fostering republican institutions.

This inheritance did not constitute a foundation for inclusive development; it represented a set of constraints that new leaders would labor under for at least a generation. Given this history and geography, we should not be surprised that the lofty promises of independence went unfulfilled.

But, as this book recounts, leaders had agency. The first generation of post-independence leaders made policy decisions that exacerbated the problems of slow growth, authoritarianism, and violence. To take one example, these founding fathers shared a commitment to socialist ideals, seeing it as both a repudiation of colonial capitalism and route to industrialization. However noble the goals, socialist policies failed for predictable reasons: the absence of a well-trained administrative elite capable of economic planning, and weak states that allowed peasants to escape taxation and attempts at collectivization. Many economic doctrines — including several promoted by preeminent economists in international financial institutions — proved infeasible.

Even when "good" policy was feasible, it often ran counter to leaders' desires to maintain their hold on power and enlarge the associated rents. Leaders agreed to non-interference in foreign affairs, a policy that allowed rapacious autocrats to make a mockery of human rights and democracy. While this diplomacy (or lack thereof) did little to improve the welfare of Africans, it eliminated pesky

threats of foreign intervention. Some policy failures are, from the perspective of the leader, successful moves to safeguard their continued and lucrative rule.

Despite the founding fathers' ability to lead independence movements and energize their populations, many of these leaders fell to self-aggrandizement and corruption once in power. Peter Ekeh (1975) argues that political culture enabled this corruption: stealing from the state was not regarded as immoral, so long as proceeds were used to deliver benefits to supporters. Leaders had strong reciprocal relationships with their supporters — a second public, in Ekeh's terms, often defined by ethnic groups. Yet, what those clients demanded was not good governance and fiscal discipline, but rather patronage. To survive in office, leaders found it necessary to build up a "political budget" that corrupted and ultimately bankrupted the state.

Poor endowments, infeasible goals, incentives not aligned with the promotion of reform, and permissive political cultures were the major sources of policy failure adumbrated in this book. They led to a generation of low growth, authoritarianism, and societal violence. In the evocative metaphor of de Waal (2015), African politics in its first generation of independence was "turbulent." In many states there were daily changes in key political appointments, announcements of bold new programs, anticorruption drives, and popular demands for reform. And yet one could return to a country after several years, and politics would look the same. The flurry of activities continued to reproduce the same political equilibrium.

However, by 1990, a new generation of leaders, often in power due to popular protest against corruption and authoritarianism, sought to break out of this low growth and authoritarian equilibrium. The national congresses, the reconstituted OAU as the African Union, the newly invigorated department of peacekeeping operations of the UN, the end of the Cold War and a recognition by aid

givers of the importance of evidence-based economic policy that takes into account local context and incentives all brought a renewed optimism to observers of Africa.

We examine post-1990 trends in Part IV of this book. We noted that there is a significant divide within the continent between those countries that have achieved moderate growth, democratic institutions, and social stability and those countries still mired in a distressing equilibrium. This at minimum demonstrates that the poor inheritance that undermined the hopes of independence is not a permanent constraint on growth and good government. From a perspective of *la longue durée*, African states remain young, with only seventy years of colonial rule and a half-century of independent rule. The ancient states of Asia, in this sense, had a head start in institutional development. This is an optimistic, forward-looking view.

Yet, our optimism remains cautious. Economic growth in the past two decades has been based on an evanescent commodities boom, and manufacturing remains stunted in even the highest growth economies. The UN Security Council has returned to a deadlock, making vigorous international responses to civil war violence less assured. New constitutions that were a response to the third wave of democracy are being violated by presidents seeking lifelong rule. To be sure, today's violations reflect a greater respect for democratic institutions — leaders amend constitutions, rather than dispensing with them when convenient. But still, genuine contestation and the transfer of power remains the exception in African politics. Vigilance, for those anxious for success, rather than optimism is the best response to Africa's current situation.

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