The Castle Lectures in Ethics, Politics, and Economics

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African States Since Independence:

ORDER, DEMOCRACY, & DEVELOPMENT

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For those many students of African politics whose research has guided us to rethink the region's past and see its future more clearly.

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Preface

Africans have taken a long and troubled march from their exuberant moment of freedom in the early 1960s. But now is a moment for renewed optimism. Today, many countries are providing growth, political voice, and security to their citizens.

Still, dark clouds remain on the horizon. Throughout much of Africa, countries harbor terrorists in ungoverned spaces, struggle to control diseases that cross borders, and expel refugees fleeing civil war and abject poverty. Nonetheless, this is a moment of great possibility for African states to overcome the barriers — to economic development, to democracy, and to order — that have stifled them for a generation.

Their success is consequential for all of us, whether in Africa or abroad. Despite Africa's importance, ignorance about the continent abounds. The current US president had trouble pronouncing "Namibia" in a speech to African leaders. But this ignorance is not only among foreigners. Lecturing to a large audience of college-educated Nigerians at Stanford, one of the authors (David Laitin) found that none of them could recall the details of a civil war that had killed a million of their fellow citizens just a generation ago.

This limited awareness of African affairs persists despite an outpouring of academic research in and about Africa in the past quarter century. Unfortunately, this

research — our own included — is written in technical language and buried in specialized journals. In this book, we endeavor to make the findings from these works available to a wider audience. We also develop a framework for integrating decades of research across multiple disciplines, providing an explanation for why Africa's leaders, despite charisma and high hopes, have struggled to escape their countries' geographic and historical constraints and implement effective policies. We hope the synthesis offered here will be of use to activists in nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), civil servants, entrepreneurs, university students, and the general public.

This book was motivated by an invitation to David Laitin to deliver the Castle Lectures in Ethics, Politics, and Economics at Yale University. He was invited by Nicolas Sambanis and Ian Shapiro and acknowledges the honor bestowed upon him to deliver these prestigious lectures. Darin Christensen helped to craft those lectures and agreed to dramatically expand the three presentations into a broad-based book as an equal co-author.

At Yale, comments by Kate Baldwin were inspiring. Melina Platas Izama pointed us to omissions and carefully reviewed part I. In early draft stage, members of the Working Group in African Political Economy (WGAPE) read and commented on the manuscript. Comments at that WGAPE meeting by Daniel Posner, Karen Ferree, James Fearon, and Jeremy Weinstein were especially useful in reorganizing the material. We presented a revised version to the Center for African Studies at Stanford University, where comments by James Ferguson, Richard Roberts, Marcel Fafchamps, and David Abernethy compelled us to make further revisions. We are especially indebted to Nelson Kasfir, who read the manuscript twice, each time correcting errors while offering continued encouragement. We also received penetrating comments on our economic policy chapters from Thomas Callaghy and Nicolas van

Region & Country Codes

World Bank Regions

EAP	East Asia & Pacific	ECA	Europe & Central Asia
LAC	Latin America & Caribbean	MENA	Middle East & North Africa
NA	North America	SA	South Asia
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa		

Country Codes

AGO	Angola	MOZ	Mozambique
BDI	Burundi	MRT	Mauritania
BEN	Benin	MUS	Mauritius
BFA	Burkina Faso	MWI	Malawi
BWA	Botswana	NAM	Namibia
CAF	Central African Republic	NER	Niger
CIV	Côte d'Ivoire	NGA	Nigeria
CMR	Cameroon	RWA	Rwanda
COG	Congo	SDN	Sudan
COM	Comoros	SEN	Senegal
CPV	Cabo Verde	SLE	Sierra Leone
ERI	Eritrea	SOM	Somalia
ETH	Ethiopia	SSD	South Sudan
GAB	Gabon	STP	Sao Tome and Principe
GHA	Ghana	SWZ	Swaziland
GIN	Guinea	SYC	Seychelles
GMB	Gambia	TCD	Chad
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	TGO	Togo
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	TZA	United Republic of Tanzania
KEN	Kenya	UGA	Uganda
LBR	Liberia	ZAF	South Africa
LSO	Lesotho	ZAR	Democratic Republic of the Congo
MDG	Madagascar	ZMB	Zambia
MLI	Mali	ZWE	Zimbabwe

Introduction

THIS BOOK addresses a fundamental question for those
interested in sub-Saharan Africa. Why have its postcolo-
nial states not fulfilled their promise to deliver prosperity,
good governance, and security? On these three goals, at
least through a generation of independent rule, most sub-
Saharan states did not keep pace with other world regions
that were also considered "underdeveloped" in the early
1960s, the decade of independence for most African states.
Nor had many of them fulfilled the promises of their in-
dependence movements and the charismatic leaders who
heralded a promising future.

Many expected sub-Saharan countries to flourish once
they were freed from the colonial yoke. The soaring
rhetoric of Africa's founding fathers, the assessments of
international officials, and the more staid analysis of aca-
demics all predicted rapid economic and political devel-
opment. The UN secretary-general Dag Hammarskjöld,
after an extended early-1960 tour of Africa, wrote that he
had just visited "a continent launched on the road to coop-
erative success by new and able young leaders" (Young,
2012, 12). Economic forecasts from a World Bank report
confirmed this travelogue, claiming that Africa's growth
potential surpassed East Asia's prospects, with at least
seven newly independent countries "'clearly [having] the
potential to reach or surpass' a 7 percent growth rate"
(Easterly, 2002). Political scientists documented a sense

of optimism among Africans: Crawford Young, one of
the eminent scholars conducting field work during the
early independence years, recalled, "The dawn of inde-
pendence seemed full of promise...euphoria was widely
shared across the continent" (Young, 2012, 10). They
were also energized by the opportunities for crafting new
political cultures and institutions. Even one of the more
hard-nosed early analysts of African independence, Aris-
tide Zolberg, seemed awed by Africa's bright prospects:

> Most political scientists who were in the field [of African
> politics] sufficiently early to share in the enthusiasm of
> the new men at the helm of the liberating movement were
> caught up in the drama of man's search for polity which
> was being re-enacted in a new and strange environment.
> The study of African politics provided a great and excit-
> ing intellectual adventure comparable to the quests which
> earlier had driven explorers to overcome apparently in-
> surmountable obstacles on the same continent. These
> intrepid men no longer sought to trace the sources of the
> Nile or the course of the Niger. The new challenge was to
> discover, with the help of imaginative theories of society,
> a system of rivulets which might merge into a new stream
> of democracy. (Zolberg, 1966, 1)

But the optimism was short-lived. In part I, we il-
lustrate the failures to meet these high expectations. In
the first three decades after independence, sub-Saharan
African countries fell behind other regions on standard in-
dicators of development, democracy, and order. In terms
of the distribution of power and resources, economic re-
sources failed to grow and political power quickly became
concentrated in the hands of (semi)authoritarian rulers,
who struggled to maintain order.

Part II offers a more sober look at the conditions facing
the founding fathers of Africa's new states. The sharp di-
vergence between expectations and performance becomes
easier to explain after reviewing the constraints under
which Africa's post-independence leaders worked. We

consider, for example, how geography and demography — expansive, sparsely populated, and ethnically diverse states — affected leaders' calculations regarding whether to expand the administrative reach of the state to peripheral regions. We also discuss those constraints imposed by the slave trade and other extractive institutions, the presence of missionaries, the partition of the continent by poorly informed European diplomats, and the strategies of rule employed by colonial states. No matter how inventive or ambitious the new African leaders were, these inheritances restricted the scope of feasible reform.

In part III, we discuss the policy choices in the post-independence period that contributed to economic stagnation, weak but repressive states, and internal conflict. Due to historical constraints and unrealistic ideological commitments, new leaders and their successors failed to provide growth and security. Africa stagnated for a generation. While our review is not exhaustive, we cover several important policy areas, including language choices, foreign policy, and the economic doctrines that guided government spending and monetary policy.

Lest one lose faith in the ability of governments to surmount constraints and promote economic and political development, in part IV we discuss several recent successes. Beginning in the early 1990s, despite a few notable setbacks, movements to replace military rule and one-party states with democracy made meaningful progress. Aided by a boom in mineral prices, economic growth during the first decade of this century has been impressive in many African countries. And new solidarity pacts exemplified in the African Union have helped cauterize civil conflict and restrain dictatorial tendencies among fellow presidents. The negative framing of African affairs through the 1980s and 1990s is therefore being challenged, a cautiously hopeful sign for the future.

The Logic of Political Rule in Africa

After establishing in part I the dimensions of Africa's post-independence lag, parts II-IV proceed (for the most part) chronologically: we begin with geographic or historical constraints, discuss post-independence policy choices, and then end with a discussion of more promising recent trends. Yet, we also see these sections as illuminating different aspects of a more general political problem: working within the constraints imposed by history or geography, how do leaders survive in office and realize their policy (or personal) goals? The policy failures of the post-independence period were not simply due to bad ideas (though there were certainly some of those). A political logic guided African leaders' decisions to champion or shelve certain policies. Where reform threatened an incumbent's political base or outstripped the weak bureaucracy inherited from the colonial state, we should not be surprised that a leader opted for the status quo or muddled through with a suboptimal alternative.

By describing the constraints facing leaders and their political objectives, we can make sense of policies that, ultimately, contributed to three decades of dismal economic growth and political instability for too many of Africa's newly independent states. To be sure, there have been impressive economic successes, as in Botswana and Lesotho. And countries such as Tanzania avoided violent breakdowns. But on average, compared with other post-colonial regions, African states faced policy failure. To account for this failure, we develop a simple analytical framework here that we return to throughout the book to help explain the early policy failures, as well as examine the possibilities for a more successful future. When discussing leaders' choices, we consider both sides of the political ledger — the benefits (e.g., status, economic growth) and costs (e.g., fomenting opposition, running budget deficits) that inform leaders' decisions. We ex-

pect that leaders choose policies that maximize the expected value of office, adopting initiatives that they expect will deliver benefits without dramatically decreasing their odds of retaining power or imposing prohibitive costs.[1]

The diagram below (adapted from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005), illustrates our framework. Starting on the left of figure 1, geography and history — both distant and more recent — shape the distribution of power and resources that leaders inherit. Some leaders inherit a country that is ethnically homogeneous; others, an ethnically diverse population. Some inherit an incompetent bureaucracy; others, a meritocratic civil service. Some enjoy oil reserves; others rely heavily on cash crops for foreign exchange. Some oversee a population that (unevenly) benefited from missionaries' educational efforts; others, a citizenry displaced and distrustful after centuries of slave trading. Some enjoy widespread support; others can count few supporters outside of their own region or ethnic group. This inheritance weighs heavily on the leader, constraining what is feasible. In part II, we examine how history and geography limit leaders' choices.

[1] For those comfortable with symbolic representation, we can express the leader's problem as $max_{p \in P}\{S(p)[B(p) - C_S(p)] - [1 - S(p)]C_{NS}(p)\}$ where $S(p)$ is the probability of survival given policy choice p in the set of feasible policies P, and $B(p)$ is the benefit the leader receives from policy p. $C_S(p)$ is costs paid if the leader survives, while $C_{NS}(p)$ is costs paid if leader does not survive. We set (or normalize) the benefits to be zero if the leader doesn't survive.

Figure 1
Conceptual Framework

Moving to the right on our diagram, leaders make policy choices. Upon coming to power, they have their own objectives: industrializing, fostering equality, and promot-

ing new national or transnational identities. Guided by these objectives and given their historical and contemporary constraints, these leaders pursue reforms that deliver policy or personal benefits without jeopardizing their political survival.[2] In part III we unpack the ideological baggage that leaders bring to office, which provides the material for their cultural and economic policies.

But leaders do not always choose the optimal policy from the perspective of overall welfare. Constrained or not, leaders want to retain control and are unlikely to implement reforms that imperil their status, wealth, and continued rule. A potentially more beneficial policy for growth, for security, or for democracy may simply be ignored if that policy also compromises the leader's incumbency. Rooting out corruption, for example, could improve public service delivery, but also anger elites that depend on rents and extortion under the corrupt system. If the leader depends on the support (or acquiescence) of those same corrupt elites, reform is unlikely. Or a floating exchange rate: while this monetary policy could boost exports, leaders might dismiss the prospect out of hand, fearing the riots that would erupt from price hikes on the imported goods that urban constituents demand.

At the far right of our diagram, we see that policy choices shape the future distribution of power and resources. Winners win; losers lose. In redistributing economic and political power, policies also change the constraints facing the leader in the future — thus, the feedback loop connecting future to historic resources and power (one government's future is its successor's history). However, policy rarely reconfigures the social order, especially in weak states and where the social order reflects powerful historical and geographical forces. For example, a landlocked country faces constraints to international trade, whether under colonial rule or after independence.

[2] We interchange the words *policy* and *reform*. However, we recognize that the leader might opt for the status quo — a clear policy choice, but not one that entails reform.

Hence, we allow for persistence in the distribution of economic and political power over time (i.e., a direct effect).

As we go through the historical and geographic constraints (in part II) and early policies instituted by postcolonial leaders (in part III), we use each chapter's conclusion to refer back to this framework, filling in the boxes with specific constraints and policies.

Distinguishing Our Approach

Our analytical framework might appear subject to Thandika Mkandawire's (2001) powerful, oft-cited critique of African development studies. Mkandawire highlights two contradictory sentiments in the writing of Western commentators: "the pessimism of the diagnosis and the optimism of the prescription" (289). These analysts can in the same breath — or, at least, a single work — lament the "impossibility of developmental states in Africa" and offer confident prescriptions for reforms that will ensure success.

We cannot deny that our review of the first thirty years of independence may feel bleak. However, we wish to highlight that Africa's geography and history, rather than serving as inescapable and enduring shackles, represent real but surmountable constraints. Moreover, we make no prescriptions for reform and remain cautiously hopeful about more recent improvements in economic development and political liberalization.

Similarly, we avoid simple dichotomies posing, for example, policy versus destiny as competing explanations for African countries' slow growth (Collier and Gunning, 1999). As we hope is already becoming apparent, we see these as *complementary* explanations. Although we don't deny that history and geography can have direct effects on contemporary outcomes, they also constrain policy decisions.

Another fault line in the study of African politics di-

vides "joiners" and "splitters." Splitters through their teaching and research have sought to undermine popular views of a culturally and political homogeneous continent. Some societies, they note, are matrilineal; others patrilineal. Some societies are pastoral, others agricultural, and still others are highly dependent upon mining. Some tribes are hierarchical; others acephalous (i.e., leaderless). Some countries faced indirect rule; others direct rule. Joiners have, on the other hand, searched for commonalities. Until relatively recently, they wrote about Africa's growth tragedy (Easterly and Levine, 1997). As economic prospects have improved, they've started to ask, "Is this Africa's time?" (Robertson, 2012) Here African countries are seen as facing common constraints and opportunities.

Our innovation — and it may not totally satisfy either camp — is to draw upon both bodies of scholarship to help explain cross-national differences in human welfare. We're interested in why Kenya has grown faster than Somalia, but failed to keep pace with Thailand (which had nearly the same per capita gross domestic product [GDP] in 1965). The splitters help us to answer the first part of this question, recounting Kenya's relatively peaceful post-independence history, which contrasts sharply with Somalia's persistent struggle to maintain peace. The joiners take a broader perspective, explaining why East Asia and East Africa followed different policy and economic trajectories.[3]

It becomes imprudent to remain as joiners in addressing policy choices and outcomes post-1990. At this point, variation across African states becomes more prominent in our analysis. Indeed, in this period, a divide has opened between states that are advancing economically and instituting political reforms and those that are mired in slow growth, personalist rule, and peripheral rebellion. In the African Economic Research Consortium's (AERC) re-

[3] What readers, especially the splitters among them, may find missing in this manuscript is much discussion of differences within individual African countries and how these contribute to inequalities across towns or provinces (e.g., between Western and Central Kenya).

view of African growth from 1960 to 2000, Ndulu and O'Connell (2008, 26) point out that the "variation in long-run growth within SSA [sub-Saharan Africa] dwarfs the difference between average growth in SSA and average growth in any other region." Therefore, in part IV, we narrow our focus in an effort to chart divergent outcomes — stories of tentative successes and ongoing stagnation — among African states.

Whether splitters or joiners, scholars have recently made progress in getting to the roots of Africa's lag by engaging in careful empirical research that, while keenly aware of the difficulties, tries to identify variables that have a causal effect on democracy, on economic growth, and on security. An important goal of this volume is to synthesize those contributions along each dimension. Empirical research on the question of African states' unfulfilled promise has been impressively robust in the past several years, but it exists mostly in highly technical journals. Here, we accept the challenge of making these studies available to the general reader in a way that is both accessible and persuasive. In this endeavor, we seek, through graphical presentations and case studies, to convey and animate core findings.

However, we must warn readers that we cannot offer definitive answers on the causes of democratic failure, economic stagnation, and conflict. The causal pathways from, for example, colonial rule to contemporary economic, political, and social outcomes are numerous, intersecting, and perhaps beyond the tools of social science to map fully. Moreover, failure on one outcome can impede progress on another, and vice versa: the failure to educate children, for example, leads to poorly informed voters, who struggle to punish officials who fail to deliver increased spending on teachers or schools. These feedback loops (in this instance, poor education ⤳ low accountability ⤳ poor education) trap countries in a ru-

inous autocratic and low growth equilibrium. This makes it all the more difficult to isolate cause and effect.

We hope that as the book progresses, each chapter will elaborate on our novel conceptual scheme of heroic goals confronting daunting constraints and the policy compromises and outcomes that result from this collision. Both the reasons for Africa's lag and the tentative steps being taken to correct it should become clearer as the book progresses. We see in this framework a realistic foundation for imagining a more democratic, a more secure, and a more prosperous continent.

Part I. From Great Expectations to Unfulfilled Dreams

In their first half-century of self-rule, newly independent African states have lagged behind the rest of the world in terms of economic development, the establishment of effective governance capable of securing social order, and the consolidation of democracy. Here in part I, we first seek to capture a moment in the late 1950s: a new generation of Africans was on the threshold of becoming the founding fathers of states escaping colonialism. Although they acknowledged the challenges that independence would bring, their optimism and goals to restore the greatness of Africa, as we document in chapter 1, were exhilarating. Yet, as chapters 2-4 recount, the displacement of elected leaders with military dictators, the disease of corruption, and the specter of violence and civil war cumulatively undermined early optimism. African states' progress was far less impressive than in other world regions on most indicators of human development and security. The symptoms of this failure plagued African polities at least through the early 1990s. In chapter 2, we focus on the lag in human development, examining indicators of income, health, and education. In chapter 3, we consider democracy and the rule of law, cataloging the undermining of democracy (with one-party states) and the cascade of coups that brought military dictatorships to many African countries. In addition, we highlight the

corruption in both civilian and military regimes that un-
dermined the rule of law. In chapter 4, our focus turns to
the breakdown of social order through communal conflict
and civil war. In these three chapters, relying on statisti-
cal evidence and accompanying case studies, we compare
African states with other regions to reckon the magnitude
of Africa's lag and convey its human costs. These chap-
ters raise the fundamental question of this book — what
explains African states' struggles in the first half-century
of independence?

1. The Charismatic Founders and
Their Dreams

WE BEGIN THIS BOOK at a moment of great promise. A decade into the post–World War II peace, complementary geopolitical and ideological changes enabled aspiring elites in the colonial world not only to articulate but also to fulfill a vision of dividing empires into nations. A new generation of Africans, imbued with ideals of nationalism, pan-Africanism, and independence, articulated the aspirations of their colonized brethren.

Their idea that African states would escape the colonial yoke became an achievable goal as the dust settled from World War II. The war had incapacitated former empires. France had been occupied, and General Charles de Gaulle, the leader of the anti-Nazi French resistance, ruled in exile until 1944. Brazzaville in the Congo, not Paris, became the symbolic capital of *La France libre* (Free France). Meanwhile, Britain had made vast concessions to the Congress Party in India about a future independence in return for its support during the war. All the European metropoles had expanded their armed forces by recruiting and training soldiers from their colonies, and European warfare gave African soldiers an experience of the wider world and a confidence that they could succeed with self-rule.

Independence movements in sub-Saharan Africa came

on the heels of successful struggles elsewhere (figure 1.1).
Nationalist uprisings against colonial rule in Vietnam
(French retreat after defeat in Dien Bien Phu in 1954)
and Algeria (the National Liberation Front was the *bête
noire* of the French Fourth Republic, helping its demise in
1958) were the major world conflicts during the postwar
peace. In 1955 Sukarno, the nationalist leader of Indone-
sia, invited compatriots from other nationalist movements
throughout Asia and Africa to Bandung. This was the
origin of a "non-aligned" movement that foreshadowed
a new era of independent states. In 1956, Gamal Abdel
Nasser, who had overthrown a traditionalist monarchy
in Egypt, burnished his nationalist credentials through
the nationalizing of the Suez Canal, successfully defying
the British and the French, who could no longer main-
tain their imperial control over this crucial chokepoint of
international shipping.

Figure 1.1
Number of Independent States,
1940-2010

The United States, the dominant state post–World War
II, played a passive but important role in advancing the na-
tionalist agenda. President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused
to support the French in their attempt to retain Vietnam as
a colony and seethed with anger over France and Britain's
military campaign to reestablish control over the Suez
Canal. Through diplomatic channels, Eisenhower made
clear that he would not wage war to sustain European
empires. More publicly, the newly elected senator from
Massachusetts, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, gave a vision-
ary speech in the Senate in support of Algeria's National
Liberation Front on July 2, 1957, only a few months after
taking his seat:

> The most powerful single force in the world today is
> neither communism nor capitalism, neither the H-bomb
> nor the guided missile; it is man's eternal desire to be free
> and independent.... If we are to secure the friendship
> of the Arab, the African, and the Asian — and we must,
> despite what Mr. Dulles [the secretary of state] says about

our not being in a popularity contest — we cannot hope
to accomplish it solely by means of billion-dollar foreign
aid programs. We cannot win their hearts by making
them dependent upon our handouts. Nor can we keep
them free by selling them free enterprise, by describing
the perils of communism or the prosperity of the United
States, or limiting our dealings to military pacts. No, the
strength of our appeal to these key populations — and it
is rightfully our appeal, and not that of the Communists
— lies in our traditional and deeply felt philosophy of
freedom and independence for all peoples everywhere.
(Kennedy, 1957)

This message was not ignored in imperial headquarters. Recognizing a new era, Tory prime minister Harold Macmillan traveled to South Africa with a speech (on February 3, 1960) before the apartheid-supporting South African Parliament. "The wind of change," he declared, "is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it."

The inevitability of independence for Indonesia, for India, for Vietnam, and for Algeria after World War II brought a new perspective on nationalism. Liberals and democrats had long seen nationalism as antithetical to a liberal state and associated it with doctrines such as Fascism and Nazism. But the anticolonial moment provided a new positive valence to nationalism — it came to represent liberation of all third-world peoples (Emerson, 1960).

Aspiring African leaders would take full advantage of this moment to press for liberation. In this chapter, we seek to reconstruct this optimistic and forward-looking moment in Africa's political history.

1   History Moved Through "Charismatic Leadership"

Third-world nationalism required a dynamic leader who could both constitute a nation from the diverse populations contained within colonial boundaries and also negotiate with the metropole over the transition to native rule. These leaders had to not only connect with and unite their populations but also convince colonial administrators that they were ready to rule. They succeeded in the former by presenting themselves as icons of the nation rather than their tribe. Indeed, nearly half of the initial heads of government were not from the dominant ethnic group of their newly independent state and could gain wide support only by associating themselves with the nation.[1] Many of them also earned legitimacy after being incarcerated by colonial authorities. They succeeded in the latter, in part, due to their Western educations — childhoods in missionary schools and university degrees from Europe and the US — which assuaged the racist concerns of colonial authorities.

New leaders inspired their fellow nationals with an almost magical quality, a phenomenon that the German sociologist Max Weber called "charisma" (from the Greek, literally "gift of grace"). Weber argued that it takes such leadership to overcome the routinized politics of everyday life; in this case, the narrow scope of political activity permitted by the colonial bureaucracy. These charismatic leaders had to convince their fellow nationals that independence was inevitable and on the path to a surmountable mountaintop, rather than an impossible uphill battle against a still dominant empire. The biographies of prominent founding fathers provide a compelling view into this pivotal moment in African history and convey their optimism regarding their countries' and the region's future.[2]

[1] Of the forty states that became independent in this moment, only twenty-three out of forty inaugural heads of state came from the dominant ethnic groups in their countries (Mitchell, Morrison, and Paden, 1989).

[2] Readers might wonder why Nelson Mandela is absent from these vignettes. His charismatic moment was in the 1990s. See Mandela (1990) for a collection of his speeches and writings from 1944 through to his release from prison in 1990.

Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana

Kwame Nkrumah (figure 1.2), the charismatic founder of Ghana (from the British Gold Coast colony), was a prominent guest of Sukarno in Bandung and one of the visionaries of the non-aligned movement. He was born in 1909 to an Nzima-speaking family, a language group representing less than 3 percent of the Gold Coast's population. In the Gold Coast, Nkrumah was educated by Catholic missionaries and won a scholarship to the prestigious colonial college Achimoto. He did not qualify for a university scholarship in London but, through the intervention of an uncle, he was accepted to Lincoln University in Pennsylvania (one of America's historic black colleges and universities); after that, he enrolled in the London School of Economics.

Still abroad in 1947, Nkrumah was induced to return home by J. B. Danquah, the founder of the earliest nationalist organization in the Gold Coast, the United Gold Coast Convention. Danquah offered the young Nkrumah the position of party secretary. Shortly after Nkrumah assumed this position, veterans of World War II rallied in Accra demanding their rightful benefits. A riot ensued that led to two deaths. Colonial authorities implicated Nkrumah, and he was detained in a remote village in the colony's north. Upon his release, he challenged Danquah's conservatism and created the Convention People's Party (CPP). Civil disobedience campaigns organized by the CPP led to Nkrumah's arrest and a prison sentence of fourteen months. Upon his release, 100,000 people were waiting for him on the streets. He had now established his street credibility. An enlightened colonial governor, Charles Noble Arden-Clarke, understood the threat and opportunity that Nkrumah represented and brilliantly appointed him as the colony's prime minister.

The sources of Nkrumah's charismatic appeal were

Figure 1.2
Kwame Nkrumah

manifold. He articulated a theory of "consciencism" (Nkrumah, 1970) that skillfully combined the Euro-Christian, the Islamic, and the African traditions into a compelling ideology for modern Africa. Wearing Western suits, he could earn the trust of the British governor as a serious and responsible future leader, yet (wearing kente cloth robes), he could also earn the trust of country villagers as a simple man who could sit on the ground and share a meal with them. In the Gold Coast, he stood for youth against age, for peasants against chiefs, and for "Ghanaians" against the British. Nkrumah was savvy enough to be on the right side of history on all three of these dimensions. This revealed impressive vision and earned him admiration to match the charismatic aura that he exuded.

His vision was clear, powerful, and yet initially deemed implausible. He envisioned self-government for a re-named country, Ghana (after a defunct but once powerful West African kingdom), as a first step to liberating and uniting all of Africa. He presented this vision in his protest speeches, in Parliament in his role as prime minister, and in speeches throughout the countryside, which he traversed in his Cadillac. Speaking to Nkrumah's charisma, journalistic reports claimed that touching that car yielded ecstasy and a sense of connection to the future among his rural audiences.

Thanks to the presence of the American journalist John Gunther (Gunther, 1955, 809–812), we have a record of Nkrumah's "independence" resolution in the Gold Coast Legislative Assembly in July 1953. He stood before the Legislative Assembly wearing "a cotton smock, white with vertical black stripes [that] symbolizes simplicity in contrast to the ornate regalia of the chiefs." He began with a quotation from Edmund Burke emphasizing the need for political maturity and then one from Aristotle emphasizing the need for political virtue. He moved from

biblical imagery ("The heroes of our future will be those who can lead our people out of…serfdom, into the valley of light") to practical wisdom ("As long as somebody else has charge of us, we can lay our mistakes at their door"). Yet his purpose was unmistakable: "We prefer self-government with danger to servitude in tranquility." To be sure, Nkrumah faced opposition in the Assembly, especially from the cocoa regions that were to be heavily taxed to support his grand schemes. But on that day, the cheers at virtually every line were dutifully recorded by the Hansard stenographers.

Gunther reports that upon leaving his private ante-room after this speech, Nkrumah was "lifted off his feet. Deputies, party friends, colleagues, seized him and, while he was laughing and struggling, carried him on their hands around and around the open square. There was a mad clatter of excitement and the parliamentarism we had just seen exploded into a wild, cheerful frenzy, and people began to sing and dance. Breathless, Nkrumah got off the shoulders of his partisans. "If Winston Churchill were ever to be captured outside Downing Street and hoisted into the air by Yeomen of the Guard dancing a jig," Gunther imagines, "the scene would be equivalent." Gunther then overhears an African onlooker, nearly weeping, who cried out, "The Prime Minister's speech is the turning point of my life. All my life I have thought that the white man was my enemy. Now I know that he is my friend!" This was the quintessential charismatic moment.

Julius Nyerere of Tanzania

Julius Nyerere (figure 1.3), the future leader of Tanzania, offered a somewhat more sedate appeal. He conceived of himself, and was regarded by the multitudes in Tanganyika (the name of the colony before the accession of Zanzibar), as both *mwalimu* (teacher) and *baba wa taifa* (father of his nation). He constantly admon-

Figure 1.3
Julius Nyerere

ished his people as if he were their primary school teacher. *Mwalimu* scolded his countrymen for failing to match the world's great powers: "Our friends are using their brains while our [people] sleep and grow fungus; they are sending rockets into outer space while we are eating wild roots!"

Nyerere vigorously promoted Swahili as a common language: he spoke only Swahili in country, and even translated Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* to demonstrate the language's adaptability. Despite his commitment to Swahili, Nyerere was brilliantly articulate in English and was the first Tanganyikan to get a university degree overseas (in Scotland). He was also baptized Catholic at age twenty. Coming from a small tribe, he was not associated with any significant subgroup of Tanganyikans and faced almost no opposition in his election as president of the first nationalist party, the Tanganyikan African National Union (TANU). As president of independent Tanganyika, he refused to live in the state house and reported that was far more comfortable joking with peasants on the road than speaking with diplomats. Typical of the first generation of leaders, he was also trusted by the British (who administered Tanganyika as a trust territory after German defeat in World War I). As independence was foreseen by the trust arrangement, Nyerere never engaged in the kind of agitation that would get him arrested.

It was several years later, after articulating a visionary statement for his country, that his fame reached charismatic proportions. He released his Arusha Declaration in 1967 (supplemented by his essay "Education for Self-Reliance"), in which he articulated an ideology of *Uhuru na Ujamaa* (Freedom and Socialism). This was followed by the nationalization of banks, insurance companies, sisal estates, and other large establishments, and a code of conduct (moving them toward monastery rules) for all party officials. This announcement set off a spontaneous

set of celebrations and marches across the country, with reports from the local press that an "entire village was seething with revolutionary enthusiasm emitted by the Spirit of Arusha."

Later on, during a long march led by Nyerere, *The Standard* reported that "Mwalimu's brisk march into the town [of Mwanza] stunned the masses who on seeing him in sound health were driven wild with admiration and excitement to borders of near frenzy. The entire town was gripped with the revolutionary fervor of the Spirit of Arusha." Nyerere's vision for Tanzania — and indeed for Africa — was one that would build on native socialism and hard work to catch up with the great powers. That vision captured the imagination of his countrymen, many of whom believed his capabilities for transforming their society were extraordinary.

Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya

Jomo Kenyatta (figure 1.4), Kenya's first independence leader, may not have been credited with magical powers or adulation. Yet, during his long rule, few questioned that the presidency was his entitlement. He was seen not as a transitory political leader but rather as an embodiment of his country.

An orphan, he was enrolled in a Scottish mission school near Nairobi. As a Kikuyu, he was a member of the plurality linguistic group in Kenya (representing about 21 percent of the population). The Kikuyu are not only Kenya's largest group, but also centrally located and, thus, were the primary victims of land seizures by the colonists establishing plantations in Kenya's central highlands. The group's numbers and grievances facilitated their political mobilization. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Kenyatta (then known as "Johnstone," the name given him by missionaries) became active in Kikuyu orga-

Figure 1.4
Jomo Kenyatta

nizations and by 1928 was publishing a Kikuyu-language newspaper in Nairobi.

A year later he emigrated to the United Kingdom and, while there, married an English woman. He studied anthropology at the London School of Economics (and later in Moscow) and worked under Bronisław Malinowski, considered one of the most important anthropologists of the twentieth century. While physically removed from Kenya, Kenyatta remained focused on the country and, specifically, Kikuyu history and culture, entitling his thesis *Facing Mount Kenya: The Tribal Life of the Gikuyu* (1938) — a collection of essays that described the social ruin brought on by colonial policy. Seeking to enhance his credibility among Kenyans, he dropped the surname "Johnstone" and became "Kenyatta." Kenyatta returned to his homeland in 1946 and joined the Kikuyu Central Association to help recover the "White Highlands," the area in central Kenya heavily settled by European farmers. Shortly, he became its secretary general. The Association was dissolved by the British government for its radicalism, but it reemerged as the Kenya African Union (KAU), seeking to expand beyond Kikuyu membership. Kenyatta became the KAU's president. As he traveled throughout the country, his speeches attracted tens of thousands of people and gave subtle signals of his support for the Mau Mau, the insurgent group seeking to retake the highlands. When violence broke out between the Mau Mau and white settlers, Kenyatta was arrested. He refused to denounce the insurgency and, after a five-month trial, was convicted in 1953 and sentenced to seven years. In that same year, the KAU was banned.

Kenyatta's persecution as a spokesman for independence gave him a unifying appeal. His charisma now combined with widespread support. When Kenyatta was freed in 1961, he assumed control of the dominant independence movement (now called the Kenyan African

National Union, or KANU). And with KANU's victory in the independence election, he had an uncontested claim on the country's presidency — a post he held until his death in 1978.

Léopold Senghor of Senegal

With some 95 percent of Senegalese professing the Muslim faith, and with Wolof speakers constituting a majority of Senegalese, Léopold Senghor (figure 1.5) was a double minority: his father was a Serer Catholic, and his mother was a Muslim from the Peul-speaking community. As a child, he was sent to a Catholic boarding school. Later, he transferred to a secular French school, where he excelled in French literature and won a scholarship to study in France. He studied there through university and was honored with an appointment as a literature professor in Tours and in Paris. He took on French citizenship in 1932 and became the first African to be an elected member of the Académie Française.

Senghor served in the French army in World War II. He was captured and interned in a German prison camp, and when he was released, he joined the French resistance. After the war, he won a seat in the French National Assembly as a member of the French Socialist Party. Senghor served as a state secretary and then an advisory minister in the Fourth Republic's socialist governments. He was on the drafting committee for the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. Up until independence, he favored Senegal being an equal region within France but retained strong socialist ideals.

Part of Senghor's international prestige was built on his poetry (written in French) that gave beauty and substance to the glorification of blackness, in the philosophy of négritude. Here he connected his personality and his future to African culture and sensibility. Upon his return to Senegal, he lent his support for African workers when

Figure 1.5
Léopold Senghor

conductors (bringing groundnuts to Dakar) went on strike against the French national railways. His combination of international prestige and a message combining culture and socialism earned him great honor. He became the first president of independent Senegal as a revered figure throughout the country.

Ahmed Sékou Touré of Guinea

Sékou Touré (figure 1.6) earned his charismatic status quite differently from Nkrumah, Nyerere, and Senghor, all of whom combined overseas European education with an ability to connect with villagers. To be sure, he studied at a French technical school in Conakry, Guinea's capital, but he was more a rebel than a prized student in the colonial system. He was expelled from school for leading a food riot. After landing a job in the postal service, he quickly became a labor organizer there and led the first successful labor union strike in French West Africa.

Figure 1.6
Ahmed Sékou Touré

Unlike Senghor and Nkrumah, Touré was not from a marginalized ethnic group. He was a Mandé, a group that made us some 48 percent of Guinea's population. But he identified himself even more broadly. He portrayed himself as a descendant of Samory, one of the great anticolonial rebel fighters in the nineteenth century who had an appeal beyond today's Guinea, including today's Burkina Faso and Mali. He legitimated himself not by tribe but by a broader category of nation.

Like Senghor, he got elected to the French National Assembly in 1951. But unlike Senghor, he was not permitted to take his seat. He was twice rebuffed to take his legislative seat in Paris. But after his election as mayor of Conakry, Guinea's capital, French colonial authorities granted him permission to sit in 1956.

His great fame and heroic status came two years later, when President de Gaulle offered French colonial territories the right to either demand immediate independence or

recognize their long-term interests as fellow members of the newly created French Community. Touré was the only leader who lobbied for the former, making Guinea the first independent French-speaking state in sub-Saharan Africa, with Touré as its elected president. This turned him into a national hero, the only client of the French who would stand for true independence. His revolutionary and anticolonial ardor continued throughout his presidency (Touré, 1973). His nationalist prestige allowed him to retain presidential power for twenty-six years, until 1984, when he died in office.

After the vote of 1958, when Guinea voted to demand its independence from France, the French tore out every phone hookup, removed all their office equipment, and left the newly independent country with no infrastructure. Unfazed, Touré turned to the Soviet Union for support, a bold move during the height of the Cold War. Later, after Nkrumah was ousted from power by a coup d'état, he became an honored guest in Guinea. Touré continued to have an uncanny ability to marginalize competing elites (surviving numerous coup attempts and assassination plots) while basking in the adulation of the masses.

Patrice Lumumba of Congo (Kinshasa)

Patrice Lumumba's charisma was amplified by his martyrdom (figure 1.7). Unlike the British and French in their colonies, the Belgians did not educate or train a professional class of Africans. In the late 1950s, there were almost no Congolese with European university experience. This was true for Lumumba. His education by both Protestant and Catholic missionaries qualified him for a job as a postal clerk. He became active in the Belgian Liberal party, bringing him into some pan-African circles, and in 1958 he created a nationalist party, the *Mouvement National Congolais* (MNC).

History suddenly moved all too quickly. In October

Figure 1.7
Patrice Lumumba

1959, while leading a rally in Stanleyville (today's Kisangani), Lumumba was arrested for fomenting a riot in which thirty people were killed. He was saddled with a sixty-nine-month prison sentence for his instigating role. But when his party won a decisive victory in the first local elections to be held in the Congo in January 1960, he was released to participate in a roundtable conference in Brussels to discuss Congo's future. Belgium agreed to liberate Congo in six months' time, with national elections to be held in May.

Lumumba's youth (he was then thirty-four years old) and radical vision made him wildly popular in electoral rallies. After the vote, he became the first prime minister of independent Congo. He differentiated himself from the president, Joseph Kasavubu, by his populist and ardent rhetoric on the day power was transferred, June 30, 1960. Lumumba (Lumumba, 1961, 44–47) railed against the atrocities unleashed on the population of the Congo Free State under Belgium's King Leopold II:

> No Congolese will ever forget that independence was won in struggle, a persevering and inspired struggle carried on from day to day, a struggle, in which we were undaunted by privation or suffering and stinted neither strength nor blood.. . .

> The Republic of the Congo has been proclaimed and our beloved country's future is now in the hands of its own people.

> Brothers, let us commence together a new struggle, a sublime struggle that will lead our country to peace, prosperity and greatness.. . .

> We shall show the world what the black man can do when working in liberty, and we shall make the Congo the pride of Africa.

With the (Belgium-supported) secession of the Katanga province months later, the West did nothing to support the central government in Kinshasa. Lumumba

went to the Soviet Union for support. Although the Soviets had limited resources to influence events in Congo, the resulting foreign accord led to a break with President Kasavubu, who arrested his own prime minister. Lumumba was brought to Katanga, where he was tortured and killed by a firing squad. Lumumba became a martyr, representing socialism, nationalism, and an African future freed from the colonial yoke and continued interference.

Obafemi Awolowo and Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria

Awolowo (Awo) and Azikiwe (Zik) were Nigeria's preeminent "southern" nationalist leaders, creating all-Nigerian movements for independence. Awolowo (figure 1.8) was a Yoruba from the southwest, a language group representing about 20 percent of Nigerians. Azikiwe (figure 1.9) was an Igbo from the southeast, a language group representing some 17 percent of Nigerians. While both Yoruba and Igbo were plurality groups in two of Nigeria's three regions, they were minorities compared with the Hausas (representing about 29 percent of the population), who constituted a plurality in the Northern region.

In the late 1950s, as Awolowo and Azikiwe traveled through their respective regions, the massive crowds chanted "Awo" and "Zik," nicknames that later became the titles of their treatises. (Awolowo, 1960; Azikiwe, 1961). They fostered an enormous optimism and hope for what the inevitable independence of Nigeria would yield.

Awo got a law degree in London and came back to Nigeria as a journalist. In 1947, he founded the *Egbe Omo Oduduwa* (the Society for the Sons of Oduduwa, Oduduwa being the traditional Yoruba deity) and then the "Action Group," the political party that in 1951 was demanding independence in a federal republic. Awo became western premier, and with great funding from the cocoa marketing boards, he was the first to bring universal

Figure 1.8
Obafemi Awolowo

Douglas Miller, Hulton Archive, Getty Images

Figure 1.9
Nnamdi Azikiwe

primary education and free health care for all to a region anywhere in Africa. He was lionized for this progressive agenda.

Zik was trained by Methodists in Lagos, and then went to the United States to attend Howard University and finally Lincoln University, where he received a university degree. He returned to Nigeria and founded the *West African Pilot*, the most influential nationalist newspaper on the continent. He was based then in Lagos, the country's capital in the Yoruba-dominated southwest. This gave him a national vision, well beyond his home region. He founded his own political party, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC), with a goal for a unified (i.e., non-federal) Nigeria. He became chief minister of the Eastern Region in the late colonial period and then governor-general (formal head of state) at independence. With the proclamation of Nigeria as a republic (1963), in an electoral alliance with the Northern party, he became Nigeria's first independent president. Zik was celebrated in the east, but through his editorship of the *Pilot* and his vision for a free and independent Africa, was endowed with charisma throughout Nigeria.

2   Conclusion

The late 1950s and early independence years were a sort of Jeffersonian moment in Africa. A generation of largely Western-educated nationalists took the helm of newly independent African states to overcome the oppressive, racist, and anti-developmental colonial states, envisioning independent Africa freed from the colonial yoke. In their constitutions, they fashioned new goals of educational and economic advancement as obligations of their states to their citizens (Spiro, 1960, 76). For example, the Somali constitution, written for one of the poorest countries of the world, promised all citizens free primary education and social security (Articles 35 and 37). Freed

from colonial dictates, African states would serve the real needs of their citizens.

Fast-forwarding, Nkrumah declared himself a demigod and was ignominiously overthrown by his own army. Lumumba was killed by regional warlords. Nyerere survived, but watched his country stagnate economically for a generation. Senghor left office with honor, but with his country in similar economic straits. Touré's experiment in radical independence provided Guineans with little but poverty and stagnation. Awo and Zik survived, not without controversy, but both gave way to a succession of military rulers who were impervious to the more progressive visions of Nigeria's charismatic founders.

Clearly, charisma did not lead African states to a promised land. In chapters 2-4, we catalogue the economic, security, and democratic deficits that turned untamed hope into a gallows humor of disappointment, as many of the promises of the founding fathers went unfulfilled.

2. Lag in Human Development

THE DREAMS OF INDEPENDENCE were scintillating. The young and ambitious generation of founding fathers articulated visions of négritude, African socialism, and pan-Africanism, all of which pointed from an oppressed past to a glorious future. Alas, on dimensions of human development, security, and democracy, the post-independence era was fraught. In this chapter, focusing on income, education, and health — all components of human development — we chronicle African states' struggles to fulfill expectations.

1   Income

Since 1960, Africa has lagged other regions of the world in per capita income.[1] As we see in figure 2.1, average per capita income in sub-Saharan states stagnates from 1960 (the year of independence for most sub-Saharan states) to 1990 — three decades that saw economic growth in most other regions. While growth has been more robust since 2000 (our subject in chapter 14), recent growth spurts have not dramatically narrowed the gap between African countries and other parts of the world.[2]

Some might argue that this is an unfair race, and that we should be comparing African states to other countries that were similarly impoverished in 1960. Yet, sub-Saharan states don't fare better in this comparison. First,

[1] The three-letter abbreviations used for regions and countries can be found on page xix.

[2] As we discuss in chapter 14, Botswana is an outlier within sub-Saharan Africa, experiencing relatively consistent growth since the 1960s.

Figure 2.1
GDP per Capita by Region,
1960-1990

we identify a group of thirty-six countries with an average per capita income similar to sub-Saharan African (SSA) states: in 1960, this comparison group had an average GDP per capita of 1,182 USD, 65 USD more than the SSA sample. By 1990, average GDP per capita in this comparison group had increased over 125 percent (i.e., more than doubled); in our SSA sample, the increase over that same period was only 34 percent.

Second, we look at specific examples of countries within and beyond sub-Saharan Africa that began the 1960s at similar levels of economic underdevelopment. The poor performance of resource-rich countries like Angola, Kenya, and Nigeria is especially striking when compared with the development trajectories of an Asian "tiger," South Korea, and the new colossus, China. As figure 2.2 illustrates, all five states languished in deep collective poverty in 1960. Books and articles on Korea and China pointed to the barriers preventing economic growth, and

Figure 2.2
GDP per Capita in Selected
Cases, 1960-1990

these expositions were not much different from what was written about Africa's poverty.[3] But in the mid-1970s, Korea broke from the pack with rapid growth. By 1990, the average income in South Korea reached nearly $9,000 per year, roughly ten times the levels achieved by Nigeria, Kenya, and Angola. China broke from the pack a decade after Korea and by 1990 had a per capita income roughly two times larger than these African states — a divergence that continued to grow after 1990.

This dismal economic performance among African states forced many economists to question earlier Nobel Prize–winning models of economic growth, which predicted that poorer countries would grow at a faster rate and, thus, uniformly converge to the higher income levels of more developed states (Sachs and Warner, 1995).

These per capita figures are averages. Perhaps sub-Saharan countries are succeeding in raising the floor but simply are not producing exorbitantly wealthy citizens,

[3] In her lead article for a symposium on "International Cooperation for Social Welfare," Henderson (1960, 3) argues: "One half of the world's population lives in monsoon Asia [including Korea]. Within this region, the concentration of population in countries already facing tremendous problems of poverty, illiteracy, and ill health, presents the most serious challenge to national and international economic and social policies and programs."

who occupy the long right tail of the income distribution in more developed states. In figure 2.3, we focus instead on whether those at the bottom are escaping dire poverty, and the numbers tell the same story. Using the available data from 2000 to 2010, we calculate the percentage of the population living on less than roughly 3 dollars per day (3.20 in 2011 dollars, to use the World Bank's precise cutoff). In thirty-five (or 81 percent of) African countries, more than half of the population falls below this level of subsistence; only ten other countries in the world reach such alarming levels. Note that this figure looks more bleak if we exclude the small island countries of Mauritius (MUS), Seychelles (SYC), and Comoros (COM). While these less-impoverished islands constitute half of the countries with poverty rates below 40 percent, their combined population (2.9 million in 2010) is miniscule.

Percentage of Population Living on Less than 3.20 USD
(Average of Non-Missing Data from 2000−2010)

Figure 2.3
Share of Population in Poverty

2   Education

Income is not the only way to measure development. Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen has forcefully argued

that development involves enhancing individuals' "capa-bilities" to lead lives that they value (Sen, 2001). From the individual perspective, education is a central capabil-ity that increases one's ability to experience and produce "works and events of one's own choice, religious, liter-ary, musical, and so forth" (Nussbaum, 2011). From the societal perspective, education creates "human capital," which economists see as an essential driver of economic growth.

A great deal of development aid to Africa has gone into the educational sector, but with only limited success. While citizens in other regions can expect to receive nine or more years of education by their mid-twenties, the average African student will not receive more than an elementary school education (see figure 2.4). As one might expect, this affects student achievement; children in many African countries are deprived a basic education and, thus, score below their peers on international exams.

Figure 2.4
Years of Schooling by Region,
1960-1990

More fine-grained evidence comes from the Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality (SACMEQ), a consortium of education ministries, policymakers, and researchers that, in conjunction with UNESCO's International Institute for Educational Planning, collects primary school data from eleven African countries.[4] From their surveys, we have standardized student achievement tests in reading and mathematics for students who were then in the sixth form. The data show that about 60 percent of the students do not reach what SACMEQ considers the *minimum* acceptable reading level, and 86 percent fail to reach what is classified as a desirable reading level.

UWEZO, a nongovernmental organization operating in East Africa, reports similar findings from its household surveys in Kenya, (mainland) Tanzania, and Uganda (UWEZO, 2014). Between 2009 and 2012, the NGO collected data on 823,074 school-aged children from age six (seven in Tanzania) to sixteen and (in the final round) on 10,422 schools. Their results reveal that "less than a third of children enrolled in grade 3 have basic grade 2 level literacy and numeracy [and] a significant number...do not possess foundational grade 2 level skills even as they approach the end of the primary school cycle" (4). Moreover, and despite considerable efforts at reform, there were no positive trends over the three rounds of surveys. One plausible answer to the disappointing results comes from the school inspections, which found that at least 10 percent of the teachers were absent from school on any given day.

Analysts have pointed to problems beyond the failure to monitor teacher absenteeism: leakage from education budgets (usually supplemented with generous foreign aid, both public and private), high levels of pupil absenteeism (with 34 percent of the students marked as "often absent"), and high dropout rates (24 percent of the schools report

[4] SACMEQ's Round II survey includes information on around 40,000 students, 5,300 teachers, and 2,000 headmasters from 2,000 primary schools.

drop-outs occur often) (Devarajan and Fengler, 2013). The culprits are manifold — and we will discuss one candidate cause, the language of instruction, in greater detail in chapter 10— but here we report the outcome: a failure in independent African states to match other regions in the production of human capital.

3   Health

Health has been a bright spot in recent African development. Data from the World Health Organization indicate that germ-based diseases account for a declining share of deaths in sub-Saharan Africa, due in large part to mass vaccination campaigns. Measles has been effectively eliminated, the percentage of deaths from malaria has been reduced by about 25 percent, and substantial progress has been made on HIV/AIDS and diarrheal diseases. Recognizing these trends, the *Economist* editorialized in 2012 that the decline in African child mortality is "the best story in development."

Yet, despite these recent improvements, mortality rates in Africa remain relatively high. Consider infant mortality, the indicator most often used to judge the quality of a nation's health sector.[5] As can be seen from figure 2.5, sub-Saharan African countries made progress in the thirty years after independence: from well over 100 deaths per 10,000 births, the mortality rate in Africa fell by 30 percent in a generation. But, that was the slowest improvement of all regions, and the rate in 1990 remained the worst in the world. Returning to our earlier cases, China and South Korea saw rates converging to European standards, while infant mortality rates remained stubbornly high in Angola and Nigeria.

Africa has an even greater gap looking at maternal mortality (see table 2.1).[6] This indicator is more indicative of government failures than infant mortality, as mothers' deaths are typically due to poorly organized clinics and

[5] Infant mortality is measured by the World Development Indicators (WDI) as the number of infants dying before reaching one year of age per 1,000 births.

[6] According to the World Health Organization, maternal mortality is the number of women per 100,000 live births that die within forty-two days of the termination of pregnancy from any cause related to pregnancy or its management.

Figure 2.5
Infant Mortality by Country,
1960-1990

limited availability of urgent care (rather than the local disease burden). While data on maternal mortality does not extend as far back in time, even in 1990 the lag remained pronounced. By 1990, the rate in Africa was above 900 (per 100,000 live births); compare this to about 200 for other less developed countries and virtually zero for Europe. In the subsequent decade, African states made considerable progress. Yet, they continued to underperform all other regions. While maternal mortality in China declined to fifty-eight by 2000, rates in Angola, Kenya, and Nigeria remained between thirteen and twenty times higher.

Poverty, minimal education, and poor health are not independent outcomes: it is difficult for unhealthy children to keep up in school and, thus, obtain the education that wins them a good job. To be more concrete, consider the effects of intestinal worms (e.g., hookworm, roundworm, whipworm, and schistosomiasis), parasites that

Table 2.1
Average Maternal Mortality

Region	1990	2000	%Δ
SSA	900	767	−15
SA	687	421	−39
EAP	259	166	−36
LAC	136	113	−17
MENA	129	91	−29
ECA	32	24	−26
NA	9.5	10.5	11

infect about 1.3 billion people worldwide. A study in southern Busia, a farming region in Kenya close to Lake Victoria, found that 92 percent of students surveyed had at least one infection related to these diseases (Miguel and Kremer, 2004). (This could be an underestimate, as students absent on the day of the survey may have had even higher rates of infection.) The economists who conducted this study found that treating the intestinal worms reduced student absenteeism.[7] Disease, then, can not only directly affect quality of life, but also have an indirect effect on educational outcomes.

Noncommunicable Health Threats

If progress has been impressive in dealing with germ-based diseases, a growing concern for African health comes from noncommunicable factors, such as nutrition, alcoholism, obesity, and road accidents. A tragic accident occurred in Cameroon in April 2016, where a lead car in a convoy transporting the US ambassador to the UN — driving at breakneck speed — ran over and killed a young boy celebrating the ambassador's arrival (Hume, Halasz, and Tanku, 2016). This unsettling incident brought attention to a larger problem: road travel in much of sub-Saharan Africa entails considerable risk. In 2013, the *Economist* reported 26.9 fatalities for every 100,000 people (The Economist Data Team, 2015).[8] Compare that with just 9.3 fatalities in Europe, despite per capita car ownership that is ten times higher than in Africa. Or compare this instead with countries that were similarly underdeveloped in the early 1960s: India has 16.6; Korea, 12.0 deaths by road accident per 100,000 people (World Health Organization). Moreover, eight of the ten worst countries in the world in terms of automobile death rates are in Africa. And pedestrians bear a good deal of the burden, accounting for 40 percent of Africa's road deaths, compared with a world average of 22 percent.

[7] The magnitude of both the direct effects and existence of any positive spillovers have been the subjects of a heated debate. Humphreys (2015) offers a "nonpartisan's" summary of the "worm wars."

[8] See also Mathers and Loncar (2006), who estimate that road accidents will be the fourth largest cause of death in low-income countries in the coming years. Habyarimana and Jack (2009) suggest why African roads are dangerous and how this public health problem can be (partially) remediated.

The AIDS Pandemic

Africa's AIDS epidemic is by far the worst in the world. To be sure, there has been notable progress in stemming its tide in sub-Saharan Africa. There were, according to UN data, 2.3 million new HIV infections detected in 2000; in 2014, that number was down to 1.4 million, a drop of 41 percent (UNAIDS, 2015). Still, in 2017, according to AVERT, 25.7 million people were HIV positive in Africa, which amounted to 70 percent of the global total, with 660,000 AIDS-related deaths in 2017 computed for Africa (AVERT, 2015).

A South Africa Case Study

Given the scale of the epidemic, we dive deeper into the South African case, drawing on excellent qualitative work by Lieberman (2009). As it is challenging to summarize Lieberman's statement of the problem without also previewing his explanation, this section briefly touches on some proposed causes of South Africa's HIV/AIDS epidemic — a discussion we otherwise largely defer to parts II and III.

Health data from South Africa again reveal that poverty can not fully explain mortality. After all, South Africa ranks among the top five richest countries in Africa. Yet, it is also the country that has had the largest HIV/AIDS epidemic, with an estimated 6.3 million people (19.1 percent of the general population) living HIV positive.[9] In KwaZulu-Natal, a province east of Lesotho, for women between the ages of thirty and thirty-four, the infection rate exceeds 35 percent.

At the beginning of the crisis in the early 1980s, nearly 90 percent of the diagnosed AIDS cases were among males, mostly homosexual and bisexual. But by 1989, heterosexual transmission became the principal means of transmission, and the epidemic grew extraordinarily

[9] This comes from the CIA Factbook. In percentage terms, as of 2011, southern Africa is the region most affected by the virus. In Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa, the percentage of the population living HIV-positive ranges from 19.9 (South Africa) to 26.5 (Swaziland). Nearby Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, and Namibia have somewhat lower percentages, but all over ten percent. No other country in the world breaks ten percent.

fast. By 2005, an estimated 320,000 South Africans had died of AIDS-related causes. Average life expectancy in South Africa was sixty-four in 1992; ten years later it fell to forty-six, a shocking decline due almost entirely to HIV/AIDS.

Although South Africa has a democratically elected government, its response to the crisis was halting and slow; it was not until 2000 that AIDS programs appeared as a line item in the national budget. The health ministry, wracked with resignations by senior officials assigned to the AIDS program, was not only slow to respond but antagonistic to potential partners. The ministry was unwilling to support nongovernmental efforts to provide medical aid, leading civil society organizations to protest against and, ultimately, sue the government for nonfulfillment of the National AIDS Plan. The government also alienated the international medical community by promoting its own AIDS drug without any evidence of its effectiveness. The government seemed uninterested in solving the public health crisis, as it failed to target information to the gay community, the early victims of the epidemic, and even cut its AIDS-education budget in the mid-1990s, just as the percentage of cases was rising. It was not until 2007 that South Africa belatedly agreed to address this health catastrophe with reporting that met international standards.

What distinguishes South Africa's delayed response to this health crisis from similarly situated countries elsewhere in the world? In an ingenious comparison with Brazil's more comprehensive and rapid response to AIDS, Lieberman is able to rule out standard explanations such as regime type (both South Africa and Brazil were third-wave democracies), bureaucratic competence (both had moderately effective government services), and civil society (both had well-positioned activists demanding government action). Instead, Lieberman focuses attention

on these countries' different levels of electoral competition. He shows that opposition parties in South Africa, namely the Democratic Alliance and Inkatha Freedom Party, were unable to challenge the African National Congress's (ANC's) dominance in 2004. Facing little competition, the ANC could remain silent on the epidemic, despite the government's glaring failure to address the public health crisis.[10]

Yet, the ANC's unassailable electoral control cannot be the entire explanation. Autocrats, such as Yoweri Museveni of Uganda and Rwanda's Paul Kagame, also faced little political competition. However, they responded much more aggressively to HIV/AIDS.

Sharp and reified racial boundaries provide another plausible explanation for South Africa's delayed response to the epidemic (Lieberman, 2009, 143). The rigid categories of "black/African," "Coloured," "Indian," and "white/European" date back to the apartheid era and remain highly relevant. For example, surveys from the 1990s suggest that nearly 25 percent of South Africans do not want a neighbor of a different race, and interracial marriage is almost nonexistent. Indeed, race almost perfectly predicts the language spoken in the home and the household's media diet. Perhaps unsurprisingly, discussions about AIDS in South Africa have also been racialized, with blacks (blaming white gays) and whites (blaming black sex workers) each seeing the other as responsible. Conspiracy theories abound in the popular press about how the disease is being used by one group to decimate the other. This racialism reached embarrassing levels when the head of the South African National Blood Services proposed disposing of blood from black donors in fear of infecting the wider society.

In the face of this racialization, a technical and unbiased approach to treating the epidemic was politically challenging. In office, Mandela was silent on the issue.

[10] Unlike Brazil or even other African countries, the ANC's leadership in ending apartheid earned them loyalty among a great majority and insulated them from cries for action in response to HIV/AIDS. Nelson Mandela, whose charismatic authority was unquestioned, did not use his bully pulpit to speak out on AIDS, as he feared it would hurt his electoral standing (Lieberman, 2009, 140). His successor Thabo Mbeki, despite his technocratic background, followed suit and had his health minister promote a healthy diet as the proper antidote. Jacob Zuma, Mbeki's successor, continued this despicable political tradition of denial, recommending a shower after sex with an HIV victim to reduce the risk of infection.

Thabo Mbeki, his successor, argued publicly in 2001 that civil society groups had a hidden agenda; their demands for action were, in fact, proclamations that "our continent is doomed to an inevitable mortal end because of our unconquerable devotion to the sin of lust" (quoted in Lieberman, 2009, 158).[11] Racial boundaries, a clear fact of life in many sub-Saharan states, but especially in South Africa, have reinforced a culture of blame and denial of responsibility that has not served citizens well in the face of a health catastrophe.

One might ask, if Lieberman is correct, how do we explain the vigilant government response to the pandemic in Rwanda, a country in which ethnic boundaries dividing Tutsis and Hutus (reified under the Belgians) have been portrayed as racial? Indeed, since the 1994 genocide, there has been a "dramatic increase in [international] resources to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic... and a corresponding increase in the availability of services.... With these resources, the Government of Rwanda has rapidly launched and brought to scale national HIV/AIDS services" (Kayirangwa et al., 2006, i27). One explanation is that post-genocide, many Tutsi women were infected with AIDS due to the gender-based violence perpetrated during the genocide. Kagame's Tutsi-led government was, even in the absence of political competition, especially concerned with addressing the needs of this constituency and invited international organizations to help.

But this cannot be the full answer. Well before Kagame's administration, "in 1986, Rwanda was the first country in the world to conduct and report on a nationally representative HIV seroprevalence survey. Also, in 1986, the Ministry of Health, the Red Cross, and the Norwegian Red Cross initiated an extensive AIDS education program using radio and public health educators. In 1987, the National AIDS Program was established in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO)"

[11] Once out of office, Mandela changed course. At an international conference in Durban in 2001, he gave implicit support to the international response to AIDS. In January 2005, the cause became personal with his last surviving son, Makgatho, dying of AIDS-related complications. Politically, however, he walked a fine line, never criticizing Mbeki's reluctance to endorse the international campaign to fight AIDS.

(Kayirangwa et al., 2006, p. i27). Consistent with Lieberman's argument, it could be that HIV/AIDS was never racialized in Rwanda, with one group blaming the other for the disease and using their alleged culpability as an excuse to deny public services. We do not have the data to support or refute that story. Whether sharp racial boundaries impede public health campaigns outside of South Africa, thus, remains an open question. In either case, South Africa's failure to stem the AIDS pandemic certainly weakens the *Economist*'s sanguine evaluation of Africa's health programs.

The Influence of PEPFAR on African Public Health

Foreign assistance has been a popular approach for addressing Africa's underdevelopment (see chapter 12 for our discussion of foreign aid's effectiveness). The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was US president George W. Bush's singular effort to address the international AIDS pandemic. From 2003 to 2013, $42 billion was allocated for prevention, treatment, and palliative care. There were fifteen focus countries in this program, twelve of them in Africa. PEPFAR is an exceptionally resourced example of aid targeted at a specific problem. Indeed, PEPFAR constituted an infusion of funds larger in many cases than the entire health budget of the recipient countries. At one point, PEPFAR equaled 118 percent of the government's health budget in Ethiopia, 128 percent in Rwanda, 155 percent in Kenya, 234 percent in Mozambique, and 249 percent in Uganda.

There is little question that PEPFAR has been consequential in reducing adult deaths due to HIV/AIDS. One study estimates that the program averted 2.9 million HIV infections from 2004 to 2013 and, by increasing the life span of those infected, reduced the number of orphans on the continent by nine million (Heaton et al., 2015).

But the scope of the intervention's effects has been

limited. For example, there is no evidence that the heavy emphasis on abstinence as a preventive measure had any effect on sex behavior (Lo, Lowe, and Bendavid, 2016). Similarly, PEPFAR has not helped to reduce neonatal mortality rates, and if anything, evidence suggests a slight increase in such deaths after the PEPFAR intervention. Lee and Izama (2015) suggest this is due to low-quality primary health systems, which did not benefit from the infusion of PEPFAR funds. These authors argue that PEPFAR not only failed to improve local health services, but actually crowded out more effective domestic programs; the increased funding and salaries for those treating HIV/AIDS diverted qualified staff from other health care services.

Ebola Outbreak in 2014

The Ebola outbreak in 2014 provides additional perspective on the health lag in sub-Saharan Africa. As of early 2016, there were 11,315 deaths in Africa caused by Ebola since the most recent outbreak. In Liberia, the figure is 4,809; in Sierra Leone, 3,955; in Guinea, 2,536, and in Nigeria, 8 (BBC News, 2016). A new outbreak in the town of Beni in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2018, despite the development of new vaccines, sadly reveals that this disease remains a threat in Africa.

Fighting Ebola demands state capacity; tracking individuals who have come in contact with infected individuals requires extensive government surveillance and record keeping. A professionalized medical establishment with clear rules of engagement thus appears essential for containing and preventing Ebola. We see some indication of this among the affected West African countries. Christensen et al. (2018a) test this claim experimentally: roughly a year before the Ebola outbreak in Sierra Leone, two interventions were randomly assigned to government-run health clinics. One focused on community monitoring

of clinics and the other on status awards for nurses. The authors find that these programs increased the perceived quality of local health care, encouraged sick patients to seek care, and increased the reported number of Ebola cases. Nigeria quickly contained confirmed cases and stemmed the spread of the disease — a feat that Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone struggled with. Nigeria has about four physicians and eighteen trained nurses and midwives per 10,000 people, about four times that of the countries least successful in containing the outbreak.

But trust in government also played a role. In dealing with this epidemic, public health officials in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea called upon communities to change deep-rooted behaviors, such as burial customs. These dramatic behavioral changes would be a tall order in any setting; following years of poor service provision and corruption scandals, many distrusting citizens defied such demands, with some health workers in Guinea being killed by a skeptical and fearful mob. Based on a unique survey in Monrovia, Liberia, Tsai, Blair, and Morse (2015) suggest that distrust in government contributed to the spread of the disease: dubious households were less likely to use preventive measures and exhibited lower support for containment policies. (In part 2, we discuss the slave trade as one historical explanation for this high level of distrust.)

It is informative to compare the crisis response to Ebola in West Africa with the SARS epidemic in East Asia, affecting China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, Taiwan, and Malaysia, with further isolated cases around the world. Its sudden outbreak in October 2002 at first was kept under cloak and veil by the Chinese government. But within months the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the World Health Organization (WHO) were in full investigative mode, Hong Kong and Singapore established quarantines, and the Chinese premier shortly

thereafter issued quarantine orders and threatened to punish local officials who did not report SARS cases in a timely and accurate manner. Within five months of the outbreak, the affected countries set up a joint ministerial task force to address the health pandemic, and in July 2003, nine months after outbreak, the WHO was able to announce that the disease had been contained (Timeline of the SARS outbreak, 2016). While there are of course many differences between SARS and Ebola — including the threat to African cultural practices from isolating victims from their kin — the ability of East Asian states (a region with average incomes just slightly above those of sub-Saharan African countries in 1960) to resolve their health problem without facing massive distrust from their own citizens reveals the special problem many African states face in addressing crises that challenge the health and safety of their own populations.

Health and Human Development in Africa

Health is a crucial component of human development. There is much to applaud about recent improvements in post-independence Africa. But on several dimensions we see a persistent lag compared with the rest of the world. First, although communicable diseases now account for fewer deaths, the gap with the rest of the world remains. Second, there is a disturbing rise in Africa of deaths due to noncommunicable conditions, whether from obesity, alcoholism, or road safety. And, as shown with road safety, these death rates are greater than in other postcolonial countries that were underdeveloped a half-century ago. Third, in areas where government intervention is key to success, such as in AIDS treatment or responding to unanticipated public health epidemics (Ebola), many African governments lack the professionalism and trust to mount an effective response.

4   Conclusion

Human development is a multifaceted concept, including income, education, and health. In this chapter we reviewed the record of African governments in advancing the human development of their citizens. On all three dimensions, we report progress since independence but not enough to close the gap with most other countries of the world. This is but one part of Africa's lag that this book seeks to explain.

3. Lag in Democracy

IN THE FINAL YEARS OF COLONIAL RULE, African leaders negotiated the transition to independence, haggling over the details of constitutions based largely on Western European traditions. Both colonial authorities and those inheriting the newly independent states hoped for democracies that would respect the rule of law. Yet, this hope was short-lived. In this chapter, we describe the collapse of democratic rule under a deluge of military coups and the rise of states built on selling offices rather than impartially administering law — what Max Weber called "prebendal," but Africanists now dub "neopatrimonial" (Bratton and van de Walle, 1994).[1]

1   Turn to Authoritarian Rule

Charismatic founders were largely young men, schooled by missionaries, recipients of European university educations, and commoners. Peaceful anticolonial mobilization brought them to power, and they presided over constitutions derived from European democratic traditions. They had grand ambitions for their countries and for their continent and were revered by their fellow citizens.

Yet, in a few short years, the optimism we describe in chapter 1 gave way to authoritarian tendencies. Zolberg (1966, 66) presciently observed the first generation of

[1] In a patrimonial state, power flows directly from the leader. The "neo-" prefix indicates a mixed system, in which both traditional authority and bureaucratic agencies command resources.

leaders transforming their political regimes using a variety of tactics:

> Co-optation, intimidation, exile, or detention of political opponents; modification of the electoral system to make competition impossible or at least unlikely; transformation of the constitution inherited from the European tradition to give wide discretionary authority to the executive and to restrict the activities of representative assemblies; the use of a criterion of political loyalty to select key administrators and division of the country into satrapies; administrative control over local government; reduction of the independence of the judiciary...; transformation of major voluntary associations into ancillary organs of the party or their political neutralization; control over written and radio communications; reduction of consultation within the party and of accountability of the leadership to the members.

In sum, Zolberg distinguished two complementary projects of the charismatic generation after independence: "the attempt to achieve unanimity by erasing all traces of political opposition" and merging their political party and the government by creating what has become known as the "one-party state" (122-27).

Despite their charisma and the excitement of independence, these early leaders faced real (if not subversive) opposition movements. Consider J. B. Danquah; he founded the United Gold Coast Convention in Ghana and helped elevate Nkrumah to the national political stage. He became a strong advocate of free speech and a powerful opponent of preventive detention. Similarly, Lamine Guèye of Senegal, although he remained a member of the *Union Progressiste Sénégalaise*, publicly criticized Senghor's autocratic tendencies. Politicians of stature and integrity spoke out against the first generation of post-independence leaders. Fearing disintegration and eager to reclaim political and economic control from colonial in-

terests, these leaders greeted this dissent with censorship and repression.

Guinea's charismatic founder, Sékou Touré, led the way in demonizing and repressing dissenters. As an apprentice in the French communist labor union, Touré had been schooled in authoritarian values. Upon assuming leadership of Guinea's *Parti démocratique de Guinée* (PDG), he saw unity as the party's principal goal. In speeches, he insisted that any opposition to the PDG represented saboteurs associated with the *ancient* colonial state. His political enemies languished in notorious dungeons.

Alas, Touré's ideas were not exceptional in the early independence period. In Ghana, documents from Kwame Nkrumah's Convention People's Party (CPP) rejected the notion that political opposition was important for democracy. In Tanzania, Julius Nyerere denied that the absence of a political opposition was tantamount to dictatorship (Sigmund, 1963, 193, 197). In Mali, Madeira Keita (1960, 19) published an article titled "Le Parti Unique en Afrique," or "The Single Party in Africa." In it he claims that "if the party is the true expression of the genuine aspirations of the people," there is no need for civil society. Finally, in Senegal, Léopold Senghor (1961) wrote that opposition can only be "tempted to serve foreign powers. . . . Our duty is to prevent subversion."

While the elimination of competing parties undermined political accountability, the imposed unanimity did not facilitate the rapid expansion of public services or the adoption of growth-promoting policies. The independence parties were not unlike L. Frank Baum's portayal of the *Wizard of Oz*: imposing in their awesome rhetoric, but pathetically weak in their ability to implement the wishes of their populations. When Bienen (1970) sought to find similarities between the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and the Communist Party of the

Soviet Union (CPSU), he was shocked to find empty offices outside the then capital in Dar es Salaam with hardly any organizational structure.[2] Nkrumah (1962) similarly noted that a year after independence, "the general staff [of the CPP] numbered less than thirty. The office was poorly equipped." He ordered a rapid party-building campaign that eventually led to the declaration of Ghana as a one-party state in 1964. A year later, in Côte d'Ivoire, at its first congress after independence, with its leading party having staved off several internal rebellions, the PDCI declared itself "a single party, for a single people, with a single leader" (Zolberg, 1966, 100).

Nyerere could appeal to African roots of community to justify one-party rule, and Nkrumah could appeal to utopian goals. Others pointed out that since there were no ideological differences among factions, it would be best to resolve distributional issues in the context of a single party. But W. Arthur Lewis, a distinguished West Indian economist and adviser to Nkrumah, saw it for what it was. "The single-party," he proclaimed, "fails in all its claims. It cannot represent all the people; or maintain free discussion; or give stable government; or above all, reconcile the differences between various regional groups. It is not natural to West African culture, except in the sense in which cancer is natural to West African culture.... It is partly the product of the hysteria of independence when some men found it possible to seize the state and suppress their opponents" (quoted in Tignor, 2006, 209). The descent into authoritarian rule — however cynical or noble the motivations — came shortly after independence.

2   Breakdown of Civilian Rule

For many countries, democracy was threatened through military takeover or coups d'état. Generals composed a first generation of coup leaders intent on stamping out the corruption and tribalism that infected young civil-

[2] Bienen (1970, 470) concludes that the TANU "does not provide an institution which can transform the economy... it is too weak and too loose and has too few material and human resources to tackle development problems."

ian regimes. But noncommissioned officers led a second wave of coups, and these leaders relied heavily on the loyalty of ethnic kin rather than the support of the military or a broad political party. While coup leaders often promised to relinquish power to democratically elected successors, reforms were usually short-lived. As is apparent in figure 3.1, sub-Saharan states became more autocratic (on average) between 1960 and 1990 according to Polity, a common measure of regime type.[3] While the region actually beats the Middle East and North Africa on this metric, that feat offers little consolation.

The antidemocratic trend began all too quickly. In Comoros and what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo, chaotic transitions provoked coups in the very year of independence. The trend continued in more stable countries just three years later. In 1963 Sylvanus Olympio, president of Togo, was overthrown and assassinated. He was deposed by an army of only 250 soldiers,

[3] Polity is an annualized country score ranging from −10 (a full autocracy) to +10 (a full democracy) The halfway house between democracy and autocracy, in the range from −5 to +5 on the Polity scale, has been dubbed "anocracy."

Figure 3.1
Average Polity Score by
Region, 1960-1990

joined by Togolese veterans of France's brutal war with Algeria. When France decommissioned its Togolese soldiers, these men expected to be honored and employed in Togo's national army. Yet, Olympio sealed his fate by refusing, claiming that the veterans were "mercenaries who were killing our Algerian friends when we were fighting for independence" (First, 1970). The perpetrators of the coup replaced the president with his political rival, Nicholas Grunitsky. Under Grunitsky, the post-coup army expanded to 1,200 soldiers, accepting 700 veterans of the French forces (Grundy, 1968). Four years later, one of the coup leaders, Lt. Col. Gnassingbé Eyadéma, assumed power and ruled Togo for a generation. This stunning coup, which challenged the democratic future of a newly independent African state, was not an anomaly but rather a blueprint for soldiers in other African states.

Indeed, Togo's coup was only the start of a deluge of coups across much of the continent. Figure 3.2 illus-

(a) Total Number of Coups by Region

(b) African Coups, 1960-1980
(Black = Success)

Figure 3.2
Deluge of Coups in Africa

trates a sharp and sustained increase in coups beginning in the mid-1960s. Between 1960 and 1980, there were ninety-one coup attempts in Africa, of which fifty-one succeeded. In those two decades, twenty-six different African countries experienced a successful coup; seven states saw three or more successful challenges (Benin, six; Ghana, four; Burkina Faso, three; Burundi, three; Nigeria, three; Republic of Congo, three; Uganda, three). Even while challenges to civilian leadership declined sharply in Asia and the Americas in the 1980s (i.e., the total number of coups in figure 3.2(a) levels off for all other regions), African states have seen continued military interventions: between 1960 and 1990, there was only one year (1988) in which the continent was coup-free (Powell and Thyne, 2011).[4]

Corruption, economic crises, and ethnic tensions quickly undermined electoral democracies in the postcolonial period. The first-generation military leaders came into power presenting themselves as "caretakers," seeking to restore integrity and nationalism and, ultimately, place democracy on a stronger footing. But instead of politically neutral officers bringing order as national saviors, these initial coups were followed by a second era of military rule, during which more junior officers transformed into personalist leaders. Figure 3.3 offers a simple but revealing timeline for the four cases we review below: elected leaders are replaced by military brass and, especially toward the end of the period, personalist dictators.

3   The Senior Officers Intercede

Nigeria

Nigeria's two coups in 1966 were perhaps the most dramatic failures of British-inspired democratic institutions in Africa. The country was not named by a charismatic founder, as was the case in Ghana. Rather, three sep-

[4] Factors that predict coups include higher levels of democratic competition, rapid social change (e.g., urbanization), ethnic tensions, economic downturns, and decreasing military spending. Electoral support for the winning party in early elections and armies that are not constituted from anticolonial rebels or colonial armies are associated with reduced coups risk (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Jackman, 1978; McGowan and Johnson, 1984; Powell, 2012).

Figure 3.3
Regime Change in Selected
Cases, 1960-1990

arate regions were imagined as a coherent state by the wife of the colonial governor, Lord Frederick Lugard, who called the combined territory "Nigeria." Lugard established a colonial order through what he dubbed the "Dual Mandate" (1926) — a system that provided salaries to traditional leaders (chiefs, kings, emirs) in return for their loyalty (a strategy of indirect rule that we discuss at greater length in chapter 9). Lugard presumed that these traditional leaders enjoyed local legitimacy, making it easier for them to control their constituents. He ruled through emirs in the Hausa-dominated Northern region; through ancestral-city kings in the Yoruba-dominated West; and through "warrant chiefs" (a modern imposition on an acephalous society) in the Igbo-dominated East (Afigbo, 1972).[5]

These three regions — the North, West, and East — were quite heterogeneous, rife with minorities who bristled at the favored roles accorded to the dominant group in each region (figure 3.4). A constitution for Nigeria, negotiated in 1954 and serving as a prelude to independence, gave substantial powers to the three regional governments, much to the chagrin of the minority groups. These smaller

[5] An acephalous, or egalitarian, society lacks political hierarchy.

Figure 3.4
Nigeria's Largest Ethnic
Groups

groups appealed to the British-appointed Minorities Commission, but their claims were rejected in 1958.

In addition to these internal conflicts, the regional governments disagreed about the allocation of power in an independent Nigeria. Emirs in the North feared southern dominance. Northern populations tended to have lower levels of education.[6] Thus, the North preferred continued British administration to a prospective administration run by "southerners" (i.e., Yorubas and Igbos). Meanwhile, there were deep tensions within the South. Obafemi Awolowo, the Yoruba leader we discussed in chapter 1, invested revenues from the 1950s cocoa boom in free education and health care. Igbos, on the other hand, saw lower returns on their palm products and, thus, feared losing out on civil service positions to the economically ascendant Yoruba.

Under these conditions, post-independence politics became a dangerous game. First, the key pre-independence elections deepened the rivalry between Awolowo and Nnambdi Azikiwe, the leading Igbo politician. The North seized upon this rivalry, allying with the East to form a government: Azikiwe assumed the presidency, while a Northern leader, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, became the prime minister. Second, battles broke out over the census. While a census may sound like a simple counting exercise, it is a political lightning rod in countries where the allocation of power or public spending depends on groups' relative sizes.[7] A first census tally in 1962 worked to the East's advantage; a recount then inflated the numbers of the other two regions. Census politics turned into a life and death issue, as the results determined which ethnic group was most likely to assume and maintain political power. Third, an intra-Yoruba political rivalry led to electoral violence in the regional elections of 1964. Awolowo refused to accept the North-East compact and sought to build a leftist coalition by mobilizing Hausa

[6] This educational gap was due in part to colonial authorities' decision to discourage Christian missionaries from working in the North for fear they might cause unrest in a predominantly Muslim population.

[7] Clifford Geertz, the preeminent American cultural anthropologist of his time, and part of the founding group of the University of Chicago's Committee on New Nations, considered census-taking in new states a "pole…around which parapolitical vortices tend to form" (Geertz, 1973, p. 275).

commoners (*talakawa*). His Yoruba rival, Samuel Ladoke Akintola, came from a different ancestral city, served as Western governor, and wanted to work in concert with elected federal authorities. Awolowo plotted a takeover in the Western region, and the federal army had to restore order.

Amid this political uncertainty, rumors of a coup proliferated. And on January 15, 1966, in a poorly coordinated operation, military plotters murdered one Yoruba (Akintola) and two Hausas (Balewa and Sir Ahmadu Bello, the head of the Northern People's Congress, the political party representing Hausa interests). The plotters missed Awolowo and did not detain or kill any Igbo politicians.

This first coup quickly sparked a second overthrow. Igbo officials had escaped assassination during the initial coup; moreover, an Igbo officer, General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Ironsi, assumed leadership following the unrest. To many, these two facts suggested an Igbo power play. Their fears were amplified when General Ironsi sought an end to regional governance, which was interpreted as a plot to establish Igbo hegemony throughout Nigeria. Elements in the military, whose officer corps was largely Hausa, quickly plotted a counter-coup. On July 29, 1966, only seven months after the first coup, Ironsi was assassinated. Yakubu "Jack" Dan-Yumma Gowon, a Christian from a minority group in the North, took the helm. Since January 1966, Nigeria has spent half of its existence under military rule.

Ghana

The early coups became a deluge with the fall of Nkrumah — a coup that shocked even careful observers of African politics. In retrospect, it is more easily understood. Nkrumah was at his charismatic height when he demanded independence and could blame Britain for any policy failures (Apter, 2015). But once independent and

in power in 1957, his monumental goals faced complex reality. He indulged himself by building useless monuments (including statues of himself) and portraying himself as the country's redeemer (*osagyefo*). More hopeful, he invested in a massive electrical project that included a dam on the Volta River. This was to be paid for, in part, by taxes on farmers, who were forced to sell their product (cocoa most importantly) to marketing boards that continued the colonial practice of paying below-market prices. The marketing boards could buy low and sell high on world markets with the difference accruing to the state and its development projects. As we document in chapter 12, this economic doctrine had a number of problems. Principally, farmers learned that they could surreptitiously cross the border into Côte d'Ivoire, where they could get a much better price for their goods. This smuggling impoverished the Ghanaian treasury.

Economic failure unleashed political opposition. Nkrumah responded by either imprisoning or forcibly exiling his political opponents. In a tense political environment, a military coup in February 1966 brought an end to democratic institutions. A "National Liberation Council," a joint operation of the police and army with a clear army command structure under General Joseph Ankrah, took power. Political parties were banned, and the Council promised order, security, freedom, and a quick restoration of democracy. Indeed, they did return the country to democracy, but it was a short-lived civilian regime, succeeded by a generation of military regimes.

Nkrumah became an exile in Guinea. He died in 1972, and, by then, his dreams for restored Ghanaian glory were long dead. The then president of Ghana, Ignatius Kutu Acheampong (who also came to power through a coup), graciously allowed Nkrumah to be buried in his homeland. There is now a mausoleum in his hometown serving as a

tourist site. But his fall from grace marked an end to the optimistic vision of his charismatic cohort of founders.

Uganda

Milton Obote received no mention in our discussion of Africa's charismatic founders. Unlike Jomo Kenyatta in neighboring Kenya, Ugandans never united behind Obote, who constantly struggled to garner a legislative majority.

Obote led the Ugandan People's Congress (UPC) — an alliance of his ethnic group, the Langi (6 percent), the Acholi (5 percent), the Toro (3 percent), and the Banyoro (3 percent). As these population shares indicate, the party represented a small share of the country's population. Obote's rise to power, despite this small support base, had less to do with his leadership qualities and much more to do with internal conflicts within other, larger ethnic groups.

Most importantly, the Baganda were split. The Baganda are Uganda's largest linguistic group (∼16 percent). Its king (the Kabaka), a Protestant, never submitted to British rule; instead, by treaty, his kingdom became a British protectorate. But in preparation for independence, the British refused to accord his kingdom special status. His supporters therefore boycotted the final election before independence in 1961. This handed victory to the Democratic Party, which garnered the votes of the Catholic Baganda, who still participated in the election. Recognizing this error, in the first election after independence, the Kabaka led a monarchist party called the Kabaka Yekka or "king only" party. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this party didn't enjoy much support outside of Baganda or among Catholics.

Obote's UPC, the Kabaka Yekka, and the Democratic Party all contested the 1962 election. The Democratic Party emerged with the most seats, though not a majority. Fearing that the Democratic Party might threaten the

monarchy, the Kabaka struck a deal with Obote: Obote assumed the role of prime minister, granting the Kabaka assurances that his royal prerogatives would be maintained. At this pivotal moment, Obote demonstrated less charisma than political cunning.

As was the case in Nigeria, politics became a high-stakes game. Obote proposed a referendum that would transfer land from the Baganda to the Banyoro, which the latter believed the British had wrongly seized and redistributed to the Baganda. The Kabaka responded by leveling a corruption charge against Obote in the National Assembly. Obote quickly abrogated the colonially inspired constitution of 1962 and deposed the Kabaka, driving him into exile in London. Obote relied on his northern troops to crush Baganda militias comprising World War II veterans, and sought popularity by articulating a leftist program, called the "Common Man's Charter." This move to the left led to a rapid outflow of capital and ensuing unemployment and inflation. Urban gangsterism (*kondoism*) became rife.

Obote needed the army, largely composed of the Acholis from Uganda's far north, to confront the Baganda.[8] A mutiny in 1964 was a warning that the military's cooperation required accommodations. Obote gave virtual autonomy to the deputy commander, Idi Amin, who began recruiting soldiers from his Kakwa ethnic group. Many of the Kakwa troops were from neighboring southern Sudan, where they had honed their fighting skills against the Sudanese government in Khartoum.

Amin's army became an autonomous force of wealth and power throughout the country. Even Obote feared Amin and built a special presidential guard from his Langi coethnics.

In April 1971, elections were imminent, and observers thought that Obote, through a proposed alliance with the

[8] Andrew Brooks (dissertation in progress) estimates that, pre-independence, the Acholi represented 70 percent of the soldiers; the Baganda, less than 2 percent.

Baganda, would maintain power. But Amin intervened and, despite the presidential guard, displaced Obote before the elections. Unlike the coup in Ghana, this was not a peaceful replacement of civilians for soldiers. Amin brought a reign of terror, with large-scale imprisonments and an estimated 250,000 Ugandans killed in the bloodbath that ensued.

4   Junior Officer Coups and the Dominance of Personalist Rule

Junior officers, those commissioned officers ranking below colonels and generals, followed the examples provided by their superiors. While the first successful coups involving senior officers occurred in the same year of independence (Comoros; the Democratic Republic of the Congo), junior officers didn't successfully overthrow a government until the fourth year of independence (in Burundi). The average number of years of independence before the first successful senior officer coup was 12.5 years; the average number of years for the first successful junior officer coup was 18.5 years (A. Brooks, 2016).[9]

[9] These statistics include some North African cases, including Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia.

These junior officers not only struck later, they also relied on different strategies for establishing and consolidating control. Unlike the generals, junior officers could not count on the support of the military hierarchy; they were, after all, ignoring the chain of command. Instead, these junior officers created populist parties (often with a leftist slant) and, more importantly, surrounded themselves with ethnic kin to protect against counter-coups. Their youth and energy gave them some of the charismatic appeal accorded to many of Africa's founding fathers. These once junior officers who became personalist dictators include Samuel Doe (Liberia), Mathieu Kérékou (Benin), Jerry Rawlings (Ghana), and Thomas Sankara and Blaise Campaoré (Burkina Faso, formerly Upper Volta). Vignettes of

the coups in Benin and Ghana illustrate the progression from military rule to personalist dictatorship.

Benin

Immediately after independence, Benin suffered from corruption, regionalism, and forced austerity. Per capita GDP fell by almost 5 percent between 1960 and 1962. The increasingly authoritarian rule of Hubert Maga brought popular discontent and then an outpouring of sympathy when Colonel Christophe Soglo led a coup in 1963. Soglo permitted a quick return to civilian rule, but power oscillated between military officers and civilian politicians. At one point the country was ruled by a three-member presidential council, whose members rotated power. Maga — the premier overthrown just seven years earlier — actually enjoyed a brief return to power under this system, chairing this presidential council from 1970 to 1972.

Despite this frequent turnover (perhaps even because of it), political gridlock paralyzed the government. Junior officers then moved in, led by Mathieu Kérékou. He was a low-level officer who served as an aide-de-camp to Maga during his first presidency. Kérékou advanced in rank after his cousin, Maurice Kouandété, became military ruler in 1967. In October 1972, he took control of the country, replacing an ineffective civilian regime (Allen, 1989).

Kérékou was a populist whose rule marked a break with the past. His first major speech to the population, the *Discours-programme* in November 1972, called for an end to foreign domination, which he blamed for the country's woes. Kérékou promoted indigeneity, supporting the teaching of indigenous languages through mass literacy programs and in universities (Igue and N'Oueni, 1994). While initially skeptical of both capitalism and socialism, which he regarded as foreign ideologies, Kérékou

embraced the latter and, in 1975, renamed Dahomey the People's Republic of Benin.

Although he had been promoted to major before staging the coup, his rule ignored the top brass: the initial coterie of officers he invited to join his revolutionary government were all under the age of forty (East and Thomas, 2003, 55). Despite his public commitment to socialism, Kérékou eschewed political equality, surrounding himself with his fellow northerners and marginalizing the Fon, Benin's largest ethnic group, which is concentrated in the country's south. Kérékou's *Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin* (People's Revolutionary Party of Benin) dominated the parliamentary elections of 1979, 1984, and 1989 — perhaps unsurprisingly, as it was the only party allowed to compete. Kérékou was elected president in 1980, an event that portended not a return to democracy but rather a decade of personalist rule.

Ghana

Coup leader General Joseph Ankrah passed the torch to fellow General A. A. Afrifa, who then transferred power peacefully to an elected civilian government led by professor Kofi Busia, an internationally respected sociologist. Economic stress compelled Busia to cut pay to judges and soldiers, but he quickly learned how counterproductive it would be to challenge the economic security of the officer-corps. The military intervened again in 1972, in a coup led by General Ignatius Kutu Acheampong. Acheampong sought to institutionalize military rule in Ghana by providing officers a decisive political role and outlawing political parties. (This was dubbed a "no party" system in a "Unigov" constitution.)

Acheampong's reforms were hugely unpopular. He was also famously corrupt, as later audits showed 500 million pounds missing from the accounts of the Cocoa Marketing Board, and he had an alleged personal for-

tune of $100 million (Young, 1982). General Frederick W. K. Akuffo led a counter-coup that promised national elections. Nearly all these officers — Ankrah, Afrifa, Acheampong, and Akuffo — were from the Ashanti ethnic group, and most were graduates of the UK's prestigious military academy at Sandhurst.[10]

Junior officers observed this rotation of Sandhurst-educated Ashantis with disdain. In May 1979, a thirty-five-year old flight lieutenant, Jerry Rawlings, attempted a coup but was caught and jailed. However, fellow junior officers sprung him and, on June 4, a second attempt to grab power succeeded. In power, Rawlings instigated the assassination of Akuffo, Acheampong, and Afrifa. This was the kind of brutality championed by Machiavelli — celebrating Hannibal's cruelty among "his other virtues" as a model for a ruler — in his advice to the Florentine prince.

Rawlings was young, dynamic, and not from the "Akan cluster," which included the Ashanti (with 44 percent of the population) and had dominated Ghanaian politics. Rawlings's mother was Scottish and his father Ewe, a language community from the east that accounts for just over 10 percent of Ghana's population. (Rawlings did marry an Ashanti, providing him a useful tie to powerful social networks.) After his coup, he called for immediate elections, and a career diplomat from the north of the country, Dr. Hilla Limann, was elected president. This lasted a mere two years before Rawlings returned to power through a coup on New Year's Eve 1981, promising "nothing less than a revolution" for Ghana. His Provisional National Defense Council was not beholden to the military hierarchy that he helped decimate. After dominating the political scene in Ghana and providing a taste of political order, he instituted democratic elections and ran as a civilian, winning two successive elections as Ghana's president.

[10] In 1972, an international Catholic news outlet wrote of the "Sandhurst Way," observing that "given the economic problems facing the emergent nations of Africa, it is paradoxical that Sandhurst has provided more rulers there than the London School of Economics" (The Tablet, 1972).

Rawlings was a mixed blessing for Ghana. Ultimately, he returned his country to a viable democracy. Yet, his twenty-two years of political dominance represented personalist rule by junior officers turned popular leaders who permitted no meaningful political competition.

5   A Retrospective on Democratic Failure

Democratic aspirations were quickly undermined in many independent African countries. Charismatic leaders turned into autocrats, purging opponents. Economic failure and fears of minority ethnic groups created social tensions in which intervention by the military initially appeared as a respite from chaos. Senior officers promised a return to democracy once order was restored. But Africa's democratic deficit continued to grow in the first generation of independence. Instead of democratically elected prime ministers, and instead of politically neutral senior officers restoring order, the archetypal regime became one led by a junior officer turned personalist leader, who relied on ethnic kin rather than broad-based parties. The failure of young democracies to take root, while not unique to sub-Saharan Africa, has left it lagging most other regions in terms of political freedom and accountability (see figure 3.1 on page 53).

6   Corruption in the Prebendal State

Consider the Nigerian cartoon "Nigeria at 49" in figure 3.5. Its message is simple but powerful: governance failures are a shared quality of the country's civil and military governments. As of 2018, Nigeria had an elected head of state from 1960 to 1966, 1979 to 1983, and 1999 to 2018; the remainder, unelected military rule. That is, twenty-seven of Nigeria's fifty-eight years of independence have involved rule by elected leaders. But even when leaders have been elected, they have not been ac-

countable; as the cartoon sardonically illustrates, theft and greed reign under either system of rule.

While Nigeria has come to exemplify corruption (Smith, 2010), it is not unique among African states. The Worldwide Governance Indicators measure how effectively states control corruption, as well as whether they permit political voice and impartially enforce the law.[11] By all of these metrics, sub-Saharan states (on average) lagged all other regions when the data were first compiled in 1996 (figure 3.6). Sadly, between 1996 and 2010, there is little indication that the region is closing this gap.

To be sure, some countries are worse than others: in 2008, Botswana scored better than the average for all other regions. South Africa, Namibia, and Rwanda also scored reasonably well (as did smaller island nations, like Cape Verde, Mauritius, and Réunion). But most African states continue to struggle in their attempts to control corruption and remain toward the bottom in international rankings.

7   Systemic Corruption

Political scientists have developed powerful descriptions of this endemic corruption. Rather than focus on specific scandals, they unpack the methods and motives of leaders who use corruption not only to profit, but also to maintain control. There have been several terms proposed for this systemic corruption; many Africanists refer

[11] The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), an academic project developed by Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for over two hundred countries and territories from 1996 to 2015.

Figure 3.6
Average Governance Score in
1996

to it as "neopatrimonialism." As described by van de
Walle (2001, ch. 3), many African leaders at the mo-
ment of independence found themselves at the helm of
weak and insufficiently legitimate states. They had lit-
tle choice but to rely on patronage and rents to assure
their tenure against threats from a range of challengers.
The result, van de Walle explains, was neopatrimonialism,
combining a façade of rational-legal rule with the private
appropriation of public resources by state elites.

Here we review work describing this syndrome by
three exemplary scholars, who help us understand the
administrative systems (or lack thereof) that permit — or
even facilitate — the defrauding of state revenues. These
accounts suggest that the bureaucracies with whom diplo-
mats, donors, and scholars regularly interact have been
hollowed out by rulers who fear, rather than reward, com-
petent administrators. What results are blocks of min-
istries in capital cities like Monrovia or Kinshasa that

might be better described as Potemkin villages than centers of authority.

Prebendalism

According to the seminal sociological work of Max Weber (Weber, Gerth, and Mills, 1946, 207), "prebends" are payments for the conferred right to the rents from land or other sources in return for "the fulfillment of actual or fictitious office duties; they are goods permanently set aside for the economic assurance of the office." Tax farming is a quintessential prebend. In early modern times, a lord conferred on subordinates the right to tax, so long as they returned an agreed-upon amount to the lord. Tax farmers, if they demonstrated loyalty to the lord, could pass their right to tax on to their descendants.

In many developing countries today, directing a customs house in a port is an obvious prebend. Traffic police in the Democratic Republic of the Congo are also exemplary. An ongoing study in the capital of Kinshasa measures the extortion capabilities of traffic policemen at key intersections (Sanchez de la Sierra and Titeca, in progress). Following the money, the authors compute how much of each bribe goes to the policemen and their superiors. They find that officers who refuse to extort motorists or don't send the expected payments up the chain get reassigned to less profitable intersections. While readers may not be surprised to learn that police can extort bribes, directors of hospitals or educational establishments have similar opportunities to tax (or, better, extort) clients for admittance or services. One of Richard Joseph's (1987) contributions is to identify the many opportunities for prebendalism in the dispensation of licenses, letters of credit, and other forms of bureaucratic access.

How are these prebends allocated? In many African states, political leaders (our contemporary "lords") and their subordinates tend to share a common ethnicity.[12]

[12] These relationships are sometimes described as "clientelistic." Leaders (patrons) dispense benefits to subordinates (clients) in return for political support.

Like any boss, leaders need to monitor and occasionally prod their underlings. This is easier done when both parties share a common language and social network.

What Joseph's work demonstrates is that corruption is not an unexpected or deviant behavior; rather, prebendalism is a governing strategy.[13] State power is used to establish a private market for public goods (e.g., safe roads or emergency medical services). This benefits leaders in two ways: first, leaders share in whatever revenues the prebend collects; second, leaders assure the electoral loyalty of prebend holders, who want to retain their lucrative positions.

The Shadow State

Prebendalism depends on state power; if the importers simply disregard the customs officer, then the value of controlling the port diminishes.

Yet, William Reno argues that leaders who take office with a tenuous grasp on power do not want to build powerful states:

> An actuarial calculation showed that as of 1991 the 485 postcolonial African rulers faced a 59.4 percent chance of dying, being imprisoned, or being exiled as a consequence of holding office. Rulers of weak states risk having strongmen appropriate bureaucracies that are effective at accumulating resources.... Rulers who face threatening internal behavior *intentionally cripple the arms of the state*. (Reno, 1999, 19; emphasis added)

Several sub-Saharan states are, as a result, evanescent and unable to maintain a monopoly on legitimate violence, the defining characteristic of modern states, according to Weber. Always fearing their imminent demise, Reno's "warlord politicians" — such as Doe and Taylor in Liberia, Mobutu in Congo, Momoh in Sierra Leone, Dos Santos in Angola — do not allocate prebends to officials, who might later become rivals. Rather, these leaders create a "shadow

[13] Writing more recently, Joseph (2013) notes that eliminating prebendalism is difficult precisely because citizens in states like Nigeria, Kenya, and Uganda expect their leaders to use political office to benefit supporters. Politicians can actually be punished at the polls for failing to engage in corruption.

state" that relies on foreign corporations and governments to supply revenues in exchange for access to natural resources or, in Liberia's case, a dollar-denominated banking system that facilitates money laundering.[14] To guard against insurgents without risking a coup, these rulers do not build a cohesive officer-corps, but instead depend on mercenaries (many of whom are South African ex-military, who found gainful employment post-apartheid providing private security to mining companies and heads of state) (Reno, 1999, 63).

Reno's cases illustrate how traditional state functions are farmed out to private, often foreign, firms (see table 3.1 for estimates of the size of shadow economies). Consider the role of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company in Liberia, which established its Liberian concession in 1926 when it leased a million acres for ninety-nine years for just over a nickel per acre (Reno, 1999, 84). Successive rulers in Liberia were only too happy to allow Firestone to take on roles typically reserved to the state: Samuel Doe and previous presidents "had brought in foreign firms and aid organizations... to fill in for missing bureaucratic capacity and a local revenue base.... [Firestone] had long assessed and collected taxes, provided housing for employees, managed local chiefs, and enforced local laws." As Doe's eventual successor, Charles Taylor, attempted to seize power in a brutal civil war, he deployed Firestone's communications technology (e.g., their satellite phones) to plan attacks on international ECOMOG forces in the capital — another instance of private infrastructure serving elites' needs (100).

In Zaire (today's Democratic Republic of the Congo), private businessmen paid the army's salaries to protect their businesses; those who did not pay were attacked (Reno, 1995, 19). In other words, the army was not a national army (protection by the state in return for taxes) but rather a private enterprise running a protection racket.

[14] Reno (1999) notes that (oblivious) international donors were all too happy to see state bureaucracies contract, as they regarded these ministries as hopelessly corrupt.

Table 3.1
The Shadow Economy

Region	Average % GDP (1999-2007)
SSA	42
LAC	41.7
SA	34.5
ECA	30.5
EAP	27.5
MENA	27
NA	12.5

Cases	Shadow Economy (2000)
D.R. Congo	48
Sierra Leone	40.2
Liberia	43.2

Source: Dreher and Schneider, 2009

Why did Mobutu refuse to pay his soldiers from state coffers? "He could use his security forces to disorganize rivals, but that risked bolstering military units that could remove him in his weakened state" (Reno, 1999, 158). Mobutu preferred an unruly and fractious military that, while offering little protection, also posed no real threat to his incumbency.

It may not be surprising that shadow states offered little to citizens in the form of public services. Where rulers receive revenues and security from foreign sources, they often see no need to serve domestic constituencies. In 1990 Mobutu allocated just 2.1 percent of government spending to health and education; compare that to 17.5 percent in 1972. As export revenues contracted, he "safely abandoned expensive health care facilities, schools, and public works — all of which served citizens but contributed little to his stock of political resources" (Reno, 1999, 153).

The Political Marketplace

Alex de Waal has been an analyst of, and participant in, several peacemaking operations in the Horn of Africa (a region that includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia) and neighboring Sudan. To set up his most recent book (de Waal, 2015), he reports on the machinations of Abdel Wahid, the representative of Darfur in negotiations with the Sudanese state. Parties to the genocide then in progress were negotiating a settlement in Abuja, Nigeria's capital. Wahid did not devote his attention to negotiating with the mediators or with the perpetrators of the genocide. Rather, he spent his time on a mobile phone with leaders of factions in Darfur determining how much cash they would need to not defect from any deal Wahid might sign. De Waal infers from this story (and many others) that human allegiance can be rented, and African

leaders (whether of countries or rebel movements) need a "political budget" to pay that rent.

While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank may pay attention to the public budget, that's not as consequential as the "political budget," the funds available to rulers for discretionary spending to retain political support. This pot is garnered from state rents, funds provided by businesses, and loyalty payments from foreign sponsors. The political budget is the fuel of what de Waal calls "the political marketplace system," and its supply is a key indicator of regime survival or crisis.

Maximizing the political budget, that is, sustaining cash flow and ensuring that claimants are paid, at minimum cost, is the route to continued rule. There are several rules for success. First, leaders (or political business managers [PBMs], in de Waal's terms) seek to reduce the costs of coercion by building up ties of ethnicity, nationalism, or religion. The more PBMs succeed in building an ethnic base, the more they can save to spend on renting loyalty from non-coethnics. Second, leaders can provide tax breaks for transnational corporations (on crude oil exports or on their acquisition of land) in return for regular deposits in the PBM's account in a tax haven. The PBM can then "round trip" those funds into his political budget back home. Cash flow rather than public service is the coin of the realm.

But African PBMs face challenges, especially from the entrepreneurs of peripheral rebellions. De Waal sees these rebellions as "rent seeking" in that their leaders attempt to stage mutinies or rebellions in order to advertise their intent and determination. To the extent that any rebel leader mobilizes militias that can cause damage and death, he will be able to induce a round of bargaining, done through both violent escapades and peace talks. If quite successful, according to de Waal, the rebel leader could induce the United Nations Security Council to establish a

peace-keeping operation (PKO). The goal of the rebel is to win a "payroll peace," where he is given a promotion and his fighters are put on the army payroll, with arrears.

The result of this continued quest for an adequate "political budget" is a syndrome de Waal calls "turbulence." And we saw this turbulence reflected in the coups and counter-coups where founders were toppled by generals and junior officers. Figure 3.2(a) shows that the first half-century of independence involved over 150 coup attempts. Yet, keen observers will note that these coups, peripheral rebellions, alliance shifts, and tentative peace pacts, while dizzying, have not altered the status quo. As de Waal notes, while every day may seem different for those observing the corridors of power, those who return to the presidential palace after a hiatus of several years will note that everything looks precisely the same (de Waal, 2015, 17). The only differences are the names of the PBMs and perhaps the increasing costs to rent loyalty.

8   *The Costs of Prebendalism*

Prebendalism, shadow states, and the turbulent political marketplace are three characterizations of the failure of many postcolonial African countries to build modern bureaucratic states based on public law and funded with public budgets.

The syndromes were delineated through what might be thought of as clinical observations, but the implications of these syndromes for the health of the body politic remain to be shown. In this section, we examine the systematic failures of African states in the fair distribution of public goods, in the sharing of power across ethnic groups, in election administration, and in the accountability of elected representatives to their constituents.

Public Goods

Prebendalism predicts systematic bias in the distribution of state benefits. What are called "public goods" in theory (i.e., available to all; excludable to none) are in practice biased toward those favored by the country's leader.

Evidence of such a bias has been hard to come by. An important paper by Kasara (2007), in fact, reveals the opposite. She finds that the taxes are higher on agricultural products from the leader's region, and when a new leader comes from a different region, the higher (on average) tax burden moves to the region of the now-current leader. Similarly, Kudamatsu (2007) reports that changes in the ethnicity of the Guinean leader had no effects on levels of infant mortality among various ethnic groups. In a follow-up paper, Kramon and Posner (2013) show that the degree of ethnic favoritism for public goods depends in good part on the country and the type of public good (education, water, electricity, and infant survival). Education in Kenya and Malawi, electricity in Zambia and Senegal, water in Zambia, and infant survival in Benin all show significant payoffs for populations who share an ethnicity with the current president. But education in Senegal and Mali, electricity in Mali, and infant survival in Senegal show significant advantages to non-coethnics of the president. In the four types of public goods in six countries, eleven of the cases (out of twenty-four) show no ethnic advantage.

Yet, other recent work provides more compelling (and distressing) evidence of ethnic bias in the distribution of public goods. Franck and Rainer (2012) study the demographic and health surveys conducted in eighteen African countries over the past fifty years. Combined, these surveys amount to more than a million African respondents. Each respondent was assigned an ethnic cluster, and for

the year of the survey, it was noted whether the president of the country was from the same ethnic cluster. This allowed the researchers to compare improvements among coethnics of the president to changes observed among other groups in the same state — a research design commonly referred to as a difference-in-difference.[15] The authors find that coethnics are more likely to receive and complete primary education and have lower rates of infant mortality. This is the strongest evidence we have of ethnic bias in the dispensing of public goods in Africa.

Ethnic Power Sharing

In allocating cabinet positions, political business managers need to build a robust coalition without running a deficit on their political budget. To that end, they often need to incorporate some non-coethnic ministers (especially when their own group is relatively small) to ensure that their minimum winning coalition (i.e., the cheapest team capable of retaining power) does not face an insurgent challenge.

Testing this notion, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) embark on an ambitious data collection effort, coding for every ethnic group, in every year, whether they were included in the ruling coalition (and, if so, as a junior or senior partner). Those out of the inner circle are classified as excluded, powerless, or facing discrimination. Their "Ethnic Power Relations" data set has nearly 30,000 observations, an observation for every ethnic group in every year. The authors' analysis reveals that the constraints on the political budget are substantial: over half of the groups are classified as excluded from power in an average year (table 3.2). And the consequences are equally powerful: excluded groups are more than twice as likely in any given year (5.1 percent vs. 2.3 percent) to initiate a violent conflict against the state. The probability that groups initiate violent conflicts goes down

[15] This research design exploits over time changes within the same ethnic group, comparing, for example, (1) the change in infant mortality among the Temne in Sierra Leone before and after their coethnic Koroma assumed power in 2007 to (2) the change in infant mortality among other groups in Sierra Leone. This analysis accounts for any static differences between groups (e.g., geographic or climactic features of northern Sierra Leone that affect Temne health outcomes) that might otherwise confound our ability to isolate the effects of coethnicity.

Table 3.2
Ethnic Power Relations in Africa, 1960-1990

Status	Freq.	%
Monopoly	117	2
Dominant	253	5
Senior Partner	722	14
Junior Partner	1,563	30
Separatist Autonomy	6	<1
Regional Autonomy	89	2
Irrelevant	426	8
Discriminated	697	13
Powerless	1,304	25

Unit of observation: group-year.

substantially with income, perhaps suggesting that PBMs in richer states have more ample political budgets to distribute to prevent defection. In many African states, it appears that meager political budgets compel leaders to exclude non-coethnics, despite the violent repercussions (table 3.3).

Status	Pr(Onset)	Pr(Ethnic Onset)	N
≥1 Excluded Group	0.051	0.034	682
No Excluded Groups	0.023	0.007	433

Table 3.3
Ethnic Power Sharing and Civil War in African States, 1960-1990

Unit of observation: country-year.

Electoral Misconduct

As was apparent in the first figure in this chapter (3.1), most sub-Saharan countries failed to introduce meaningful political competition in the first few decades of self-rule. Most elections were in one-party states. When elections were held, fraud served only to amplify the inevitable victory of the incumbent party.

But with the return of real electoral contests in many African states (to be more fully evaluated in part IV), some political business managers have turned their attention to buying votes. The National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) data set provides information on every executive election between 1960 and 1990, including whether they were expected to be "free and fair," whether the opposition was harassed, whether the media was biased in the incumbent's favor, or whether riots occurred (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). Figure 3.7 indicates that, across three of these four variables, Africa lagged most regions in the first three decades after independence. (The likelihood of riots is actually higher in South and East Asia.)

This figure does mask some variation within Africa. According to Afrobarometer surveys, most citizens in

Figure 3.7
Electoral Quality, 1960-1990

Botswana agree that their elections are "free and fair"; yet respondents in Nigeria, Kenya, and Zimbabwe are cognizant of systematic fraud (Collier and Vicente, 2011).[16] Other questions from Afrobarometer indicate that voters in these countries express concern about vote buying, party-induced violence, and fraud. Even in Ghana, which has been a success story for democratic consolidation post-Rawlings, voters report a concern for the violence that occurs around elections. In 2017, Kenyan courts invalidated the presidential tally due to allegations of corruption. If African states are to become full democracies (and escape the middling range of anocratic states), they must ensure that elections permit free expression and political turnover.

Political Accountability

In democracies, one commonly proposed solution for rooting out corruption is transparency. If voters know

[16] According to its website, "Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan research network that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, economic conditions, and related issues in more than 35 countries in Africa."

which politicians are stealing from the public purse, they can punish these bad actors at the polls.

In an ingenious experiment conducted in Uganda, Members of Parliament were evaluated using report cards (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2012). These report cards (see figure 3.8 for an example) were disseminated to civil society groups and to voters in a way that would allow the researchers to gauge their impact on electoral outcomes. These report cards included evaluations of MPs' attendance at plenary sessions, participation in committee work, and in provision of constituency service. Provided with an objective assessment of MPs' efforts to serve the national electorate and their own constituents, researchers expected that voters would punish officials shown to be shirking their duties.

Figure 3.8
Ugandan MP's Scorecard
(Humphreys and Weinstein, 2012)

Yet, while Humphreys and Weinstein (2012) find that harder-working MPs are more likely to be reelected, they do not find that providing the report cards changed voting behavior. To infer this, they examined constituency scores and grades (e.g., Mr. Mutabaali received a score of 57 and a letter grade of C) for each MP. They then looked at the numerical cutoff, say from a letter grade of B and C at 65. From this setup, they could compare sets of candidates who had different letter grades but virtually similar scores (say 64 getting a C and 66 getting a B). They found no difference in reelection chances between these high C and low B candidates. In some instances, it appears that candidates with lower grades were more successful in the next election — for example, candidates with low to middling A grades had a lower probability of reelection than candidates receiving high C or B grades.

Sadly, this experiment suggests that voters do not reward candidates for performance, providing little incentive for elected officials to serve their constituents' interests. Indeed, this lack of accountability if anything helps sustain corruption (i.e., the provision of private goods to ethnic kin) and the failure to provide public goods.

The Prebendal or Shadow State and Its Implications

Formal African states — the ones with constitutions, legislatures, ministries, and UN seats — are not the principal projectors of authority over their populations. Those who have observed the real projection of power see instead informal arrangements that grant prebends to influential regime supporters, that rent loyalty from potential insurgents, and that govern in the shadows of formal institutions. While these governance failures are apparent in corruption measures, they also have consequences for citizens' welfare: public goods are either sold to the highest bidder or distributed to coethnics, electoral competition is limited, and accountability is minimal. Corruption has

become so rife in many African countries, it is now sustained by expectations that someone who assumes power will use that power to reward friends and family. Even if it is not their intention to enrich their kin with the spoils of office, officials find themselves bombarded with requests to help relatives secure access to schools or jobs, and will be scorned by their ethnic kin should they demur (Smith, 2010). We see again the lag in Africa, here in the provision of honest government to its citizens, blurring the grand visions of the independence era.

9   Conclusion

The transition to democracy and the rule of law in Africa, so optimistically envisioned in the late 1950s, was quickly subverted by corruption, ethnic favoritism, budget allocations to purchase political support, the banning of opposition parties, and ultimately the collapse of civilian rule in nearly half of Africa's independent states. The modern state apparatus was visible in the United Nations General Assembly, where African ambassadors voted for the interests of their state and the continent. But, back home, all too many citizens were being ruled by "shadow states" that engaged in extortion and the limited and selective allocation of state benefits. The democratic deficit is an essential feature of Africa's unfulfilled promise, and accounting for this deficit (and that of social disorder and economic stagnation) is a principal concern of parts II and III of this book.

4. Lag in Social Order

THE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL BARGAIN between
state and citizen, going back at least to Thomas Hobbes's
Leviathan, revolves around the provision of public order:
citizens cede authority to a government, which provides
security in return. Some of the coup plotters we met in
the previous chapter pointed to a breakdown of this funda-
mental bargain, justifying their revolutions as necessary
to escape the chaos of civilian rule. Yet, despite the con-
centration of power in a new generation of authoritarian
leaders, these rulers failed to hold up their side of the
bargain. Callaghy (1987) dubs them "lame leviathans"
— leaders with the power to intimidate their people, but
not the power to protect them. The failure to consistently
provide physical security to citizens is another dimension
along which states in post-independence Africa did not
fulfill their promise.

This chapter first illustrates the failure of African states
to provide order. It then explores the variety of violent
conflicts — communal conflicts fought in rural areas, ur-
ban riots, coups, and insurgencies seeking to overthrow
established governments — that demonstrate the limited
capacity of post-independence states to provide security
to their populations. While these different types of con-
flict are often studied separately, we summarize research
which suggests that civil wars and coups both emerge
from the same political logic — rulers facing a zero-sum

trade-off between protecting against threats from inside the palace or in the periphery (Roessler, 2016). Before concluding, and presaging a fuller discussion in part IV, we consider the implications of civil war (versus international wars) for state-building.

While the number of violent conflicts in sub-Saharan African states remains disturbingly high, some observers incorrectly portray the region as a cacophony of violence, with tribe fighting tribe in endless conflicts over identity and (political) status. But, as Fearon and Laitin (1996) observe, this view is radically mistaken. If you consider every neighboring ethnic group in Africa, the probability of a violent conflict between any two in a given year is tantamount to zero. When reporting on ethnic conflict, the press rarely acknowledges just how rare violent outbreaks are given the many zones where ethnic groups meet.[1] Although African states have struggled more to contain conflict than some other regions, our discussion does not imply that violence is ubiquitous. Nonetheless, many citizens in sub-Saharan countries remain insecure, and this chapter reveals the breadth and devastating human consequences of their states' failures to provide social order.

1   African State Failures to Provide Basic Security

Failed states cannot provide basic order. The Fund for Peace constructs a Fragile States Index, which assesses each state's risk of failure. The index consists of twelve indicators (e.g., deterioration of public services, population displacement, widespread human rights violations), each ranked from 0 to 10. The maximum score is then 120, and Somalia once attained a score of 114.9. The average index value for sub-Saharan states in 2010 is just under 90 (see table 4.1), outpacing all but South Asia in the likelihood of state failure. Three African states topped

[1] This is an example of a more general mistake: failing to consider the denominator. To compute the probability of an event occurring (e.g., a conflict or an illness), we need to know how many times it could have happened, even if it never did.

Table 4.1
Failed State Index by Region

Region	FSI (2010)
SA	93
SSA	88
MENA	75
LAC	70
EAP	70
ECA	53
NA	32

Country (Rank)	FSI (2010)
Somalia (1)	114.3
Chad (2)	113.3
Sudan (3)	111.8

the index in 2010: Somalia, Chad, and Sudan. In Robert
Rotberg's (2002) accounting of states that have actually
failed, seven out of eight were in sub-Saharan Africa.

As we see in figure 4.1, these fragile states have fre-
quently failed: in the 1990s, nearly 7 percent of cases (i.e.,
32 of 480 country-years) in Africa were considered failed
states according to the Polity data set. While the Fund
for Peace may rank South Asian states as more prone to
collapse, sub-Saharan Africa saw the highest rates of state
failure in the 1990s.

Interestingly, when it comes to armed conflict, Africa's
report card is not significantly worse than in parts of Asia
or North Africa. These regions have all seen high and
sustained levels of internal conflict since the 1970s (see
figure 4.2 for annual counts of civil and interstate wars).
(Note that with only eight countries in the South Asia
region, conflict in any one state pushes the rate up by
12.5 percent; conflict in one of sub-Saharan Africa's forty-
eight states increases the regional rate by only 2 percent.)
Although sub-Saharan states do not stand out on this in-

Figure 4.1
Percentage of Failed
State-Years by Region and
Decade (Polity)

Figure 4.2
Trends in Armed Conflict by
Region, 1960-1999 (UCDP)

dicator, their performance is hardly reassuring: between 1960 and 2010, thirty-two different sub-Saharan countries experienced at least one internal or interstate conflict according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which defines an armed conflict as "a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths."

And these are not minor episodes of violence. Fearon and Laitin (2003) use a threshold of 1,000 killed to identify civil wars. Using their data, we find that the probability of a civil war starting in any given country and year is over 2 percent in both sub-Saharan states and South Asia — nearly twice the rate in other regions (table 4.2). These conflicts exact a considerable toll: newly compiled data from Fearon and Laitin implies that over

Table 4.2
Probability of Civil War Onset,
1960-1999

Region	Pr(Onset)
SA	0.047
SSA	0.022
MENA	0.016
EAP	0.014
ECA	0.011
LAC	0.010
NA	0.000

six million people died in African civil wars in the four decades following independence. Worse, these deaths are mostly noncombatants associated with collateral damage, refugee starvation and disease, and gratuitous violence against civilians by undisciplined troops.

Readers may think it unfair to compare newly independent African states to long established countries. To be sure, African countries struggled to maintain order in their first years of self-rule. This was equally true in the states that emerged from the former Soviet Union and in North Africa. However, civil conflict in Africa peaked in the late 1980s and early 1990s, three decades after independence. This suggests that order does not inevitably emerge as independence struggles fade from view.

The conflict data reveal that states throughout the developing world have struggled to fulfill their most basic function — namely, to provide security to their populations. While sub-Saharan Africa is not anomalous in this regard, its absolute performance has been lackluster. We now review different types of conflicts, ranging from low-level communal fights to open rebellions against the state, that generate instability in different sub-Saharan states.

2   Low-Level and Communal Conflicts

Many conflicts do not reach the scale of civil wars. Between 1960 and 2014, there were twenty-five "minor" armed conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa — that is, conflicts that claim at least twenty-five battle deaths every year but fewer than 1,000 deaths across the entire conflict. The best available estimates (from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program) suggest that this violence resulted in the deaths of just over 6,200 combatants (table 4.3), the most of any region.

Less than thirty minor armed conflicts may seem like a small number. However, each conflict involves a number of pitched battles or violent acts against civilians. (More-

Region	Minor Conflicts	Total Deaths	Average Duration
SSA	25	6,279	3.7
ECA	17	5,325	3.0
EAP	14	2,632	4.1
LAC	11	3,800	7.0
SA	10	2,985	2.4
MENA	4	1,485	8.8

Table 4.3
Low-Level Conflicts by Region, 1960-2014

over, many episodes of political violence do not result in twenty-five combatant deaths per year and, thus, are excluded from this count.) The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) tracks individual violent events in Africa since 1997 regardless of the death toll. By ACLED's count, between 1997 and 2015, there were nearly 33,000 battles and over 31,000 acts of violence against civilians in sub-Saharan Africa. While a majority of these events involved no fatalities, their collective toll is striking (dominated by the massive death count in what has come to be called Africa's Great War in the Democratic Republic of the Congo): over 590,000 killed.[2]

These low-level violent events include many distinct actors and motivations: terrorist acts, small insurgent groups, abusive army platoons, and violent cattle-rustlers. Yet, scholars have identified classes of conflicts with common motivations. We briefly summarize descriptive research on three common types of low-level conflict: land-related conflicts, electoral violence, and Salafist attacks.

Conflicts Between Herders and Farmers

The war in Darfur started in the early 2000s in western Sudan. While precise figure are elusive, many estimates place the death toll from fighting, disease, and starvation in the hundreds of thousands and the number of internally displaced people in the millions (Minority Rights Group International 2015). This war is often understood

[2] ACLED defines a conflict as "a single altercation where often force is used by one or more groups for a political end, although some instances — including protests and non-violent activity — are included to capture potential pre-cursors or critical junctures of a conflict" (Raleigh, Linke, and Dowd, 2014).

as an ethnic conflict that pitted a marginalized non-Arab population against the politically dominant Arabs who controlled the Sudanese state.

Yet, this intense interethnic violence can be traced to a long-standing economic conflict between camel and cattle herders, who were predominantly Arab, and farmers, who were more often "African" (Faris, 2007).[3] Droughts and desertification in Africa's semiarid Sahel region (between the Saharan desert and the southern savannas) forced nomadic herders to migrate further south in search of water and pasture. Migrating camels and cattle often trampled the crops of farmers in central and southern Darfur (Lefkow, 2004); severe droughts in the 1980s even prompted nomads to establish semipermanent settlements in Darfur's southern regions.

Historically, southern farmers tolerated herders: Faris writes, "the nomads were welcome passers-through, grazing their camels on the rocky hillsides that separated the fertile plots. The farmers would share their wells, and the herders would feed their stock on the leavings from the harvest." Yet, as productive land became scarce, farmers started to obstruct nomads by erecting fences and burning grasses (de Waal, 2004). This competition for resources boiled over into conflict, with episodes becoming increasingly violent in the late 1980s after an infusion of automatic weapons and with the breakdown of intercommunal tribal conferences that had previously resolved disputes. The central government failed to fill the vacuum left by the cessation of tribal conferences; worse still, politicians in Khartoum frequently provided support to Arabs in these conflicts in order to gain favor in factional battles among the ruling elites (Roessler, 2016). This favoritism marginalized the African populations that would later contest the government's authority.

Violence between herders and farmers is not new or unique to Sudan; rather, it is a recurring phenomenon

[3] De Waal (2004) argues that the ethnic cleavage between Arabs and Africans is a relatively recent construction: "In fact there are no discernible racial or religious differences between [Darfurian Arabs and Africans]: all have lived there for centuries; all are Muslims (Darfur's non-Arabs are arguably more devout than the Arabs); and until very recently, conflict between these different groups was a matter of disputes over camel theft or grazing rights, not the systematic and ideological slaughter of one group by the other."

in the Sahel. Studies have documented violent conflicts between herders and farmers dating back to the seventeenth century and ranging geographically from Turkana, Kenya, to Mali, to Senegal (Hussein, Sumberg, and Seddon, 1999).

According to Boone (2014), these conflicts between herders and farmers are merely a subset of land-related disputes. She argues that increased demand for arable land, due to rising population density or foreign investment, has increased the frequency of land conflicts. Poorly defined customary property rights allow chiefs in some countries to sell customary land out from under their constituents, engendering a violent backlash.

Electoral Violence

In his review of conflict trends in Africa, Straus (2012) argues that the declining frequency of large-scale conflicts raises the salience of both land-related conflicts and electoral violence in Africa. According to the African Electoral Violence Database compiled by Straus and Taylor, roughly 20 percent of elections in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2008 were marred by high levels of electoral violence (i.e., targeted assassinations or more than ten related deaths); another 40 percent involved harassment. Most often, it is the incumbent that perpetrates this violence. Between 1990 and 2010, elections in Côte d'Ivoire (2000), Kenya (1992, 2007), Nigeria (2007), South Africa (1994), Togo (2005), and Zimbabwe (2008) led in each country to over one hundred deaths (Salehyan and Linebarger, 2013). While there is no evidence of a sustained upward trend in electoral violence, recent contests do not suggest that this conflict is abating: eleven of seventeen elections in 2011 involved some form of violence, and conflict following the presidential elections in Côte d'Ivoire killed approximately 3,000 (Bekoe, 2012).

Kenya's 2007 election is an extreme instance of elec-

toral violence in a restored democracy: roughly 350,000 citizens were displaced and over 1,000 killed in the violent repurcussions that followed the presidential contest. A peaceful campaign just five years earlier that was largely deemed free and fair by international observers presaged broad acceptance of the 2007 electoral process. However, the eruption of violence following the announcement of the results took many by surprise.

On December 30, Kenya's Electoral Commission declared that the incumbent, Mwai Kibaki, had beaten Raila Odinga by over 200,000 votes. This official result ran counter to pre-election surveys and partial tallies from December 28 and 29, which had Odinga leading. Moreover, Odinga's party won ninety-nine parliamentary seats (relative to the forty-three won by Kibaki's party). For the presidential and parliamentary results to diverge so sharply, many Kenyans would have to have voted split tickets — a behavior that voters rarely reported in post-election surveys (Dercon and Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012). International observers echoed Odinga's concerns, questioning the credibility of the vote tallies.

In the hours after the results were announced, Odinga supporters reacted violently; conflict was reported in five of Kenya's eight provinces and targeted Kibaki's Kikuyu coethnics. This one-sided violence quickly gave way to revenge attacks, with criminal gangs targeting Odinga's supporters in Kenya's central Rift Valley — a region that experienced over half of all reported deaths. Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto (then adversaries; they would later be elected Kenya's president and deputy president in 2013) were both charged with crimes against humanity for their alleged roles on opposing sides of the conflict; charges against Kenyatta were dropped in December 2014. Two months after the election, on February 28, a power-sharing arrangement (brokered by the late UN secretary-general

Kofi Annan) was announced that installed Odinga in the newly created office of prime minister.

This violence not only imposed a heavy human cost, but also crippled the Kenyan economy: tea and flower exports plummeted, tourism dried up, and manufacturing was reduced by roughly a third in January 2008. This episode of electoral violence helps illustrate both an important class of low-level conflict as well as the reinforcing qualities of Africa's lag: manipulated elections incite widespread violence, which in turn hampers economic development.

Salafist Attacks

Islamic fundamentalist movements originating in the Middle East have spread to Africa, and African states have not had the capacity to cauterize the bloodshed and destruction caused by these groups. In sub-Saharan Africa, these attacks have hit Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Somalia, Kenya, and especially Nigeria. In the Sahel, the United States Africa Command has been working closely with local armies and regional organizations to isolate and degrade these threats. In October 2017 one of its patrols was ambushed in Niger, near the Malian border, by jihadists associated with al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. Several Green Berets were murdered. Here we look at a homegrown Salafist insurgency in Nigeria, but also active in Chad, Niger, and northern Cameroon, called Boko Haram (in Hausa, "Western education is forbidden").

Boko Haram, like other Salafi organizations, adheres to a literal interpretation of Islamic texts. The group, however, represents a violent fringe within Northern Nigeria's Salafi community that seeks to install a pure Islamic society in Nigeria and neighboring states. It has aligned its views with groups outside the region, denouncing Western governments and professing a right to violently impose

their strict interpretation of Islamic law (Thurston, 2016, 9).

According to Thurston (2016), Boko Haram emerged from competition among Salafist groups in Northern Nigeria. With Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999, there was a debate in the North about the proper role of Islam in politics. Boko Haram staked out one extreme in this ideological conflict, arguing that Northern states' Sharia codes fell short and, thus, failed to safeguard public morality from western influences and rapid social changes (10).[4]

Since its founding in 2002, Boko Haram has killed 15,000, abducted innocent schoolchildren, and displaced millions from their homes. President Goodluck Jonathan, even after declaring a state of emergency in 2002, failed in his attempts to contain the group with military action and technical support from Western powers. His own military failing him, President Jonathan lent state support to civilian vigilantes (the Civilian Joint Task Force, C-JTF), who have used this power to also abuse innocent Muslims without fear of punishment.[5] With the public disgusted over the failure to eliminate this curse, Jonathan lost reelection against former president and army general Mohammed Buhari, who promised to wipe out the Salafist insurgency. However, in the early months of Buhari's term, Boko Haram continued to cause havoc in northeastern Nigeria, using horrific tactics, such as deploying young girls as suicide bombers to mosques. The African Union and the United States Africa Command are working with Nigerian authorities to eliminate this terrible plague, but again, a weak state has been unable to protect the security of millions of vulnerable Nigerian citizens.

3   Civil Wars in Post-Independence Africa

Large-scale wars fought between insurgent militias and the state are alarmingly high. We classify those that reach a death toll of at least 1,000 as civil wars. Between 1960

[4] This origin story departs from several common — but, Thurston argues, misleading — narratives about the group's rise: poverty (which is rampant throughout Nigeria); political marginalization (Boko Haram emerged and continues to operate under a Northern president); or simply the diffusion of al-Qaida (an organization that the Boko Haram rarely referenced at its founding) (7).

[5] Abuses by the state and its allies are documented in Amnesty International, (2015).

and 2010, there have been forty-three civil wars in Africa
with an estimated 6.64 million killed (figure 4.3). These
include both combatants (on both sides of the conflict)
and the large number of civilians who died while being in
harm's way, or from disease and famine as refugees were
escaping from the violence.

Figure 4.3
Cumulative Deaths from Civil
Wars

Although onsets of civil war in Africa have been rela-
tively constant over the decades, the nature of these wars
has changed. As Reno (2011) illustrates, while past con-
flicts focused on liberation, more recent civil wars emerge
from competition among warlords over the rents from
office.

Anticolonial Wars

During the early European occupation of sub-Saharan
Africa, indigenous groups fought against colonial en-
croachment. The Ashanti (in today's Ghana) fought con-
tinuously against British occupation in the nineteenth

century, with three major wars. The so-called Mad Mullah of Somaliland fought a twenty-one-year insurgency against the British from 1899 through 1920 when his forts were finally bombed by British aircraft during World War I. The Maji Maji rebellion (1905-07) in today's Tanzania fought against attempts by German imperialists to extract value from their possession.

However, by the end of World War I, African colonial states had largely established an imperial peace. (The Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya — a largely Kikuyu movement to retake the European-occupied highlands — being a notable exception.) Even when nationalist movements arose, they were not violently repressed; in fact, most African states received independence without fighting anticolonial Wars. French colonies faced little resistance from the metropole: failed and bloody campaigns to retain Vietnam and Algeria exhausted the French public and armed forces, sapping any will to resist the independence movements in sub-Saharan Africa.

But there were exceptions in Rhodesia (today's Zimbabwe), South West Africa (today's Namibia), and South Africa. These insurgencies opposed apartheid and minority rule by white settler populations and their descendants. There were also independence wars fought against a resolute and nondemocratic Portuguese colonial state in Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique.

These violent transitions to independence led by African insurgent armies had several common features. First, the insurgent armies were constituted mostly of educated young men who saw low glass ceilings in the colonial administration. These ceilings applied to all Africans, and, thus, the campaigns unified different ethnic and linguistic groups.

Second, the insurgent armies did not have access to the arms and technologies of the imperial forces; they needed

external support against modern armies. In South Africa, the African National Congress, the preeminent party demanding freedom from apartheid, never established a "liberated zone" or even engaged the South African army in direct combat. It relied instead on "a loose coalition of grassroots activist groups" supported by foreign governments (such as Mozambique after it gained independence) that provided a degree of cover for the insurgent forces (Reno, 2011, 116). In Rhodesia, insurgents trained and regrouped in relative safety in independent Zambia and Mozambique.

Third (and relatedly), insurgents seeking independence needed to present a united national front to maintain external support, as Western powers were less likely to support a single revolutionary faction than a united independence movement. In the Rhodesia war, presidents Kenneth Kaunda (of Zambia) and Julius Nyerere (of Tanzania) jailed insurgents who did not abide by the unity accords of the two cooperating insurgent armies: the ZAPU (the army of Joshua Nkomo, mostly manned by the Ndebele population) and ZANU (the army of Robert Mugabe, mostly manned by the Shona population). In South West Africa, the nationalist Ovambo People's Organization (OPO) transformed itself into the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) to show national unity and thereby win foreign support. Unfortunately, this unity did not always survive independence, as is apparent in the post-independence violent conflict between ZANU and ZAPU in Zimbabwe.

Post-Independence Violent Breakdowns in Unity

Throughout the postcolonial world, a country's susceptibility to a civil war is at its height in the first few years of independence. This is because minority groups in an independent state fear that newly empowered groups will treat them unfairly. Fearing marginalization, the best time to

seek separation is right away, when the new state is weak. Of course, the leaders of the new state will promise fair treatment, but this promise is not credible — these same leaders can renege on protections for minority groups once they have the power to squash separatist campaigns. Fearon (1998) identifies this inability of newly installed presidents to assuage the fears of minority populations as a "commitment problem."

As we noted above, this so-called commitment problem did not manifest itself right away in newly independent African states. In many cases, colonial armies remained in country (through the institution of secondment) protecting the newly installed governments. However, in what are now Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe, civil wars broke out between minority populations and the inheritors of the colonial state. Here we look at two of the more brutal wars, those of Biafra against Nigeria and RENAMO against FRELIMO in Mozambique.

Nigeria

This war, in which the Eastern Region of Nigeria attempted to secede and declared itself the Republic of Biafra, claimed a million lives through combat and famine. A poignant portrayal of the human suffering — albeit a partisan view of the sources of the war — is Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie's novel *Half of a Yellow Sun*. While one can dispute aspects of Adichie's history, the brutality she portrays is irrefutable:

> Starvation was a Nigerian weapon of war. Starvation broke Biafra and brought Biafra fame and made Biafra last as long as it did. Starvation made the people of the world take notice and sparked protests and demonstrations in London and Moscow and Czechoslovakia. Starvation made Zambia and Tanzania and Ivory Coast and Gabon recognize Biafra, starvation brought Africa into Nixon's American campaign and made parents all

over the world tell their children to eat up. Starvation
propelled aid organizations to sneak-fly food into Biafra
at night since both sides could not agree on routes. Star-
vation aided the careers of photographers. And starvation
made the International Red Cross call Biafra its gravest
emergency since the Second World War. (Adichie, 2006,
296-297)

The strategy of the Nigerian government to abet mass
starvation in a region it claimed to still rule illustrates the
immense human suffering that conflict and misrule inflict
on citizens.

Returning to the origins of the war, readers might recall
Lord Lugard's three-region scheme to knit the different
political cultures of the Hausa-Fulani, the Yoruba, and
the Igbo into a coherent national unit. Several factors led
the Eastern Region (the future Biafra) to defect from this
tortured union.

First, the East was already losing out to the West in the
race for education and, thus, in the competition for remu-
nerative civil service jobs that opened with the colonial
exit. The West was rich in cocoa (and export proceeds
covered the costs of universal primary education), while
the East was relatively impoverished given the low prices
for its palm products. Having its own national govern-
ment would therefore serve the interests of Igbo youth in
the race for civil service sinecures.

Second, in January 1966, the North and West were
enraged by what they saw as an "Igbo coup." As we
described in the previous chapter, General Ironsi's as-
cension, particularly following a coup that claimed no
Igbo casualties, was seen in the North and West as the
beginning of an Igbo-led dictatorship. In response, Igbo
trading communities in the North (in Kano's *sabon garis*
or neighborhoods of internal migrants) were massacred,
sending Igbos a clear message that they were unwelcome
outside their own region. The counter-coup that July, in

which General Ironsi was assassinated, hammered that message home.

Third, massive deposits of oil had been discovered in the Bight of Biafra, in the South South Zone, a non-Igbo portion of the Eastern Region. But by a quirk of constitutional fate, mineral rents were to be shared by all regions; unlike taxes on cocoa exports (which accrued to the the West), oil revenues would go directly to the central government. Worse still for the East, Ironsi's successor, General Gowon, divided the country into twelve new states, and did it in such a way as to disconnect the Igbo majority of the Eastern Region from the oil zones. If the former Eastern Region became a country — a newly independent Biafra — the Igbo plurality would control the future oil revenues.

Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu articulated the East's de-mands for greater autonomy, and the central government, led by Gowon, agreed to a conciliation conference to be held in a neutral site, in Aburi, Ghana. While the regional military governors were all friends from the British Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (and called each other by their pet names), their interests were irreconcilable. The federal forces were growing stronger and, thus, Ojukwu could not wait to see if Gowon would treat the Igbo-dominated states fairly. If Ojukwu was going to secede, it was best to move early. Moreover, he had a promise from Chief Awolowo that if the East seceded, the West would quickly follow and announce its own state called the Oduduwa Republic. Alas, for the East, Awolowo turned coat. He was appointed minister of finance by Gowon, and he created a new currency that impoverished all Biafrans (who could not transfer their savings denomi-nated in the newly defunct Nigerian currency).

With both incentives and the potential for future oil resources, Ojukwu announced secession and moved his army into the zone around Benin — an area between

the East and West — to confront federal troops, thereby sparking a three-year civil war that resulted in devastating loss of life.

FRELIMO and RENAMO in Mozambique

The leader of FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*), Eduardo Mondlane, shared several characteristics with the charismatic founders we highlighted in chapter 1. He was educated abroad, receiving a PhD in the US. He also did not represent the country's largest ethnic group. In fact, Mondlane spent most of his young life abroad and was considered an *assimilado* due to Portuguese and African roots. Nonetheless, Mondlane presented a united military front against Portugal's colonial armies.

Like other anticolonial rebels in nearby Zimbabwe, FRELIMO relied on international support, both the safe haven provided by neighboring Tanzania as well as the support of international aid agencies and the Kennedy administration. Yet, unlike our other founders, Mondlane was never offered the chance to govern; he was assassinated by a bomb hidden in a book. He was succeeded by Somara Moisés Machel, who became Mozambique's first president.

Portugal experienced its own democratically inspired coup in 1974, and with this regime change in the metropole, counterinsurgency operations ceased in the colony. FRELIMO inherited control in 1975. But despite the international acclaim accorded to FRELIMO for its commitment to social and economic development and Mondlane's rigorous commitment to honest government, the young government faced a vigorous challenge from RENAMO (*Resistencia Nacional Moçambicana*).

RENAMO was originally sponsored by the (white-only) Rhodesian government, and later by the apartheid South African government. The Rhodesians resented

FRELIMO for providing safe haven to their insurgents; the South Africans similarly feared that Mozambique could shelter anti-apartheid activities. Other Western governments, as part of their anticommunist foreign policy, also provided early support to RENAMO.

But RENAMO was not a front for entirely foreign interests. The group rallied support domestically from two principal groups: first, traditional elites (particularly from further north) alienated by FRELIMO's attempts to reorganize society through "communal villages" (relocation to government-designed communities organized around cooperative agriculture); and second, urban business classes threatened by FRELIMO's Marxist inclinations. Combining its foreign and domestic support (and running a lucrative protection racket), RENAMO mounted a serious challenge to the state. The civil war (which we discuss in greater detail in chapter 15) destroyed Mozambique's infrastructure and killed 200,000 noncombatants in the fighting and ensuing famine.

The anticolonial struggles, except those in Rhodesia and those against the Portuguese, were largely peaceful, but the unfinished business of colonial separation (in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in Nigeria, in Zimbabwe, and in Mozambique) had bloody implications. In all these cases, the counterinsurgents lost their wars, but the violence suffered by the affected populations was enormous.

Reform ("Second-Liberation") Rebels

The corruption and authoritarianism we described in chapter 3 motivated insurgent campaigns for a "second liberation," to use Reno's phrase. Yoweri Museveni's National Resistance Movement in Uganda and Meles Zenawi's Tigrean People's Liberation Front in Ethiopia are the classic success stories. Paul Kagame's Rwandan Patriotic Front in Rwanda and John Garang's leadership in

the Sudan People's Liberation Army in Sudan also share many qualities of second-liberation rebellions. Kagame's forces were victorious, leading him to the presidency. Garang, in line with the US-sponsored Comprehensive Peace Agreement, became the first vice president of Sudan, but he died in a plane crash a mere few weeks after assuming that office.

Unlike the liberation campaigns against colonial powers, these movements had minimal and inconsistent Western backing. First, the Cold War was ending and, with it, developed countries' intense interest in the internal affairs of sub-Saharan states. Second, these reform-minded rebellions came on the heels of antidemocratic campaigns in the region. Colonel Muammar Qaddafi of Libya supported rebels in Chad, Liberia, and Sierra Leone; South Africa's apartheid government contributed to RENAMO's campaign in Mozambique. Genuine reformists got lost in this maelstrom of insurgencies.

Lacking external backers, second-liberation rebels found few safe havens. The Somali National Movement (based in former British Somaliland) and Sudan People's Liberation Army (based in today's South Sudan) got kicked out of Ethiopia, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Tutsi emigres based in Uganda) faced anti-immigrant hostility. Without international funding or shelter, these reform rebels needed to win support from their fellow citizens in the diaspora and, more importantly, in country. Sympathetic villagers could provide provisions and cover to rebels battling state armies. To cultivate this local support, these second-liberation rebels shifted their tactics, engaging in less looting and violence toward local populations (J. Weinstein, 2007).

A Case of a Successful Second Liberation: Museveni, the NRA, and Uganda

Idi Amin's military dictatorship was a human disas-

ter. Amin's regime killed between 100,000 and 500,000 Ugandans; he also deported 80,000 individuals of Asian, largely Indian, descent. This loss of life and the expropriation of the Asian business class destroyed the economy. Amin's brutality alienated civilians and spurred a mutiny in 1978. Some of the defecting soldiers fled to neighboring Tanzania, where Amin stalked them, invading Tanzania. Amin's army was unable to hold ground against the Tanzanians, who forced Amin to retreat and eventually abdicate power and flee Uganda.

The first post-Amin governments were weak and short-lived; after eight years of Amin's reign, his immediate successor served for less than seventy days. When elections were held in 1980, Milton Obote reassumed power, relying on his close relations with the military. Yoweri Museveni, who had contested the election, charged that the polls had been rigged and launched a rebellion. He organized a militia called the National Resistance Army (NRA) from a coterie of his former classmates at the University of Dar es Salaam, his ethnic kin from the Banyankole group, and Ugandan volunteers trained in the FRELIMO insurgency who had been stationed in Dar es Salaam. They created a base in a part of the country close to the capital (the Luwero Triangle) and slowly built up support from the countryside. Their mission was bolstered when the military overthrew Obote, and the newly installed officers sought to make a deal with Museveni. In December 1985 the government and insurgents, under sponsorship of Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi, agreed on a peace formula that would give Museveni the role of deputy chairman of the ruling Military Council. However, Museveni never laid down his arms and overthrew the military government the following month upon returning to Uganda (Girod, 2015, 102). In 1986, Museveni was sworn in as president. Save for a lingering but brutal insurgency in Uganda's northwest — the Lord's Resistance

Army — Museveni's rule achieved a degree of peace in Uganda not fully experienced since the colonial era.

Museveni's victory, like that of most other reform rebels,[6] brought greater stability. Yet, like the first generation of liberators, these leaders began to see themselves as irreplaceable bastions of their fragile states. Both Museveni and Kagame have amended their constitutions to enable extended terms. As of late 2018, Museveni had served for thirty-two years; Kagame, for sixteen years. In Ethiopia's parliamentary system, there were no term limits, so Zenawi's seventeen years as prime minister — a post he held until his death — did not require constitutional reengineering. Nonetheless, given his repression of opposition politicians and human rights abuses, he is not remembered as a committed democrat.

These second-liberation rebels who attained power may not have brought democracy and the rule of law; but, well connected and indebted to the local populations that supported them, they brought heretofore unfulfilled security to their populations.

Warlord Rebels

If the few second-generation leaders ultimately gained international support, rebels of the next generation were seen as abominations. European and American progressives who stood with the anticolonial and, often, Marxist rebels could not abide those who Reno refers to as "warlord" leaders (Reno, 1999).

Consider Prince Yormie Johnson of Liberia, one of the rebels seeking to replace Samuel Doe.[7] In Stephen Ellis's chilling opening chapter of *The Mask of Anarchy*, we see little resemblance to the charismatic founders of chapter 1. In a drunken state, Prince Johnson and his lackeys visited the presidential headquarters and brutalized Doe to the point of excising his heart and consuming it (Ellis, 2006). These leaders did not unify citizens by

[6] South Sudan's John Garang died in a plane crash before assuming office.

[7] As a master sergeant in the Liberian Army, Doe overthrew William Tolbert, the leader of the oligarchic regime of the True Whig Party, descendants of the American slaves who had resettled in Liberia.

articulating a common future; rather, they cannibalized the state, attempting to destroy or dismantle any person or organization that could pose a threat (including their own bureaucracies). (They built the "shadow states" that we described in chapter 3.) Besides Liberia, warlord leaders terrorized civilian populations in Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Somalia, where several warlords competed for control over the presidential palace after the dictator, Maxamad Siyaad Barre, was overthrown in 1991.

These warlord leaders typically succeeded the personalistic regimes of earlier coup-victors, such as Samuel Doe or Mobutu Sese Seko of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.[8] And unlike the first- or second-generation liberationists (often with Marxist pretensions), these warlords professed no ideology, master plan, or even reformist agenda. These were often former members of the dictator's inner circle (Prince Johnson and Charles Taylor in Liberia are examples) who defected to seize a larger share of the official and illicitly generated revenues flowing to the ruler. They commanded (intentionally) fragmented security forces, bands of militias or foreign mercenaries whose continued loyalty came at a fee (and, thus, could also be bought by a higher bidder). Where rulers could not pay cash, that fee took the form of liberties to tax (read: pillage) certain towns or villages: in Liberia, Lidow (2016) finds that under- or unpaid commanders preyed on local populations.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, these rebel leaders (unlike Museveni or Kagame) did not provide stability. Their fragmented and fickle security forces could not decisively defeat insurgents, who were able to mount campaigns using cheap imports of light arms. Moreover, these leaders did not enjoy the support of a major power. Thus, resolving these long-term and violent stalemates between governments and insurgents fell to the United Nations,

[8] Mobutu also employed many of the strategies that Reno associates with warlord politicians: hollowing out government agencies, concentrating power, and ruling not through a social contract with citizens, but rather through deals with militias.

with the Security Council for a short period of time get-
ting Russian consent to peacekeeping operations under
the leadership of Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan
— a subject we return to in chapter 15.

Case Study of Warlord Politics in Somalia

Maxamed Siyaad Barre is an example of a first-
generation coup leader: a general in the Somali army
who took the reins of power (with Soviet help) after the
overthrow of the democratically elected, but highly cor-
rupt, government of President Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke
in 1969. Both Siyaad and Sharmarke were from the for-
mer Italian colony of Somalia and from the Darood clan
family, albeit from different sub-clans.

Somalia had deep political divisions, despite its cul-
tural homogeneity; nearly all citizens spoke the same
language and subscribed to Sunni Islam. The Darood
favored a united Somalia comprising the North (Soma-
liland) and South, the Somali majority zones of Ethiopia
(called the Ogaadeen), the Northeast Region of Kenya,
and the French Territory of Afars and Issas (today's Dji-
bouti). In this Greater Somalia, the Darood would be the
largest ethnic group. Non-Darood northerners thus stood
to lose influence with unification and nearly derailed the
initial joining of Somalia and Somaliland in 1960.[9]

Siyaad seized upon neighboring Ethiopia's civil war
(which would bring Mengistu to power) to realize his
vision of a unified Somali nation. Using Soviet military
materiel, Siyaad sent his own army to provide support
for the Western Somali Liberation Front in Ethiopia's
Ogaadeen region in 1977. There was early success, but
then Somalia's Soviet patrons switched sides, seeing an
alliance with Mengistu as a bigger Cold War prize. The
Somalis were quickly routed, and the blame game began.
The Isaaq generals were dubbed as traitors, and Siyaad

[9] The majority clan family in
the north was the Isaaq; in the
south, the largest group was the
Hawiye.

ordered the bombing of Isaaq-dominated Hargeisa, the capital of former British Somaliland.

Siyaad survived this chaos using brilliant clan arithmetic and brutal tactics. He faced three clan-based armies, all attempting to seize power in Mogadishu: the army of the Isaaq (the SNM), the army of the Hawiye (the USC), and the army of the Majertayn Daroods, a rival to Siyaad's Mareexaan Daroods (the SSDF). To hold off these forces, Siyaad rented out the Soviet-built air base in Berbera (the port city of the North) to the Americans for their recently created Rapid Deployment Force. This arrangement yielded around $40 million a year in US foreign military assistance. Siyaad used this political budget to purge potential rivals among military commanders and arm disaffected sub-clans within rival clans. By buying allegiances and fomenting rivalries, Siyaad maintained a tenuous hold on power for more than a decade.

In 1991, Siyaad was finally forced from power by a loose collection of rival groups. This power vacuum sucked would-be successors into a conflict among warlords that eventually motivated UN peacekeeping operations.

With Siyaad fleeing by tank to Kenya, the USC army reached the presidential palace before other insurgent groups and, thus, laid claim to leadership. A Hawiye businessman, Ali Mahdi (sub-clan Abgal), was sworn in as Somalia's president with logistical help from the remnants of the Italian embassy staff that remained amid the siege of Mogadishu.[10] Yet, Maxamed Farraax Aidiid, from the Hawiye sub-clan Habr Gedir, had commanded the USC army south of the capital and felt that he should be president as the clan's leading military commander. He brought his troops up to Mogadishu (capturing a delivery of currency printed abroad) and initiated an intra-Hawiye war for Mogadishu. The Issaq-led SNM, refusing to abide by peace talks, returned to former British Somaliland

[10] In their role as UN trustees of Somalia post World War II, the Italians relied heavily on Abgal support and favored them with government and business deals.

in the north and built an unrecognized government in a relatively peaceful region.

Yet, the south devolved into an ungoverned and conflict-ridden region: the fractionalized militias recruited young boys willy-nilly from all clans to man roadblocks and engage in kidnapping, piracy, and extortion to maintain control over neighborhoods or ports. The anarchy provided opportunities for Salafist operatives to recruit. Extortion rather than nation building was the modus operandi for this generation of warlords qua political leaders.

Various institutions have tried to bring stable government to Somalia: UNOSOM (and other acronymed organizations sponsored by the UN Security Council), the Transitional Federal Government (TFG, set up from Nairobi, with North European diplomatic support), the Islamic Courts Union (basically a Habr Gedir counter to the Majertayn dominance in the TFG), the Ethiopian army encouraged by the United States to help bring order to the country, al-Shabaab (a rump group of the defeated Islamic Courts Union), and the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). As will be analyzed in chapter 15, AMISOM has had moderate success in displacing al-Shabaab, but the civil war (technically) continues, and the warlords remain decisive in resisting the restoration of a nation-state.

4   The Relationship Between Coups and Insurgencies

In our discussion we have treated coups and civil wars as distinct syndromes plaguing sub-Saharan states in the generation after independence. Yet, as Roessler (2016) argues, coups and civil wars are both consequences of the same strategic problem facing leaders.

Recall de Waal's political business manager (PBM), who uses the spoils of office to build a loyal base of support and line his or her own pockets. These PBMs

face a difficult problem: they can co-opt other political elites, showering them with cabinet positions or other sinecures in an effort to buy loyalty. Alternatively, they can exclude (or even purge) other elites.

The first choice invites coups: ministers and military commanders can more easily organize and execute coups from within the palace or cabinet room. Thus, with every ministerial appointment, the PBM cannot be sure whether he or she is buying an ally or empowering a rival.

But, the second choice, excluding elites, can provoke external challenges. The surest way to "coup-proof" is for the PBM to surround himself with a palace guard and powerful ministers (in defense and treasury most essentially) made up of ethnic kin. Yet, in this effort to prevent coups, the PBM provokes insurgencies. Elites that are excluded from the PBM's coalition invest in militias, increasing the long-term risk of an ethno-regional rebellion. Moreover, by focusing security resources on preventing palace coups, the PBM diverts attention from managing peripheral insurgencies. In short, the PBM's dilemma is that actions that reduce the short-term risk of internal challenges raise the long-term risk of civil war.

The genocidal campaign in Sudan against the Darfuri rebellion illustrates this Faustian trade-off. In the 1990s, Sudan's president Omar al-Bashir had many Darfuris in his inner circle, and these regime loyalists stood with their president against ethnic kin to forestall an insurgency. However, Hassan al-Turabi, al-Bashir's co-conspirator who helped bring him into power and served as the secretary general of the Islamic Movement, had his eyes on the presidency, and he built up a network of supporters in Darfur. Fearing a coup by al-Turabi and his Darfuri allies, al-Bashir broke ties with those Darfuris in the corridors of power. But by coup-proofing his regime, he effectively incentivized Darfuris to return to their home territories and

provide support for the devastating rebellion that ensued (see Roessler, 2016).

Thus, the outcomes are linked. Coup-proofing facilitates insurgency, as it not only enrages an excluded ethnic group but also weakens the army's counterinsurgency capability due to expenditures for the palace guard. Worse, lack of local knowledge in the terrain of the excluded groups leads the emasculated national army toward indiscriminate violence, inflaming the population that the rebels seek to mobilize. Thus Roessler's key findings (figure 4.4): excluded groups (left) are more likely to rebel; groups included in government (right) are more likely to mount a successful coup.

Figure 4.4
Trade-off Between Coups and Insurgency (Roessler, 2016)

5   Conclusion

There has been an evolution in the types of conflicts waged in independent Africa; wars have become increasingly brutal and state-destroying. There is a logic to many

of these civil wars: elites cannot credibly commit their loyalty to rulers; once inside the halls of power, ministers have an incentive to mount a palace coup. In response, rulers have an incentive to recruit and heavily invest in palace guards comprising their ethnic kin. Unfortunately, this coup-proofing response pushes excluded elites into insurgent action.

As reported by Fearon and Laitin (2003), the fundamental problem of civil war is weak states in which leaders, to protect themselves from their own populations, are less able to protect their populations from rapacious insurgents. Fearon and Laitin point out that weak states rarely have information about their own populations for monitoring purposes.[11] The solution must be capable states that can protect their populations. But this leads to the question as to why African states are "weak"? Why do we have civil wars that do not make states, but rather destroy them? These are questions that remain on our agenda and are the foundation for part II and part III of this book.

[11] Alas, as we know from Jerven (2014), African states lack reliable national statistics.

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